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Abstract 
The purpose of this study is to determine whether or not Sallie McFague's body of God model 
is an adequate resource for a Christian ecological theology. The study endeavours to evaluate, 
test and revise this particular theological model. It is located on the abstract and hypothetical 
level and is thus a non-empirical analysis of McFague's thought. The researcher analysed the 
body of God model by using theological and philosophical resources. Current literature on 
ecological theology was studied in order to formulate thirteen criteria for an adequate Christian 
theology. These criteria were used throughout the study to test the theology that accompanies 
McFague's model. The study analysed three key areas of McFague's thought: cosmology, 
anthropology and theology. It was found the body of God model tends towards reductionism, 
because it does not appear to endorse a coherent complexity hierarchy. This reductionism was 
apparent in the three key areas of McFague's thought. However, it was found the body of God 
model functions as a transformative metaphor that takes into account the social reality that 
affects the health of planet earth. Its strength is a clear orientation towards ethics that takes 
Jesus' praxis as its departure point. The researcher provides suggestions on how the body of 
God model may overcome reductionism. After consideration of the three key areas of 
McFague's thought, the researcher concluded that the body of God model is an adequate 
resource for a Christian ecological theology. It is suggested that this theological model is 
applicable to the South African context in three areas: the socio-economic reality and its 
impact on the natural environment, the land ownership and the issue of racism. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
1.1 Outline of research topic 
The purpose of this study is to determine whether or not Sallie McFague's body of God 
metaphor is an adequate resource for a Christian ecological theology. The value of this metaphor 
is that it favours holism over dualism and thus offers an integrated view of life. This approach 
reflects postmodern ideas of diversity, relationship and reverence for nature. 
1.2 Reasons for choosing topic 
This study is a focus on ecological theology. It is done from a Christian perspective in the area of 
systematic theology. A systematic theology interfaces biblical studies and Christian doctrine 
(classic and comtemporary) with the natural, life and human sciences. The state of the natural 
environment is a central concern for humanity today, particularly in a context of capitalism, 
globalisation, urbanisation and industrialisation. The question that arises for the theologian is 
what sort of theology is needed in order to construct an adequate ecological theology? The study 
provides a critical analysis of the body of God metaphor by addressing the doctrines that 
accompany it. 
1.3 Research problems and objectives 
Is Sallie McFague's body of God metaphor an adequate resource for a Christian ecological 
theology? This is the primary question in this paper. There are three areas that need to be 
conceptualised in this regard: God (theology), human beings (anthropology) and nature 
(cosmology). These influence how human beings perceive the natural environment. In other 
words these three factors need to be understood as being in relationship with each other. In order 
to critique McFague's body of God metaphor it needs to be established what an adequate 
ecological theology is. 
Three secondary questions need to be asked in this regard: 
1. What are the requirements for a Christian ecological cosmology? 
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2. How does a Christian ecological theology understand humankind and its role in creation? 
3. How does a Christian ecological theology address God's role in creation and how nature 
relates to Him or Her? 
The answers to secondary questions (l)-(3) will be provided by using insights from 
contemporary science and several ecological theologians. These criteria will then be used to test 
the body of God metaphor. The strengths and weaknesses of this metaphor will be presented. 
Where necessary and if possible modifications will be made to it in order to strengthen its case 
as an adequate ecological theology. 
1.4 Theoretical framework 
This study may be termed a theological response to Sallie McFague's body of God metaphor. 
It is located under the rubric of systematic theology. There are various other sub-disciplines in 
theology and these include biblical studies, practical theology, history of Christianity, 
Missiology, science of religion and various others. Systematic theology is primarily concerned 
with articulating the Christian faith in a coherent and cohesive manner (Macquarrie 1977: 39). 
The emphasis is thus on doctrine and in this case the God-world (G-W) relationship. This 
means that Christian doctrines relating to cosmology, anthropology and theology will be 
critically analysed in reference to a particular life concern, in this case ecology and how 
humanity is to respond to creation. A systematic theologian has the important task of bridging 
insights from the natural, human and life sciences with Christian theological reflection. The 
systematician is a lateral thinker whose objective is to gain as broad a perspective as possible 
concerning views and opinions about reality. Reality in the context of this study may be 
referred to as natural reality. 
The purpose of this investigation is to provide a critical theological response to the theology of 
Sallie McFague. Because systematic theology is philosophically inclined there is always the 
danger that it may become abstract and disconnected from life. This could result in an 
irrelevant and impractical theology. It is for this reason that a systematic theology needs to 
address a particular situation in life (Sitz im leben). In this manner it will be informed and 
informing vis-a-vis a particular context. Addressing ecological issues thus makes a systematic 
theology contextual. 
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The study is concerned with ecological theology, a form of contextual theology. Other varieties 
of contextual theologies include liberation, black, feminist and African theologies. John De 
Gruchy maintains that all theology is contextual (1994: 9). A theological system develops 
within a particular historical context. Context is thus contagious to theological reflection. In 
order to understand a theology, its social, political, economic, religious and environmental 
atmosphere requires articulation. Contexts are diverse and so are their corresponding 
theologies. Sallie McFague affirms De Gruchy's idea when she writes, 
Theology is, then, contextual-always and inevitably. These contexts are of many different 
kinds and levels...Theology, then, is always theologies, many different understandings of 
God's relation to the world from varying contexts (2001: 66). 
What this means is that there is a multiplicity of theologies. We may thus refer to a theology, 
but not the theology. Sallie McFague's theology is one particular theological response to 
ecological issues. 
A central characteristic of contextual theologies is that they consider practical, real life issues 
and the implications of these for Christian theology. In other words a contextual theology is 
inserted into a particular life situation (Ruether 1991: 362). This situation acts as a screen or 
filter through which the theologian's theorising is passed. The focus of this paper is the natural 
environment1 and the threats and injustices that concern it. A contextual theology such as 
liberation theology identifies who the oppressed are in a particular context. 
Another characteristic of a contextual theology is that it attempts to retrieve elements in 
Christian thinking that assist the theologian to respond to a life issue. On the other hand it 
critiques those aspects in Christian theology that contribute to the life issue under query. 
An ecological theology therefore looks at those elements in the Christian tradition that may 
assist in alleviating the environmental crisis, as well as those areas in its theology that augment 
a negative attitude towards creation (Conradie 2005a: 282). This particular study attempts to 
1 The Oxford Dictionary (1998) defines environment as, "surroundings, circumstances affecting person's life". The former 
definition thus relates to the physical surroundings of a being such as a city environment or natural environment. The latter 
concerns human beings such as the political or financial environment. This study makes extensive uses of the term natural 
environment. Human and non-human beings are located in the earth environment and this signifies that the natural order 
affects both. 
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establish whether McFague's theology does this. Contextual theologies are concerned with 
worldviews. 
Worldviews are pictures of reality that human beings have (McFague 2001: 42). They are the 
assumptions that one has of life and thus act as an interpretive framework. Language has an 
important role in this regard. McFague maintains that, "worldviews are anchored by models or 
root-metaphors" (2001: 42) 
The models McFague refers to here are also known as "dominant metaphors", while root-
metaphors are similar, but wider in range (1983: 23). Metaphors therefore function at a deep 
level within the human psyche. They determine how people relate to one another and the rest 
of creation. One important metaphor is an individual or community's image or concept of God. 
Gordon Kaufman affirms this idea, because he believes our God-metaphor functions as an 
"ultimate point of reference" that assists human beings to interpret the totality of life (1996: 
45). Metaphor is thus crucial in constructing an ecological theology. This study analyses the 
theology that is derived from McFague's body of God metaphor. 
1.5 Method 
Gordon Kaufman asserts that a God image/concept concerns not only existential issues, but 
also needs to consider cosmological queries and interpretations (1993a: 12). He insists that a 
theology that does not take seriously the insights presented by contemporary science regarding 
the universe and the entire created order is irrelevant for the intellectual world and even 
becomes a form of idolatry that has contributed to the ecological crisis. Kaufman asserts that it 
is too simplistic to start with cosmology and then progress in a linear fashion towards 
anthropology and theology (: 13f). Anthropology and cosmology need to be developed 
interrelatedly with theological concerns in mind. In other words cosmology, anthropology and 
theology cannot be treated in isolation. They are intertwined. McFague's views on cosmology, 
anthropology and theology will thus be analysed and tested to determine if they are viable for 
an ecological theology. 
The research is non-empirical and uses theological and philosophical analyses, although 
focusing on the former. Current literature on ecological theology will be studied. By using the 
analyses mentioned and the current literature, the study endeavours to evaluate, test, revise and 
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build on McFague's body of God hypothesis. The approach here is therefore on the abstract 
and hypothetical level and will thus not be a qualitative or quantitative study of the body of 
God metaphor. 
The study will thus attempt to establish if the body of God metaphor can be used as a resource 
for an ecological theology. In order to test McFague's theory, the study will endeavour to 
develop criteria for a sound ecological theology. Insights from contemporary science and 
various ecological theologians will be used in this regard. The body of God is a metaphor 
concerned with the G-W relationship. It is for this reason that the study will focus on three 
areas of McFague's thought: theology, anthropology and cosmology. Each of these will be 
tested according to criteria for an adequate ecological theology. 
1.6 Limitations 
1. The study is non-empirical by nature and therefore remains at the theoretical/abstract level. 
The efficacy of the body of God model in transforming worldviews would need to be 
tested theologically at the church level or psychologically at the phenomenological level. 
2. The second limitation is related to the first. This is a theological response to the body of 
God model. There could be a philosophical or psychological evaluation of it as well. 
3. The researcher is trained in the area of systematic theology and is thus biased towards that 
particular field. A researcher in the field of biblical studies, practical theology or 
missiology may provide a different response to the body of God model. 
4. The study covers three broad areas of Sallie McFague's thought, namely cosmology, 
anthropology and theology. It would be possible, for example, to do a study only on her 
understanding of ecojustice. The study provides an overall analysis of McFague's body of 
God model. 
5. McFague's ecofeminism is not fully treated. Although this is an important aspect of her 
theology, it is not in the scope of this research to addresses this issue completely. 
6. The researcher is new to the field of ecological theology. 
7. The study is located in a Christian context. Insights from other religions are as important in 
addressing issues relating to the natural environment. 
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1.7 Outline of chapters 
Chapter two addresses the issue of religious language and how theological discourse is related 
to this. Sallie McFague's theological method and epistemological framework is determined by 
what is known as metaphorical theology. The study will formulate two criteria for theological 
language and then apply these to three dominant approaches to discourse about God: Aquinas' 
doctrine of analogy, Tillich's religious language as symbolical and finally, metaphorical 
theology. The study will investigate McFague's version of metaphorical theology and its 
relationship to realism and antirealism. 
Chapter three is the most important chapter of this study, because it attempts to develop criteria 
for an adequate Christian ecological theology. Three related areas of study are addressed: 
cosmology, anthropology and theology. The study investigates what is unique for an 
ecological cosmology by using insights from scientific cosmology. It will be argued a 
theocentric cosmology is necessary for an ecological theology. The study addresses the 
doctrine of anthropology by using insights from various scientific and ecological perspectives. 
This is necessary to understand the locality and particularity of humankind in creation. It is 
argued that a holistic anthropology is needed for an ecological theology. Moreover, the notion 
of human beings in God's image is addressed. The issue of ecojustice is presented as a central 
concern for any ecological theology. The study then addresses the relationship between nature 
and history. Chapter three progresses to requirements for an ecological theology. It addresses 
the God-world relationship by arguing that panentheism appears to be an adequate 
understanding of how God interacts with the world for an ecological theology. Chapter three 
then explains the role of the Spirit in the cosmos. Moreover, the study discusses Christ's 
cosmic scope and the significance of a Trinitarian approach for an ecological theology. This 
chapter closes with thirteen tentative theses for a Christian ecological theology. 
Chapter four addresses Sallie McFague's cosmology. McFague's use of scientific insight is 
addressed first. She argues against the machine model as an image for the universe. The 
researcher believes McFague's concerns vis-a-vis this model are appropriate. The body of God 
cosmology is based on the organic model and offers a relational view of life. McFague 
qualifies her version of the organic model with what is termed the common creation story. The 
researcher argues McFague's relational cosmology and embodiment metaphysic are prone to 
reductionism and proposes modifications to these two aspects of the body of God model by 
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using K. Wilber's holoarchy notion and the panpsychism concept of process thought. The 
chapter attempts to establish if McFague's cosmology is theocentric and then closes with a 
reflection on the adequacy of the body of God cosmology from an ecological perspective. 
Chapter five concerns McFague's relational anthropology, which is qualified by the common 
creation story. The researcher contends that McFague's relational anthropology and her 
argument for human particularity seems to have reductionistic tendencies. This becomes 
apparent in terms of the mind-body issue. The researcher suggests that insights from 
supervenience theory, transpersonal psychology and biblical anthropology need integration 
into the body of God model anthropology to counter the charge of reductionism and strengthen 
its case for a holistic view of the human being. McFague's view on sin and the Pelagian 
influence on this are addressed. The study then analyses her understanding of ecojustice, 
eschatology and the relationship between nature and history. The chapter concludes with a 
reflection on the applicability of the body of God anthropology for an ecological theology. 
Chapter six concerns McFague's theology. The study provides support for her critique of 
various models for the G-W relationship. The body of God theology is based on the notion of 
internal relations. According to this view God is internally related to the universe. McFague 
argues her theology is panentheistic and uses agential metaphors to support this claim. Mother, 
lover, friend and embodied spirit are used to describe the G-W relationship. McFague believes 
these provide indications for divine immanence and transcendence. She argues for a 
procreation-emanation view of creation. The researcher argues that the metaphors of mother, 
lover and friend lack conceptual purchase, while the metaphor of God as the embodied spirit of 
the world does not appear to provide a strong argument for divine agency and transcendence. 
The study then addresses McFague's view of creation. By analysing these areas of McFague's 
thought, the researcher will attempt to ascertain whether the body of God model is pantheistic 
or panentheistic. The study progresses to McFague's pneumatology and Christology in order to 
determine the cosmic scope of these doctrines. The researcher will analyse the Trinitarian 
reflection in the body of God model. Chapter six concludes with a reflection on the adequacy 
of the body of God theology for an ecological theology 
Chapter seven provides a summary and conclusion of the previous chapters. The researcher 
attempts to provide an answer to the primary question of this study in this chapter. It concludes 
with a section on the South African context. 
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Chapter 2: The issue of religious and theological language 
Introduction 
Before investigating the theology that accompanies McFague's body of God metaphor, it needs 
to be established whether or not McFague uses an adequate form of religious language. To do 
this, the study will formulate two tentative requirements for religious language. Language is a 
central concern for postmodern thought. Human beings use language to understand and 
interpret their world. The issue that arises for Christianity, a theistic religion, is how discourse 
about God is possible. The etymology of the word theology implies that Christians talk about 
God. But what is the connection between theological and religious language? Moreover, the 
study will test Aquinas' doctrine of analogy and Tillich's use of symbolic language in order to 
strengthen an argument for a metaphorical theology. The chapter closes with a reflection on 
the issue of realism and McFague's metaphorical theology. 
2.1 The relationship between theological and religious language 
John Macquarrie notes that theological language is located under the rubric of religious 
language and is thus part of a particular "form of life" (1975: 7). The concept form of life is 
borrowed from the philosophy of Ludwig Wittgenstein. It is a general activity with which the 
language is associated or a part of. This appears to bear close resemblance to the German idea 
of Sitz Im Leben. Language therefore occurs within a particular life activity. In reference to 
theological talk, the form of life is faith or religion. Theology in this sense is extra-linguistic 
and articulates the life of religion and faith. Religious language is broader than theological 
language, but to understand the specific logic of theological discourse requires that its 
relationship to religious language be understood. Macquarrie puts it well, 
Religious language includes prayer, confession, recital... Theology is a reflective and 
sophisticated kind of religious language, yet any attempt to explain its logic must have 
regard to its connection with religious language (: 7). 
Theology presents religious imagery in an ordered and systematic manner and is therefore the 
intellectual aspect of religious language. This makes theology scientific, although it is different 
in this regard from the natural, life and human sciences (: 8). It is similar to other intellectual 
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disciplines: it explains, interprets, attempts to establish credibility and strives for intelligibility. 
Theology differs from other disciplines, because its subject matter (i.e. God) is mysterious and 
largely beyond reason. 
It is for this reason that religious language uses resources such as image, symbol, metaphor, 
myth and story (1984: 26). Theological language takes these resources and interprets them in 
an ordered, coherent manner. In other words religious language is the primary data that 
theological language uses for its conceptualisation. It is important that religious and 
theological language is kept in a dialectical relationship. This means remaining critical of the 
images- more specifically the metaphors in this case-, which are presented for reflection. So, 
not all of religious language can be taken literally. To do so would result in over-familiarity 
with God and thus idolatry. There therefore needs to be a dialectical relationship between 
metaphors/images and concepts. In other words, there needs to be a balance between primary-
religious and secondary-theological language. Macquarrie views this as a balance between 
existential and onto logical terms for God where the former refers to the reality of God within 
"religious consciousness" and the latter to God's reality described by intellectual means (: 26-
7). Existential terms relate to a subjective experience of God, while onto logical terms consider 
the objective reality of God. 
This is the first requirement for theological language: there should be a dialectical 
relationship between primary-religious and secondary-theological language. 
Macquarrie therefore insists that theological language affirms and denies what is said in 
religious language, it therefore has a "paradoxical nature" (1975: 13). This idea of paradox 
runs through many religious traditions. 
Within the Christian tradition there is the notion that God is both incomprehensible and 
known. John Hick rightly observes that the various religious traditions all understand the 
Real2, the Divine, God or the Ultimate as being unknown and known (1989: 236-237). In all 
these traditions the Ultimate is either characterless or assigned with various attributes. 
Real" is a term used by Hick to relate humanity with the ultimate. 
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The Christian tradition affirms this conjecture (Berkhof 1986: 29f). The church fathers 
appropriated the Greek concept of a perfect Divine Being that is beyond attributes, while also 
confessing that God is revealed in the Logos and is thus known in both creation and the 
salvation process. Scholastic thinkers differentiated God's quid and quails, where the former 
stipulated that God's essential being is unknown and the latter the concept that God's nature 
can be known when God reveals GodseIf through the Divine attributes. The Scholastics 
believed knowledge of God came through General revelation (i.e. unaided reason). 
In the Christian tradition there are the doctrines of "God a se" and God "pro nobis" (: 237). 
The former is the self-sustaining, infinite and pre-creation God that completely transcends the 
capacity of the human mind and is independent of all creation, while the latter is the known 
God who is revealed to humanity as a creator, redeemer and sustainer (Badham 1990: 172). 
The doctrine of God a se and God pro nobis, as understood from Calvin's perspective, means 
that we cannot comprehend God's essence and thus rely on divine revelation to know God at 
all (Berkhof 1986: 29,43f). Luther affirmed Calvin's position and distinguished between the 
Deus absconditus (the God hidden from humanity) and Deus revelatus (God revealed to 
humanity), where the former highlights the inability of humanity to know God's essence and 
the latter signifies the notion that we only know God in God's hiddenness. 
The difficulty with discourse about God is that it needs to take into consideration both the 
unknowability and knowability of God. In other words a form of religious language is needed 
that takes into account what can and cannot be said about God, or, rather a form of discourse 
that highlights God's transcendence and immanence. 
The type of religious language this study is searching for is one that signifies the dissimilarity 
and similarity between God and creation. This of course is a paradox. If theological language 
is of such a nature then is it irrelevant? It is if one type of logic assumes authority over other 
ways of reasoning. This was the position of the logical positivists (Macquarrie 1975: 4). This 
of course is a most unpostmodem view, because it would mean judging truth claims according 
to another form of life. In a postmodern world, each language is invited to present its unique 
type of logic. The logic of theology, as Macquarrie asserted in the above reference to the 
relationship between religious and theological language, can only be understood in context of 
its particular form of life. 
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The study's second requirement for theological language is that it should take into account the 
paradox of God. 
What is needed is a theological discourse that is concerned with both the "is" and "is not" of 
God. In other words this type of language needs to speak of God's presence in and distance to 
the world. This implies that theological language may encourage a panentheistic view of the 
G-W relationship. It will be shown that panentheism could be a useful approach to an 
ecological theology. 
The two criteria for theological language mentioned before affirms Kaufman's understanding 
of the task of theology which is: 
to assess and criticize received ideas of God in terms of their adequacy in expressing 
God's absoluteness and God's humaneness, and to reconstruct the image/concept of God 
so that it will present these motifs as clearly and meaningfully as possible ... so that God's 
presence in contemporary life becomes intelligible (1996:49) Italic's Kaufman's. 
We now evaluate various approaches to theological language according to the above two 
criteria and these include: Aquinas' doctrine of analogy, religious language as symbolic and 
finally, the role of metaphor in religious language. 
2.2 Aquinas' doctrine of analogy 
Hick notes that words occur in both secular and theological contexts (1963: 79). Words are 
defined primarily in their secular setting and thus do not present much difficulty when used in 
that context. However, when these ordinary words are applied to God, problems arise. Does 
God "speak" or "forgive" in the same manner that human beings do? 
The Scholastics addressed this issue in their doctrine of analogy and Thomas Aquinas deserves 
special attention in this regard. B. Davis notes that Thomas' doctrine of analogy was developed 
in light of his doctrine of God, where God is understood to be, "infinite, incomprehensible, and 
entirely simple" (2004: 148) 
Thomas indicated two primary ways of applying words to God and creatures (: 148ff). He 
believed that a word is not used univocally when applied to both God and a created being. The 
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word univocally means that a word is being used with precisely the same meaning when 
applied to two subject matters. For example God is not "faithful" or "love" in the same manner 
that humankind is. Neither is a word used equivocally in its application to God and human 
beings. Equivocally means a word is being used with completely different meanings when 
referring to two objects. Thomas found univocal and equivocal language to be inadequate. 
He thus had to find a third way of relating words to God that would be located between 
univocal and equivocal language. Words can thence be applied to God and creatures in an 
analogical manner (Hick 1963: 80ff). With analogical language there is a strong sense of 
correspondence between two terms or qualities when applied to God and human beings. 
Qualities such as love, courage, compassion, wisdom or goodness are, from a human 
perspective, weak distortions of the Divine qualities. If God is perfect then it means God has 
actualised these qualities. For human beings the qualities are in a state of potential, but the 
qualities that God possesses corresponds to the qualities that humankind possesses. In other 
words these qualities differ only in degree. When a word is applied to both God and 
humankind it differs in degree, but not in definition. Why can words and terms be applied to 
God and creatures? What is the relationship between God and creatures? 
Davis indicates that Thomas believed the relationship between God and creatures was of a 
causal nature (2004: 149). Creatures and their properties are derived from God. God causes 
them into existence. This means that the properties they possess are as a result of the first 
cause, which is God. There are therefore similarities between God and creatures. We are thus 
able to sometimes apply words to God and humankind. 
Alister McGrath elucidates the idea of similarity and correspondence in analogy (1994: 253-
55). Fundamental to the doctrine of analogy is the notion that God created the world and there 
is thus an analogia entis (i.e. "analogy of being") between God and world; it thus appropriate 
to use "entities" within creation as analogies for God (: 253). An analogy therefore functions as 
a pointer to God; it does not attempt to reduce God to the level of the entity, as the entity is not 
identical to God. It is apparent that analogy attempts to find similarity and correspondence 
between God and creatures. Words, terms and qualities can be applied to both God and 
creatures in an analogical way. McFague observes that the doctrine of analogia entis, although 
a medieval doctrine, has led to a "symbolic sacramentalism" that still pervades contemporary 
Catholic thinking, which at a surface level signifies the distinctive nature of reality, but at a 
- 13-
deeper level understands all reality to be connected to the extent that everything can become "a 
symbol of everything else" (1983: 12). The focus of this symbolic sacramentalism is a God 
who created all that is. Everything is thus a reflection of the divine. Analogical language is 
thus built on an edifice of the similarity of God and creation. 
How does Aquinas' doctrine of analogy meet the two criteria for theological language? In 
relation to the first criteria this doctrine appears to be a highly conceptual form of discourse. 
Thomas' three main predications for God as infinite, incomprehensible and simple indicate 
that his system is primarily concerned with the objective reality of God. The difficulty for 
Thomas was how to move closer to the existential pole of the dialectic. He attempted to do 
this, but seems to remain closer to the conceptual-theological pole. This seems to be due to an 
overemphasis on the transcendence of God. In terms of the second criteria, Thomas' position 
attempts to resolve the distance he encounters between God and the world. The doctrine of 
analogy tries to overcome this imbalance by over emphasising the similarity between God and 
creatures. Analogical language therefore does not appear to adequately address the 
dissimilarity between God and humankind. It therefore does not address the issue of paradox in 
theological language. 
2.3 Religious language as symbolic 
An important advocate of the symbolic nature of religious language is Paul Tillich. He 
developed this aspect of his thought according to his theological method known as the "method 
of correlation" in volume one of his Systematic Theology (1968: 67). Tillich makes an 
existential analysis and then shows that various Christian symbols provide answers to these 
existential concerns. The method of correlation thus permits Tillich to use theological language 
in his system, as it attempts to find a balance between the existential and the essential (i.e. the 
ontological). 
How symbols function in Tillich's system is significant. He makes a distinction between sign 
and symbol (: 265). While both point to something beyond them, a sign has an external 
connection to that which it points. An example would be a stop sign that signifies drivers are 
meant to stop. A symbol has a participatory connection with that to which it points. It therefore 
participates with its reference point. 
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Where do these symbols come from? They develop out of the collective unconscious (: 190)3. 
Tillich appears to be using Jungian analytical psychology in his analysis of symbol. A symbol 
in this way is able to expose depths of reality and elements of the soul that are usually closed 
off from human beings. 
For Tillich the focus of religious faith is the "ultimate concern" (: 14). This faith expresses 
itself in symbolic language. He maintained that there is only one literal statement for God: God 
is being-itself (: 261). All other statements are symbolic. 
A symbol is something that occurs in finite reality and is a sector of this reality (: 265). It 
appears to address the issue of similarity and dissimilarity and Tillich writes, 
a symbolic expression is one whose proper meaning is negated by that to which it points. 
And yet it is also affirmed by it, and this affirmation gives the symbolic expression an 
adequate basis for pointing beyond itself (: 265). 
Hick presents a comparison between Aquinas' doctrine of analogy and Tillich's use of the 
symbolic nature of religious language (1963: 83). Both approaches have a negative aspect: 
when human beings speak of God they do not use literal or univocal language. Terms and 
words are formed from an experience of finitude and can thus not be adequately applied to 
God. Both Aquinas and Tillich's approaches safeguard theological language from turning God 
into a human being and thus retard idolatry. 
How does Tillich's theory about the nature of discourse about God face up to the two criteria 
for theological language? Tillich's method of correlation clearly signifies a strong conceptual 
framework for theological language. It forms a dialectical relationship between existential 
issues and God's essential nature. It highlights the notion that the human subject's existential 
concerns are overcome by certain symbols pointing to the divine reality. There appears to be a 
problem with Tillich's use of symbolic language and the issue of paradox. It seems as though 
his insight on this matter depends on the concept of a symbol participating in the reality to 
which it points (i.e. Being-itself). For a symbol to be negated and affirmed by the reality to 
which it points, it needs to participate in that reality. In other words if Tillich could 
3 This is taken from volume two of Tillich's Systematic Theology. Subsequent references to Tillich are from volume one. 
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demonstrate how exactly this process occurs then his approach to theological language would 
be able to accommodate the concept of paradox. 
However, Hick notes that Tillich does not "define or clarify this central notion of 
participation" (1963: 83). Tillich does not illustrate how different symbols participate in 
Being-itself. For example does "God is good" participate in Being-itself in the same manner as 
another religious symbol? Or do non-religious symbols participate in their ultimate concern in 
the same way that a religious symbol does? Tillich believed that everything that exists 
participates in being-itself, so what is the difference between the way a symbol does this and 
the manner in which other things do so? Tillich is not clear about this. His approach should 
thus be used with caution. 
2.4 Metaphor in religious language 
The word metaphor is composed of two Greek words: Meta ("trans") and pherein ("to carry") 
(Soskice 1985: 1). The word was originally used to explain how a word could be extended, so 
that it could be transferred from a primary to a secondary application. 
The exact difference between metaphor and analogy is disputable (McGrath 1994: 255). A 
definition for metaphor is thus important. 
Janet Soskice defines a metaphor as, 
that figure of speech whereby we speak about one thing in terms which are seen to be 
suggestive of another (1985: 15). 
Max Black defines a metaphor as that which, 
has the power to bring two separate domains into cognitive and emotional relation by 
using language directly appropriate to the one as a lens for seeing the other (in Fretheim 
1984: 5). 
Sallie McFague writes, 
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a metaphor is seeing one thing as something else, pretending 'this' is 'that' because we do 
not know how to think or talk about 'this', so we use 'that' as a way of saying something 
about it (1983: 15) Emphasis McFague's. 
It was noted in chapter one that a worldview is deeply influenced by language. A consideration 
of culture/religion and the language specific to this takes seriously the role that metaphors, 
images, symbols, myths, signs and analogies play in a construction of reality. These are thus 
all important for a worldview. In other words this study takes seriously the role religious 
language plays in relation to how creation is perceived. Metaphors thus influence perception. 
In other words the cognitive or extra-linguistic function of metaphor is important and this will 
thence influence a definition of metaphor. Terence Fretheim writes, "the power such 
metaphors have in the shaping of thought and life is not always recognised" (1984: 9) 
Soskice asserts that a metaphor is not a "mental event" and that any psychological terms in its 
definition lead to misunderstanding (1985: 16). She believes that a study of metaphor must 
begin in the linguistic context. However, if metaphor is viewed only in this manner, its 
transformative function is reduced. A metaphor is something that changes someone's 
perspective and thus results in "transformation and revolution" (McFague 1983: 18). In other 
words metaphors are powerful enough to change a worldview. The reason for this is that 
metaphors are embedded in the mind. They act as datum checks. 
Black's definition states that metaphor is a "lens for seeing the other". In other words this 
definition takes seriously the role metaphor has in worldview construction. A metaphor's 
extra-linguistic significance is thus presented. Perception is taken into account. In addition to 
this Black's definition refers to both the cognitive and emotional aspects of metaphor. There is 
thus a concern for conceptual and emotional parts of language. This is important for 
theological-conceptual and religious-existential language. 
McFague's definition also considers the significance of perception, as she refers to seeing one 
thing as. This means that the relationship between worldview and metaphor is a close one. 
Soskice's understanding of metaphor is that it is possible to "speak" about one thing in terms 
of another, whereas McFague believes "seeing" one thing in terms of another is important. In 
other words a metaphor influences a human being's outlook on life. A familiar way of 
understanding one object is used as a vehicle to perceive another object. 
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Black and McFague's definitions for metaphor are significant for this study, because they 
relate to the hermeneutical aspect of human life. How does a metaphorical approach relate to 
the two criteria for theological language? 
The use of metaphor in theology means that it is appropriate to use the term "metaphorical 
theology" (McFague 1983: 14). These terms imply that there is both a primary-religious and a 
secondary-theological tendency in this particular theological method. This needs explanation. 
McFague maintains that there is a multiplicity of metaphors in the Christian tradition and that 
to get a broad view of the God-human relationship; a "piling up" of these is necessary (: 20). 
This also should prevent the over emphasis on the similarity between God and world of certain 
metaphors which may result in idolatry. In other words a metaphorical theology should prevent 
over-literalisation of metaphors. Fretheim affirms McFague's view on this and warns theology 
cannot be satisfied with a "limited fund of metaphors" (1984: 8). 
McFague suggests that theology must "move beyond" the metaphors of religious language and 
interpret them for the current context (: 23) . In other words McFague is indicating that the 
theologian must start with the metaphors provided by religious language and then progress to 
the conceptual pole of theological language. 
McFague suggests that the term model denotes the move from religious language to 
theological language (: 23). A model combines metaphorical language with conceptual 
language and thus represents characteristics from both. It is thus a step towards conceptual 
language. It combines the existential and ontological realities that Macquarrie mentioned 
previously. For McFague a model is a "dominant metaphor" that endures and lasts; one such 
model being "God our father"(: 23). This is a metaphor that has developed into a model. This 
model is open to interpretation and has a variety of supporting metaphors, so that an entire 
theological system can be constructed from it. It has personal, relational imagery and the 
potential of being developed into an ordered theology. 
4 Gordon Kaufman maintains theology's purpose is to find an adequate image or concept of God that is commendable to the 
current context and its issues (1996: 44). In order to do this the theologian needs to critically analyse previous biblical 
interpretations, doctrines and dogmas so that these do not become "ultimate authority" (: 44). 
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Soskice's understanding of model is the converse of McFague's. She asserts that model and 
metaphor are different (1985: 55). The latter is derived from the former. In other words 
metaphorical discourse is based on models. A model is not necessarily linguistically orientated. 
For example the fatherhood in God's fatherhood is the model. If it is said that God loves his 
children then this is metaphorical language based on the model of fatherhood. However, the 
difficulty with this approach is that it considers metaphor to be only a figure of speech, as was 
noted previously. Soskice's approach implies that metaphor cannot become theological, as it is 
not able to move towards the theological conceptual pole. 
Ian Barbour also argues that models have a dialectical relationship between metaphor and 
conceptual language (1990: 45-6)5. Concepts are abstract, whereas metaphors emphasise 
experience and occur in the form of a symbol in the context of worship. Models are more 
developed than metaphors and not as abstract as concepts. Barbour sees continuity between 
religious and scientific models. Both use analogies in the form of metaphors or symbols and 
develop these into models. Religious and scientific models can be extended so that they 
include theories, they can thus be adapted and modified in light of new phenomenon and 
experiences. This gives models an open-ended characteristic. Both models give a unified view 
of diverse theories. In other words models summarise and present a broad view of "complex 
relationships" (: 42). These insights from Barbour indicate that science and theology are able 
to converse. This reinforces McFague's contention that models form a dialectical relationship 
between metaphors and concepts. 
Another important characteristic of metaphor is its emphasis on similarity and dissimilarity; a 
metaphor can be understood if these two factors are taken into consideration (Fretheim 1984: 
5; Brown 1982: 39-56). McFague writes, 
thinking metaphorically means spotting a thread of similarity between two dissimilar 
objects, events, or whatever, one of which is better known than the other, and using the 
better-known one as a way of speaking about the lesser known (1983: 15). 
Metaphor is thus different from analogy. The latter endeavours to find continuity between two 
terms or objects, while the former acknowledges continuity and discontinuity between them. 
Metaphor thus uses analogy, but is not the same as it. In regard to theology, a metaphorical 
5 Clayton also affirms McFague's use of models (2000: 14-18). 
6 It must be noted here that metaphor uses analogy, however the two are not identical. 
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approach stresses God transcendence and creation's finite nature, as well as God's continuity 
with creation (: 13). Fretheim maintains that metaphors cannot fully capture the full reality of 
God, as there is a distinct distance between God and the images/concepts for Him or Her. 
However, metaphors do contain information about God (1984: 7-8). 
Fretheim observes that there is a relationship between metaphor and essentialist construction 
(: 7). A metaphor should not be understood literally, but there is a degree of literal 
understanding in it. Fretheim believes that a metaphor may be considered literal when it 
implies that God is related to the world. In other words metaphors that highlight God's love 
and goodness should be taken literally. However, metaphors do not fully describe God. They 
indicate that there are discontinuity between God and creation. This type of thinking speaks of 
the "is" and "is not" of God and creation or of the "yes" and "no". 
McFague believes symbolic-sacramentalism in Catholic thought is different from a 
metaphorical theology. Symbol here is simply a "solidification of metaphor" where the tension 
in metaphor has been reduced so that similarity is emphasised (: 16). Metaphor is for this 
reason able to bring about surprise, as it is unconventional. It therefore invokes a response or 
judgement in the hearer of the metaphor. This is often not the case with analogy or symbol. A 
good metaphor is thus thought provoking. It evokes a certain attitude towards that to which it 
is referring. 
This signifies the objective of a metaphor. It is meant to change a current point of view about 
something and thus induce judgment. A metaphor is thus characterised by, 
ordinariness, incongruity, indirection, skeptism, judgement, unconventionality, surprise, 
and transformation or revolution (McFague 1983: 18). 
In other words a metaphor is meant to change a worldview. This means that an analysis of 
metaphor should not merely be governed by the rules of formal logic. A metaphor may well be 
tested according to such criteria. In addition to this a metaphor needs to be understood 
according to its particular type of logic. It uses paradox to bring about a sense of surprise or 
conflict. There is a sense of tension about it. 
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This tension is what intrigues Paul Ricoeur. For him metaphors are significant, because they 
are able to generate new meanings about their reference points (Fodor 1995: 157). Ricoeur 
makes use of Monroe Beardsley's controversion theory to show that what appears to be 
contradictory in a metaphor is used to generate meaning. A metaphor has a place for logical 
absurdity. Metaphor is therefore a type of "category mistake" or "calculated error" (: 157). The 
reader or hearer notes that the metaphor is absurd and therefore must choose either a literal 
understanding, and believe that the metaphor is absurd, or discover a new meaning for it so 
that it makes sense. It was noted before that certain metaphors may be taken literally, such as 
God is living, loving and good. However, some cannot. Consider the metaphor, God is a 
mighty mountain. To refer to God as a mountain is absurd. This metaphor causes a sense of 
surprise. It therefore shows that there is more to this than a literal rendition. What appears to be 
implied here is that God is majestic, strong and stands above everything. There is thus 
similarity and dissimilarity in this particular metaphor. 
It is for this reason that a metaphor may be considered open-ended and contextual (Brown 
1982: 39-56). They cannot be fully conceptualised and reduced to propositional statements. A 
metaphor is therefore dynamic. Its meaning will be influenced by the context that interrogates 
it. A. McGrath summarises this idea well when he says a metaphor, 
cannot be reduced to a set of precise statements about God, valid for every place and every 
time. It is meant to be suggestive, allowing future readers and interpreters to find new 
meanings within it (1994: 256). 
Metaphorical theology is a form of discourse that finds a balance between religious language 
and theological language. A model is both metaphoric and conceptual. It allows the theologian 
to construct concepts about God, while taking the issue of paradox into consideration. A 
metaphor considers both the "is" and "is not" of God. This manner of discourse appears to be 
appropriate, as it meets the requirements of the two criteria. 
McFague's use of metaphor is thus justified, because she makes use of models that 
demonstrate the paradox of God7. 
7 McFague appears to be a postmodern thinker. In order to articulate why there is such diversity in terms of life views, 
postmodern thought highlights the role that language, culture and religion play in any construction of reality. Truth is 
determined by language/culture and because these vary so do truth claims (Greer 2003: 225). Modernism is contrary to 
postmodernism in this regard. For Immanuel Kant the four categories of quantity, quality, relation and modality fulfilled 
this function (Thilly 1955; 424). According to Kant the categories are aprioi and thus universal and invariable. 
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H. Paul Santmire insists that it is important to discover a "root-metaphor" that addresses 
ecological and political concerns (1995: 60)8. This study will endeavour to establish if 
McFague's metaphor does this. 
2.5 Realism and McFague's metaphorical theology 
McFague's metaphorical approach to theology raises the issue of realism. A convincing 
argument for a metaphorical theology is that it takes worldviews into consideration. 
McFague's body of God model may change the way human beings view the natural order. This 
is its great strength. But does this mean that reality is only a construct of the mind, or is there 
really something out there? 
Realism is the view that objects that exist and are under investigation are independent of the 
mind (Craig 2000: 744). Realism therefore relates particularly well to physical facts. For 
example, the amount of people living in a country is a fact. Atoms and molecules do exist. 
There are a certain number of planets in the solar system. 
Realists believe, metaphysically speaking, there are fixed ontological realities to which human 
beings may refer and the manners in which humans construct reality bridge them with the 
world. As the researcher understands it, this means realists attempt to connect Kant's 
noumenal and phenomenal realities. The realist position affirms that different paradigms must 
be compatible, because they are orientated towards the same ontological reference points 
(Greer 2003: 242). 
Critical realism is a realist position (Barrett 2000: 135). According to this approach the subject 
matter or object under investigation is not merely a construct of the mind, but exists externally 
to it. This type of realism is critical, because it affirms the notion that the mind provides 
"conceptual filters" in order to acquire knowledge of the subject matter or object (: 10). 
Critical realism is contrary to naive realism, which proposes that the mind's models and the 
reality, to which they refer, correspond precisely. Critical realism therefore acknowledges that 
knowledge is provisional. 
Kaufman acknowledges the importance of metaphors in theological discourse, but stresses the need to de-reify those that 
may lead to oppressive situations (1993b: 95-115). 
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Antirealism denies the realist position (Craig 2000: 744). It maintains that there are no 
onto logical reference points and reality is simply a construct of the mind. There is therefore no 
reality outside of the mind. As the researcher understands this position, antirealists remain in 
Kant's phenomenal reality . Antirealism is an appropriate epistemological position for 
postmodern thought, because it does not assume an absolute, external reality. 
How do these insights relate to McFague's theological method? She insists her metaphorical 
theology uses metaphors and models that do not describe reality or God. Moreover, a metaphor 
or model's purpose is not to achieve logical accuracy, but to alter how human beings view 
reality. The advantage to such an approach is it offers the theologian a wide scope for 
imagining the G-W relationship, but what are the limits to this? More specifically, does a 
metaphor alter a human being's worldview or is it God's grace that achieves this? This concern 
relates to the issue of conversion. Does a gracious God initiate a conversion process in the 
self s life or is it a metaphor that does this? In other words, does God have a role in influencing 
how human beings view the natural order? McFague does not appear to be clear on these 
issues. She insists it is metaphors that determine how human beings relate to the natural 
environment. From this perspective the body of God model appears to be a form of 
antirealism. 
McFague, as will be shown, believes God is permanently incarnated and that incarnation is a 
part of God's very nature. She appears to endorse a form of general revelation in this regard. 
This would imply that McFague does acknowledge the notion of God beyond the mind. The 
idea of God revealing Him or Herself needs to be integrated into McFague's theological 
method in order to respond to projectionist theorists who claim God is simply a projection1 of 
the human mind with all its longings, desires and intentions . By stressing divine revelation 
and the role of metaphor, McFague's epistemology may then be adapted to a critical realist 
position. If this adaptation is not made to McFague's metaphorical theology it will remain on 
the phenomenal side of reality. J. Bracken highlights the danger to such an approach, 
9 Antirealism thus appears to be a close cousin of idealism. The idealist would assert that mind is the fundamental reality and 
that physical reality is dependent on it even if a reality beyond the mind is proposed (Sprigge 2000: 379). 
10 C. Gunton defines projection as, "the function of descriptive language as not so much describing the world as projecting 
upon it patterns of interpretation" (1992: 66). He argues there is a large degree of this in McFague's metaphorical theology. 
1' D. Bromell believes a metaphorical theology does not prove, "that there is, independent of our projection of possibilities, 'a 
personal, gracious power who is on the side of life'" (1993: 499). 
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For, taken literally, this metaphorical approach to theology effectively confines the 
discipline to a phenomenology of religious experience which says nothing about God as 
the reality to which religious experience ultimately refers (2002: 365). 
These reflections merely signify the danger for any metaphorical theology. There appears to be 
sufficient resources in McFague's theology to modify the body of God model so that it 
becomes a critical realist position, for example her use of incarnational theology . This will be 
addressed in the study's theological reflection. It is not within the scope of the study to modify 
McFague's metaphorical theology. The researcher has merely indicated one of the dangers to 
her theological method: the body of God model's bias towards antirealism. 
Conclusion 
Two criteria were formulated to address the validity of McFague's metaphorical theology. It 
was argued that theological language should balance primary-religious and secondary-
theological language. This is necessary so as to emphasise the conceptual aspect of theological 
discourse. Moreover, theological language should be of such a nature that it addresses the 
paradox of God. Aquinas's doctrine of analogy and Tillich's notion of religious language as 
symbolic are problematic vis-a-vis the two criteria for theological language. McFague's 
metaphorical meets these two criteria, but the researcher argued that it may be a form of 
antirealism. It was suggested that the notion of divine revelation needs to be stressed in 
McFague's theological method if it is to counter this charge. 
12 M Taylor insists a metaphor takes similarity seriously and affirms the notion that there is a disclosure of the unknown even 
though language is often inadequate to understand this. He maintains a metaphorical theology should be both sacramental and 
prophetic (1984: 470). McFague appears to achieve this as will be shown in the section on cosmic Christology. 
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Chapter 3: An adequate Christian ecological theology 
Introduction 
This chapter is the most important section of this study, because it endeavours to formulate 
criteria for a Christian ecological theology. These will be used through the study to test 
McFague's body of God model. The body of God model has significant claims about 
cosmology, anthropology and theology. The chapter begins with a reflection on cosmology and 
what is specific about an ecological cosmology. Ecological theologians make extensive use of 
scientific cosmology. The study therefore discusses insights on the nature of the universe from 
various scientist-theologians. It will attempt to establish what is unique for a Christian 
ecological cosmology. The study then addresses what should constitute a Christian ecological 
anthropology. Ecological anthropologies study humankind's position, particularity and role in 
the cosmic community. Moreover, they endorse a holistic view of the human being. The study 
indicates what the term imago Dei means from an ecological perspective. The term ecojustice 
is then introduced to highlight humankind's unique responsibility vis-a-vis the natural order. 
The study explores the relationship between nature and history. The chapter proceeds to a 
refection on ecological theology. The study will argue that panentheism should be the basis for 
an understanding of the G-W relationship. This is necessary to preserve divine transcendence 
and immanence. The study discusses the role of the Spirit and then Christ in cosmic processes. 
There is then a discussion on a Trinitarian ecological theology. 
The chapter concludes with a layout of thirteen propositions. Insights from the cosmological 
reflection are used to formulate three requirements for a Christian ecological cosmology. Six 
criteria for a Christian ecological anthropology are then presented, while insights from the 
theological reflection are used to formulate four requirements for an adequate Christian 
ecological theology. 
3.1 Ecological cosmology 
Before attempting to develop a framework for an ecological cosmology, an understanding of 
the words ecology and cosmology is needed. The term ecology was first used by the German 
biologist Ernst Haeckel (1834-1919) and is constituted by two Greek words: oikos ("house") 
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and logos ("word", "study" or "reflection") (Boff 1995: 9). The oikos in this regard is the 
habitat in which human beings, other organisms and inanimate beings are located. Ecology is a 
study of the relationships that occur between these three. It is therefore about relationships and 
attempts to view creation in a synthetic, rather than in an isolationistic/analytical manner. 
Ecology therefore poses a challenge to modernity, which is primarily analytical. It is most 
concerned with the connectedness of life and is thus holistic (1997: 4If). 
Holism is a term coined by the South African statesman and philosopher, JC Smuts (1870-
1950) (Merchant 1995: 83). It was in the book Holism and Evolution (1926) that Smuts 
described the characteristics of holism in order to differentiate it from a mechanistic 
worldview. Holism promulgates the idea that parts affect the whole. 
It views reality as dynamic, creative and synthetic (Le Roux 1987: 104). This ability to 
synthesise is, however, not completely controlling by nature. Smuts still wanted to include the 
concept of diversity into his idea of holism. Entities are related to one another in many ways, 
but they still retain their unique character. Moreover, these entities influence the whole. They 
have their own reality and also influence and are influenced by broader reality. 
This means, from a holistic perspective, the whole is greater than the sum of its parts (Boff 
1995: 11). Natural reality is able to synthesise and complete the components in a whole. 
Moreover, it can relate a whole to an even broader whole. Holism therefore views the whole, 
which is derived from the "organic interdependence" of the elements in it (1997: 41). The 
whole is therefore constituted by the relationships between the entities (with their own 
individuation) in its particular system. 
It becomes apparent at this stage that a holistic ecological view of life is one that takes change, 
unity, diversity and relationship into consideration. The advantage to such an approach is that 
it still remains faithful to postmodern thought. Moreover, such an approach takes systems 
seriously. In other words, a holistic ecological view of life encompasses what is termed an 
"ecosystemic" worldview (Jordaan, J and Jordaan, W 1998: 31). Such an approach attempts to 
avoid reductionism. It highlights the impression that entities cannot be studied in isolation, but 
only interdependently. 
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What is cosmology? H. Eaton maintains that cosmology is synonymous with worldview (2000: 
119). It receives input from the natural sciences, philosophy and religion. It is derived from 
culture and is concerned with the world's nature, or rather how the universe/cosmos is 
structured. So, cosmology is the picture of the cosmos a religion or culture may have and 
consider normative. Cosmologies contribute to how society is structured and impact the 
manner in which humanity responds to the earth. The sociology of knowledge shows this. 
E. Conradie believes that cosmology should be used rather than worldview, as the latter is 
anthropocentric and thus limited in scope (1997: 213). Cosmology on the other hand is broader 
and attempts to present a complete image of the world or universe. It thus specifies how the 
universe came to be and where or to what it is destined. Moreover, cosmologies highlight 
where humankind is situated in the cosmos. 
AO Balcomb believes metanarratives describe the origin and destiny of the universe and these 
stories provide meaning for human beings, as they are able to understand life better (2000:50). 
It is only when human beings understand where they came from and where they are going that 
they can make sense of what comes in between - life. 
L. Boff summarises what has been discussed thus far as follows, 
We understand cosmology to mean the image of the world that a society fashions for itself 
by artfully combining widely varying types of knowledge, traditions, and intuitions... by 
means of the great cosmological narratives (1997: 35) Emphasis the researcher's. 
Theology and science are often in conflict, particularly vis-a-vis the doctrine of creation, 
however they were not always opponents. The medieval period was characterised by a quest 
for what NM Wildiers refers to as, "order, balance and synthesis" (1982: 61). Theology was no 
different. By making use of Greek philosophy and science, theologians integrated cosmology, 
anthropology and theology into what is known as the "medieval synthesis" (Johnson 2000: 9). 
This synthesis resulted in a view of life that was exemplified as ordered, unchanging, perfect, 
hierarchical and anthropocentric (Wildiers 1982: 57-8). It was believed that God brought about 
the order and hierarchy in the universe. The theologians of this period synthesised the 
contemporary scientific cosmology with their religious cosmology. 
- 2 7 -
However scientific cosmological reflection gradually became of secondary importance in 
theology. There are several reasons for this, but the Copernican revolution was the most 
important of these (Conradie 1997: 215). Copernicus challenged the church's view that the 
earth was the centre of the universe, positing instead a heliocentric position. The church thence 
became suspicious of scientific cosmology. 
However it is important for an ecological cosmology to garner insights from scientific 
cosmology. Science provides concepts of reality that should be taken into consideration when 
theologising. Hessel and Ruether believe ecological theologies should reconstruct previous 
Christian views on cosmology, the G-W dynamic and humanity's purpose in light of 
ecological concerns. Those cosmologies that have incorporated Greek philosophy and its 
dualism must be reshaped according to contemporary views on cosmology. (2000: xxxv). 
The type of cosmology required in this study is one that takes ecological issues seriously. So 
when the term ecological cosmology is used, the word ecological functions as an adjective. In 
other words a cosmology is needed that emphasises the mutability, unity, diversity and 
relational character of creation. A holistic cosmology is required for an ecological theology 
instead of a dualistic type. Insights from both contemporary science and theology can assist in 
demonstrating these characteristics. 
3.1.1 Scientific cosmology 
It should be noted at the outset that contemporary scientists do acknowledge that there is a 
large degree of regularity in nature, but that it is also characterised by novelty and chance. P. 
Davies believes there are immutable natural laws of such a nature that when they are applied to 
matter result in openness and change in the created order (2004: 104). 
Insights from science inform us about the origin/s of the universe. Boff writes, 
Once we were all together in the form of energy and the original particles. We are all 
made of the same elements (1997: 45). 
According to Ian Barbour, quantum theory has seriously challenged Newtonian physics (1990: 
96-108). Quantum theory articulates the interconnectedness, interrelatedness and 
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interdependence of life. Newton's understanding of the universe as deterministic and 
reductionistic is questionable. It was believed that the future condition of the matter in a 
system in motion could be predicted by acquiring knowledge of its current state. Moreover, 
universal laws controlled everything from a tiny particle to a planet in space. Newtonian 
thinking also held that parts affect the whole. In other words this was bottom-up causation, 
where the smallest particles determine the reaction of the whole. Change occurs when the parts 
are rearranged; however the parts themselves never change. The result of this was that nature 
came to be viewed as a machine (: 96). The world is sub-ordinate to natural laws and does not 
need divine agency. This removes any potential for novelty or freedom in creation. In other 
words according to a mechanistic worldview, creation is not a living entity. It is simply 
composed of lifeless atoms. 
However, Barbour indicates that the "Heisenberg Uncertainty" principle demonstrates that 
there is a large degree of "indeterminacy in nature" (: 101). There is novelty in nature, because 
entities have possibilities for becoming available to them and thence the potential to change. 
The future is indeterminate and entities have a range of alternatives, which they can pursue and 
actualise. Time does not repeat itself, as the "world would not repeat its course if it were 
restored to a former state" (: 103). 
Quantum theory also challenges Newtonian reductionism. Previously, matter was believed to 
be constituted by indivisible protons, neutrons and electrons, but is now shown that these 
particles are composed of smaller parts known as "quarks" (: 104). Quarks cannot exist alone, 
as they require the larger whole. Large amounts of energy fail to separate quarks and merely 
generate new ones, which then combine with the ones already there. This results in the genesis 
of new particles. At the atomic and sub-atomic level there are complex systems, which build 
themselves up, and these have characteristics that were not seen in only the components. In 
other words, it is important to look at the larger whole and not just the components. Barbour 
writes, 
Interpenetrating fields and integrated totalities replace self-contained, externally related 
particles as fundamental images of nature. The being of any entity is constituted by its 
relationships and its participation in more inclusive patterns (1990: 105) Emphasis the 
researcher's. 
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John Polkinghorne also addresses the issue of indeterminacy in nature (1995: 147-155). He 
makes use of "chaos theory" to explain the dynamic nature of systems that do not have 
thermodynamic equilibrium. This theory states that even minute and undetectable changes in a 
system's initial conditions can result in an unpredictable future. For example future conditions 
of the universe cannot be easily predicted by merely understanding its present state. The most 
important insight that Polkinghorne is offering here is that openness or "intrinsic 
indefiniteness" occurs not only at the quantum level, but also at the macrophysical level 
(: 155). 
One of the values of relativity theory is that it synthesises energy, matter, space and time and 
thus further strengthens the case for a dynamic universe (Barbour 1990: 124). Space and time 
are connected into what is known as a "spacetime continuum"; in addition to this mass is a 
form of energy, while it is difficult to distinguish between acceleration and gravity (: 109, 
111). Matter and space interact with each other, while there is a dialectical relationship 
between processes of time and the geometry of space. Matter distorts and changes spacetime. 
This presents a picture of the universe where events interact with each other. It must be noted, 
however, the connections between events take time. There are thus moments of isolation. 
In a dynamic universe there needs to be some manner of limitation. If not, systems would be 
completely chaotic. Barbour insists that even within physics there is the notion of evolutionary 
thought (: 113). He draws on insights from Nobel Prize winner Ilya Prigogine's work on 
thermodynamics. Inanimate beings are believed to be able to self-organise where random 
behaviour at one level leads to order at another. This results in an increase in complexity with 
new rules controlling the new state. What Prigogine appears to be implying here is that the 
more complex something is, the higher its capacity for self-organisation. This could be the 
limitation principle required for an orderly system. This type of thinking can be applied to 
"living systems" (: 113). 
When considering complexity in living systems, the concern is with evolutionary theory. This 
approach signifies not only the mutability of creation, but also its unity and diversity. These 
two concepts should be kept in balance. The former tends towards a reductionistic and 
monistic13 view of life. This contributes to essentialist constructions of reality. If the latter is 
13 Monism is the view that everything may be traced back to one substance or reality. Its opposite is dualism (Klein 1999: 
636). 
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emphasised then the connectedness of life is lost. The idea of hierarchies of complexity 
appears to provide a solution. Arthur Peacocke uses the theory of "emergentist monism" to 
account for hierarchies that include a gradation of complexity or degree of self-organisation 
(2001: 50). Entities in the world, both animate and inanimate, are composed of "fundamental 
physical entities" (: 49). Complexity does not occur due to the insertion of additional entities at 
higher levels. It is derived from below. 
However this bottom-up causation principle is balanced by a form of top-down causation14 
referred to by Peacocke as "whole-part influence" and he defines it as, 
the net effect of all those ways in which a system-as-a-whole, operating from its higher 
level, is a causal factor in what happens to its constituent parts, the lower level (: 52). 
Peacocke goes on to describe how there is information flow from higher level entities to lower 
ones (: 53). A higher level in this regard changes events that take place among its lower level 
constituents. Information in this regard is distinct from energy and matter, but when 
information is transferred a degree of energy or matter is exchanged. Peacocke uses the mind-
brain-body interaction to support his claims and also illustrates that this idea of information 
transference concurs with evolutionary thinking. For example information flow from the 
environment over a long period of time may influence an organism's DNA and this DNA will 
then influence the organism's functioning in such a manner that it will produce adequate 
progeny. For Peacocke the world is comprised of a diverse set of systems that interact with 
each other (: 55). Events in one system affect events in other systems. There is thus 
information flow between systems. For example, on earth systems of life forms are influenced 
by the atmosphere and geological systems. Peacocke writes, 
the world-as-a-whole suggests that it is metaphysically plausible to perceive it as an 
interconnected and interdependent System-of-systems, the 'systems' being now of 
different types (: 55) Emphasis Peacocke's. 
The researcher believes that a cosmology that includes both bottom-up and top-down causation 
does possibly provide room for divine agency, otherwise God may merely become the output 
of an evolutionary process and thus reducible to cosmic reality. Such a monistic or pantheistic 
This is a term used by Ellis and Murphy (1996:16). 
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approach is at odds with the Christian tradition that affirms the distinction between God and 
creation. It is therefore necessary to oppose a naturalistic or pantheistic approach to 
cosmology. 
The views presented by the scientists above are indicative of a holistic cosmology that concurs 
with ecological insights. The universe is viewed as dynamic, unified, diverse and relational. 
The dynamic nature of the universe means it is characterised by emergence and evolution. 
Creation in this sense becomes historical. It is both open and closed. Entities are 
interconnected, interdependent and interrelated. Reality is composed not of separate 
substances, but of relationships and events. This is a holistic view of the world where 
mutuality and reciprocity are of primary concern. Such a view of the world emphasises the 
notion of community. 
H. Rolston denotes such a community a "biotic community" (1994: 78). In this thought, reality 
is viewed as a dynamic, living interaction between parts. The various members of such a 
community are integrated and able to flourish. Moreover, there is both a degree of stability and 
development within this community. Boff maintains that humanity is part of a "cosmic 
community" which has a common origin and destiny (1997: 45) 
Moreover, Barbour views entities in the universe as being part of a community and writes, 
Cosmology joins evolutionary biology, molecular biology, and ecology in showing the 
interdependence of all things. We are part of an ongoing community of being; we are kin to 
all creatures, past and present. (1997: 215) Emphasis the researcher's. 
Another way to describe such a worldview is the universe as an organism (Barbour 1990: 168, 
222). Such a view is social by nature. In such a society the members have a marked sense of 
individuality and yet there is unity and contact. With such a view there is no dichotomy 
between the living and the non-living. However, the diversity of entities is still emphasised. 
Living and non-living beings are part of an organism that is held in a dynamic balance. The 
earth has been viewed as a super-organism known as Gaia (Lovelock 1979, 1988). This 
metaphor therefore has scientific support. In addition to this, it is an applicable form of 
religious language, as it is a model and thus takes unity (similarity) and diversity 
(dissimilarity) into account. 
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3.1.2 A theocentric cosmology 
The perspectives garnered from the above scientific insights have naturalistic tendencies and it 
is therefore important to propound the place of God in such thinking. One of the perennial 
tasks of the science-theology debate is to describe the relation between natural and divine 
causation. This will be addressed later. It is important to maintain a theocentric position in 
regard to cosmological reflection. S. Bouma-Prediger insists such a perspective is crucial, 
because it avoids the naturalistic tendency to declare creation as autonomous or the 
romanticised view that creation is the divine (1995: 278). Only by acknowledging that God 
gives everything existence, will human distinctiveness and creation's interdependence be 
affirmed. 
Moltmann addresses the unity and diversity of creation. In the book, God in Creation, he 
makes his intentions clear: an ecologically inclined doctrine of creation should result in the 
idea of an "ecological world-community" (1985: 12). He also rejects mechanism and atomism 
as worldviews and instead argues for an organismic approach where unity and interdependence 
are demonstrated (1989: 57f, 79-80). Moltmann believes the earth is an organism that is alive. 
It is thus an open system that is self-regulatory. Humankind relies on this organism for its well 
being. What is atomism? I. Paul defines it as, "the reduction of complex entities to unchanging 
constituent parts" (1987: 133). It is therefore a form of reductionism. 
3.2 Anthropology 
3.2.1 Humankind as part of the cosmic community 
The study's cosmological reflection presented scientific support for using metaphors such as 
cosmic community and organism. These metaphors explain humanity's interconnectedness and 
interrelatedness with creation. They highlight unity and diversity in creation. But what is 
humanity's position in creation? W. Granberg- Michaelson believes this is a central issue for 
an ecological theology (1994: 103). Insights from Peacocke, Ruether and Conradie provide 
input in this regard. 
- 3 3 -
Peacocke maintains that the world is comprised of a diversity of interdependent and 
interconnected systems. Emergent monism and whole-part influence demonstrate bottom-up 
and top-down causation within systems. Systems have uniqueness and individuality. The 
human being is one particularly complex system located high in the hierarchy of complexity 
(2004: 138-9). Humanity is related to creation, but distinct by virtue of its complexity. The 
human brain is for example the most complex organism known. 
Ruether asserts humanity is part of an evolutionary process that is continuous (1993: 31). It 
was noted before that the universe is dynamic, developing and evolving and thus has a history. 
Humankind is therefore not the glory of creation, but one particular aspect of it. Human beings 
evolved late in the evolutionary process, while nonhuman creatures were on the earth billions 
of years before them (2000: 103-4). The earth was self-sustaining and autonomous before the 
arrival of humankind. Human beings are thence a part of creation and not superior to it. The 
human story is but one particular story in cosmic history. We are one part of the cosmic 
community. This means that humankind is to humbly accept its place in this community. If 
humanity is a part of creation then reductionism becomes an issue. 
Conradie insists an ecological theology needs to articulate an anthropology that avoids 
reductionism and believes the concept of emergent complexity, which is, 
characterised by organisational patterns that give rise to novel forms of behaviour that are 
not predictable... from a reductive analysis of the pre-emergent properties of a system 
(2005a: 298). 
Significant in this regard is that human beings and creation are in genetic continuity and share 
an evolutionary history and lineage (2005c: 98). Moreover, humanity is dependent on other life 
forms in terms of food chains. There is thus interdependence between species. Human 
uniqueness should therefore be understood in the context of its place in the cosmic community. 
Humankind differs in degree from creation. While human beings have genetic continuity with 
creation they have biological traits that contribute to unique human behavioural characteristics 
such as, "emotions, abstract reasoning, symbolic language, imagination, self-awareness... 
literature, myth...ethics" (: 101). 
While nonhuman beings have mental capacity, the human species has a complex mental 
infrastructure. This is highlighted by its capacity for language and symbolic referencing (: 103, 
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113). 98% of the genes in a chimpanzee are the same as a human's, but these primates do not 
have the ability for complex reasoning or creativity. 
Conradie believes that a complexity hierarchy is necessary to avoid scientific reductionism 
(: 107). If a hierarchy of complexity is not appropriated by an anthropology, then the mental 
aspect of human existence is reduced to the physiological: free will, emotions, awareness of 
one's self and aspirations are merely the interactions of neurons. 
Conradie insists that the mind is a, 
dynamic emergent property of brain activity which is neither identical nor reducible to the 
neural events in which it is rooted. Mental activity is therefore embodied in brain activity, 
but is not identical with brain activity (: 108). 
Hierarchies of oppression and domination are to be opposed and hierarchies of diversity 
affirmed. Moreover, a particular hierarchy is not to be considered more relevant or significant 
than others. 
Besides challenging reductionism, emergence theories necessitate the need for top-down 
causation (: 109). A system's overall functioning influences the behaviour of its components. 
While the whole relies on the existence of the lower components, it is different by nature to its 
components and is not reducible to them. Moreover, emergence theories demonstrate how 
human knowledge, language, culture, ethical behaviour and religion developed over time and 
in context (: 112-6). 
Conradie rightly observes that human beings have a highly developed mental infrastructure 
that endows them with substantial power. It is therefore important to acknowledge that there is 
such a power dynamic and then indicate how this power is to be used (: 116f). However, in a 
hierarchy there is a strong degree of dependency as well. The higher the degree of complexity 
in a system, the more dependent it is on the systems below it. This makes extremely complex 
life forms vulnerable, as they depend on the well being of the less complex systems beneath 
them. Human beings are highly complex life forms and thus depend on the health of the 
ecosystems below them. The fact that everything has value is important for ecojustice, as will 
be shall discussed later. 
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3.2.2 A holistic anthropology 
Many ecological theologians oppose dualistic anthropologies. Ruether believes a dualistic 
anthropology in Western thought distorts human being's relationships not only with 
themselves, but also with nonhuman creatures and the entire cosmos. She thus rejects the 
Platonic soul-body dichotomy (2000: 103). She also indicates that human consciousness (i.e. 
subjectivity) is not ontologically external to the self, but is "an experience of our own 
interiority" (: 104). Ruether thus parts company with dualistic Greek philosophy, as well as 
Descartes15, Kant16 and their disciples. 
Moltmann notes that the biblical view of the person is a holistic one, which is foreign to 
Platonic anthropological dualism (1985: 250, 256). He points out that an integrated view of the 
person is necessary, because how we perceive ourselves determines our view of broader 
reality. Moltmann asserts that the feeling of alienation the modern human being experiences 
from his or her body has contributed to the ecological crisis (: 48). Human beings see their 
bodies as objects that need to be subdued and it is not surprising then that the natural world is 
viewed as a thing that needs to be controlled. If human beings are to rediscover their 
connectedness to creation they need to understand that the soul is in the body. 
Conradie takes issue with dualistic anthropologies (2005a: 297). He maintains that 
ecofeminism in particular has highlighted the dualisms that result from Western thought. 
Dichotomies between male and female, mind and body, culture and nature, as well as human 
beings and animals result from such thought. Other dualisms include the Platonic form/matter 
split, Cartesian mind/matter separation and the Kantian subject/object dichotomy. Ecofeminists 
in particular have noted the link between patriarchy and the exploitation of creation. Moreover, 
dualistic thinking results in oppressive hierarchies where those beings higher up in the 
hierarchy control those lower down: God is ruler over the world, men control woman, the mind 
subordinates the body and humankind dominates nature. S. Rakosky maintains ecofeminism 
Descartes taught that the body is res externa and relates to motion, time and space, while the mind is res cogitans (i.e. 
"thinking thing" and has no spatial or temporal references (Reese 1999: 168-9). The concept of extension thus relates to the 
body and thought to the mind. Mind and body are two separate ontological substances that God has created. And, they are able 
to continue independently and thus do not influence each other. 
16 Kant believed the only true source of knowledge is the mind. He postulated a reality beyond the mind, which the mind 
receives impressions of, but it can never really know this reality. There is thus a dualism between the mind and the "thing-
in-itself' (Frost 1956: 272). 
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amalgamates, "feminism and ecology into the matrix which exposes the domination of women 
by men and the domination of the natural world by human beings" (2004: 300). 
In addition to this, dualistic views of the human being have resulted in many theologians to 
abandon any reflection on the soul (Conradie 2005 c: 110). It appears to the researcher that the 
issue here is how to describe the interaction between the soul-mind-body. The religious 
understanding of the person is understood in terms of the soul and body, while the scientific 
view of the self is a study of how mind and body interact. A consideration of these insights 
indicates that an ecological theology should include a holistic anthropology where the soul, 
mind and body are in continuum. 
3.2.3 In the image of God 
Most Christian anthropologies have their departure point from the notion in the image of God 
(i.e. the imago Dei). This idea is recovered from the first creation narrative in the bible (Gen. 
1:26-7). One of the main interpretations of this phrase is that human beings have the ability to 
reason (Migliore 1998: 121). In classical theology there was the view that the world was 
created by divine logos (i.e. reason) and human beings are able to participate in this divine 
reason, by virtue of their rationality. This consequence of this was an over intellectualising of 
Christian theology that did not accommodate the physical and emotional aspects of human 
beings. 
There is another interpretation of the imago Dei. To be in the image of God implies that human 
beings are distinct from other creatures and creation's "head and crown" (Berkhof 1986: 205). 
This is problematic, as it separates human beings from other creatures 
These interpretations of the imago Dei do not correlate with an anthropology that articulates 
both humankind's interrelatedness with and distinctiveness from creation. D. Hessel takes issue 
with interpretations of in the imago Dei where humankind is separated from nature and then 
given dominion over it (in Hessel and Rasmussen 2001: 188). This manner of thought 
encourages a negative attitude towards nature and doesn't understand environmental 
degradation as impoverishing human beings in any manner. 
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T. Berry notes that when humanity loses its intimacy with creation, the earth is no longer a 
subject, but an object (1995: 68). Moreover, the earth is no longer sacred or viewed as a source 
of healing. It is instead viewed as a collection of resources that need to be used by humankind. 
A revised interpretation of the imago Dei that supports a relational, ecological sensibility is 
thus required. A. Konig observes vis-a-vis the imago Dei that in the first creation narrative, 
human beings are created according to the same process that brought the rest of creation into 
being; and they are created on the day that land animals are made (1994: 106). In Gen. 2:7, 
human beings are made from dust, something that is from the earth. These insights clearly 
illustrate humanity's connection with creation. 
And, Konig notes that in the image of God applies to the whole person and not just a part of 
them (: 106-7). Christian theology has taught that the immortal soul (i.e. the mind) is the only 
part of the person that is in the image of God. The physical part, or the body, is inferior and 
thus not the image of God. This Platonic and Neoplatonic dualism is contrary to the biblical 
view of the person, which is holistic. This view includes the whole person and not one part or 
component of him or her. There is thus a strong sense of relatedness between humanity and 
creation, if the image Dei is interpreted in the manner Konig does. 
If human beings are communal by nature, it means that they are orientated towards 
relationship. If we are to understand created in the imago Dei in relational terms, then a more 
positive view of the relationship between humanity and creation can be presented. A. Konig 
insists that the notions of "covenant partner" and in the image of God show human beings to be 
relational by nature; they are meant to be in relationship with God, each other and nature 
(: 102). This relationship is of a covenantal nature. A covenant relationship specifies that 
relationships constitute human beings. It describes a relationship between two unequal 
partners, where human beings respond to God's initiative. The covenant is thus God's and not 
humankind's. To be in a relationship with God, human beings are meant to live according to 
God's covenant. In other words human beings are required to do what God requires. 
These insights from Konig understood from the perspective of the New Covenant are 
important for human relationships. Jesus of Nazareth (i.e. Christ is viewed as the image of God 
in Col. 1:15, Heb. 1:3) is recorded as saying, "I desire mercy and not sacrifice" (Mt. 12:7). 
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This covenant requirement is that human beings treat each other and nonhuman creatures with 
mercy. This influences how the imago Dei is to be understood. 
Konig notes that one aspect of the imago Dei is that human beings have dominion over the 
earth, however the Hebrew words for dominion are gentle words that relate to animal 
domestication (: 106). This implies that, like God, human beings are to rule with a gentle hand. 
The notions of mercy and gentleness should thus be central to an understanding of the imago 
Dei. 
Fretheim notes that any "relationship of integrity" involves the limitation of some freedom and 
the distributing of power (1984: 36). When a promise or agreement is made within a 
relationship it means that complete freedom is limited. This is a valuable insight, particularly 
when Konig's discussion on covenant relationship is considered. If human beings are to have a 
covenant relationship with creation, they are to make a promise to it: to accept their position 
and to rule with a gentle hand. In this manner human beings should not have a relationship of 
domination over creation. Even though they have a large degree of power, they are to exercise 
this with responsibility. 
In light of what has been discussed it becomes apparent that an ecological theology is 
suspicious of anthropocentrisms that emphasise the domination of humanity over creation. 
Anthropocentrism is the idea that human beings are the centre of the cosmos and thus superior 
to the rest of creation (Gnanakan 1999: 122). All that is in the universe serves human interests 
and values. Anthropocentrism therefore appears to be a form of humanism17. 
K. Tanner maintains that a non-anthropocentric view of life is needed in order to address the 
environmental crisis (1994: 103). With anthropocentrism, nonhuman beings have God-
endowed attributes that are meant to enhance human existence. Moreover, nonhuman beings 
are simply there to feed and clothe human beings (: 107). This thinking therefore promotes a 
utilitarian understanding of creation. 
17 This was an intellectual movement in renaissance Europe that influenced the culture of that period. In relation to the 20th 
century in is a school of thought that rejects most religious belief and insists human beings should be concerned primarily 
with human well being. In other words the human project gains precedence over everything (Flew and Priest 2002: 175). 
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A non-anthropocentric approach on the other hand extends the notion of value to include 
nonhuman beings. It is believed, according to this view, that all of creation to some degree is in 
the imago Dei (Deane-Drummond 1996: 74). God loves all of creation. In this way creation is 
understood as worthy to God and thus has rights. This encourages what the researcher 
understands as a cosmocentric view of the world. A non-anthropocentric approach does not 
imply that human rights do not exist. It simply specifies that nonhuman reality has rights as 
well. 
The researcher believes that anthropocentrism has been interpreted incorrectly. It has often 
been understood in light of the Gen. 1:26 command for human beings to have dominion over 
the earth. Lynn White believed such an understanding of the relationship between creation and 
humanity has led to an exploitation of the environment, because, "Christianity is the most 
anthropocentric religion the world has seen" (1996: 189). However, this is a misunderstanding 
of dominion. Using Konig's interpretation of dominion, human beings may rather be viewed as 
stewards. Humankind in the imago Dei means human beings have a "responsibility" of 
stewardship (Deane-Drummond 1996: 73). This metaphor of human beings as stewards 
signifies that human beings have a responsibility for ensuring that nonhuman beings have 
rights and values of their own. 
The metaphor of stewardship appears to require revision. What is needed is the notion that 
human beings are responsible for the welfare of creation, but that they do so because they are 
dependent on it. Moreover, human beings are to realise that the earth has its own healing and 
management infrastructure. They are thus required to understand these processes and allow the 
earth to heal itself. This means being in dialogue with the created order. This appears to be a 
more tenable understanding of responsibility in regard to the metaphor of stewardship. The 
researcher believes that it is possible to refer to this as an anthropocentrism of responsibility 
where humanity acknowledges that it is dependent on creation. 
An important concern arises. What role is there for God in such anthropology? 
Konig's insights, in regard to the notion of covenant relationship, show that human beings are 
open to both God and the world. What makes a Christian anthropology unique, is the notion 
that human beings are meant to be in a relationship with the triune God; this means that 
anthropology is primarily a theological issue 
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This demonstrates the need for an anthropology where human beings are open to and 
orientated towards the triune God. The researcher believes one of the values in Barth's 
dialectical theology is that it emphasises the depravity of human beings and their need for God. 
Synthesising this with the concept of humanity's dependence on creation means that human 
beings are to exercise humility before God and creation. This does not mean that they are to 
worship creation, only to care for it. 
For Barth, it is only when human beings are open to God (through Christ) that they realise they 
are sinners and that sin is destructive to both themselves and the world. Knowing God thus 
leads to knowledge of humanity, sin and grace (1961: 359ff). This highlights the necessity for 
human beings to be aware of sin and their need for grace. But how are we to understand sin 
from an ecological perspective? 
Conradie notes that one of the central tasks for an ecological theology is to clarify the nature of 
sin (2005b: 4-22). Ecological theology responds to the result of human sin (i.e. the ecological 
crisis) and challenges, "alienation, anthropocentrism and human domination", but, ecological 
theology needs to move beyond this and rearticulate what the nature of sin is (: 5, 16). The 
estrangement of humanity from creation has been viewed as one possible interpretation: 
humanity is alienated due to its belief that it is superior to creation. There is a multiplicity of 
interpretations for sin in ecological theologies. However, the issue here is whether or not an 
ecological theology takes sin and its impact on creation seriously. 
3.2.4 Ecojustice 
It was noted before that humanity has a large degree of responsibility for creation and this 
leads logically to the issue of ecojustice. It was noted before that one of the consequences of 
human sin is environmental exploitation. Human beings are thus accountable for the condition 
of the earth. Ecojustice explores the link between ecological wholeness and social justice 
(Hessel and Ruether 2000: xxxvi). The result of such reflection is what is known as 
oikotheology. This theology intimates the notion that the beings on earth are a part of a 
household (oikos). They are all meant to benefit from an economy (oikonomia) that is serious 
about "ecological and social stewardship (oikonomos)" (: xxxvi). 
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This demonstrates that ecojustice is concerned with the welfare of both human and nonhuman 
beings. There is thus a concern for what D. Hessel calls "ecological health" and "economic 
justice" (1992: 9). When ecojustice happens, human being's basic needs are met so that 
community is built. In this way people can live in harmony with God, one another and all of 
creation. In addition to this, ecojustice maintains that people are to appreciate creation and 
view it in a non-utilitarian manner. 
J. Cobb, like Hessel, affirms the idea of an economics that is directed towards community. He 
refers to this an "economics of community" (: 37). He writes, 
the economy should be ordered for the well-being of human communities understood to be 
immersed in larger natural communities whose well-being is also important (: 37). 
Hessel and Cobb indicate that there needs to be harmony between God, humanity and the 
entire creation. However, harmony and peace break down when there is violence. 
Moltmann notes that humanity has a violent relationship with creation and that peace will only 
occur when human beings realise that "other living things" have values and rights (1990: 255). 
This means not viewing nature from a utilitarian perspective, but from a justice perspective. 
Justice brings about peace: human beings are to strive for the rights of nonhuman creation. 
Moreover, Moltmann believes that the term imago Dei points to the idea that human beings 
have a responsibility for nonhuman beings (1984: 28-9). He insists that every human being has 
the right to be responsible and self-determining. Human beings are working towards a future 
that includes fellowship with God, human beings and the entire creation. Being responsible 
and self-determining means that, "people live personally, collectively, economically, and 
ecologically in time and history" (: 29). 
In other words, if human beings are to struggle for justice in the world, they are to include not 
only human rights, but the rights of the entire creation as well. This means that an ecological 
theology should be a form of liberation theology that links social domination with the abuse of 
nature (Bouma-Prediger 1995: 270). 
- 4 2 -
Ruether notes that there is continuity between the ecological crisis and issues of social 
domination. Where there is social domination, nature is dominated as well (1981: 59). Ruether 
critiques any social system that facilitates high profits for a select few by giving low wages to 
many people, encouraging high prices and allowing poor working conditions. These 
individuals also do nothing about pollutants from industrial processes. As was the case with 
scholars mentioned before, Ruether insists social justice is required for ecological integrity 
(: 60). 
If the right of all life is to be affirmed how does the issue of value relate to a complexity 
hierarchy? Humanity's uniqueness does not afford it more dignity than the rest of creation 
(Conradie 2005c: 120f). If the dignity of human beings is to be affirmed so is that of 
nonhuman beings. The entire creation has dignity, because of God's love for it. It appears to be 
a complex issue on whether or not human and nonhuman beings have the same dignity, worth 
and value. While all life forms have intrinsic value, they do not necessarily have equal value. 
According to D. Griffin, "intrinsic value" is the value anything "has in and for itself; 
"extrinsic value" is the value things have for "anything else" (1994: 192). "Instrumental value" 
is a form of external value and at the anthropological level is a form of utilitarianism, because 
it understands non-human beings in terms of their usefulness for human beings. At an extreme 
level this turns creation into an object. 
Intrinsic value on the other hand makes something a subject (Birch 1990: 59). A subject is able 
to experience its environment. Everything in the created order experiences the need to live, 
survive and endure. This is a fundamental way of understanding life. Everything thus has 
intrinsic value. 
However instrumental value also means the value something has for another in terms of 
survival. At the human level this means that human beings need to use the natural environment 
for their basic needs. J. McDaniel therefore maintains that both intrinsic and instrumental value 
is needed for creation's integrity (1990: 230-1). Humankind should use the latter responsibly. 
Griffin also speaks of "ecological value" (1994: 192). This is a form of extrinsic value where 
something has value in terms of its capacity to support the processes of life. Examples would 
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be food, water and air. It will also include the role that various non-human and human beings 
have in sustaining an ecosystem. 
It is with this in mind that Conradie writes, "The health of the ecosystem has priority over the 
health of individual specimens" (2005c: 127). These insights imply that although not all beings 
in creation have equal value, they do never the less have intrinsic value. For example, it would 
be poor advice to imply that viruses and bacteria have more value than human beings. A 
human being should have the freedom to kill a fly or malaria mosquito. 
3.2.5 The divorce of history and nature 
An anthropocentric worldview that does not consider the fact that human beings are dependent 
on systems of lower complexity allows human history take precedence over nature. In other 
words, human history is prioritised over cosmic history. Culture and human civilisation are 
viewed as more relevant than creation. 
According to A. Primavesi, Western ideas of a split between nature and culture derive from 
Greek philosophy (1991: 46-7). In Greek thought there was the notion that order had to 
overcome disorder. A hierarchical view of life emerged where nature had to be controlled by 
reason. The result of this was that, 
Nature, woman and body are material, irrational, passive, dependent and immanent, as 
opposed to culture, man and spirit which are immaterial, rational, active, independent and 
transcendent (: 47). 
These views affected western thinking through modernity to the present. Nature is viewed as 
inferior to culture. In this manner nature does not have intrinsic value and needs to be 
controlled. Primal worldviews are not immune to this either. S. Ortner maintains that the 
purpose of ritual is to maintain harmony in the natural order (1995: 41). The idea here is 
culture has the power to govern natural processes. This has led to a transcendent view of 
culture in general. Such an elevated view of culture may lead to an anthropocentrism of power, 
control and domination over creation. 
Christianity is a historical religion. It is derived from the Judeo-Christian tradition and 
therefore has its roots in the Old and New Testaments of the Bible. It is thus a religion based 
- 4 4 -
on covenant. This means that Christianity appears to be most concerned with right 
relationships between God and human beings. Jesus of Nazareth summarises this idea in his 
injunction to love God and each other (Mk. 12:29-31). Paul takes this further and states in 2 
Cor. 5:17-9 that Christ reconciles humanity to God. Christianity is thus a religion that concerns 
itself with soteriology. This approach places more of an emphasis on the doctrine of human 
salvation than the doctrine of creation. 
This problem may be traced to ancient Israel in its ideological conflict during the 13th century 
BCE with Canaanite fertility religions (Anderson 1988: 181-191). The latter believed that it 
was possible to control the gods through sexual rites so that the harmony of nature could be 
maintained. This ultimately served human interests, but for Israel, Yahweh's power was 
demonstrated through historical events (e.g. the Exodus) where He liberated them from 
bondage and established a covenant with them (: 191). 
Israel's objection to Canaanite religion was thus based on historical terms, in other words on 
Israel's salvific history. It did not contest that religion from the perspective of creation or 
nature, because the Yahwism of the OT was most concerned with redemption (Von Rad 1984: 
53-4). The doctrine of creation was simply absorbed into the doctrine of salvation. Israel came 
to believe that Yahweh was creator, because He was saviour. G. Von Rad notes that the 
priestly writer of the first creation narrative was motivated to write Gen. 1, because of his 
understanding of redemption (: 60). The doctrine of creation was thus subordinate to the 
doctrine of salvation. The main concern for the OT is therefore the salvation of humankind and 
the climax of this was seen by the NT writers in Jesus Christ (2 Cor. 5). 
It was highlighted earlier in the study that even though cosmological reflection was used 
extensively in medieval theology, it was gradually lost. According to Santmire the primary 
focus of reformation theology was human salvation (1985:122ff). The doctrine of justification 
by faith was central to Luther's thought, while Calvin believed human knowledge of God is 
foundational for any theology. Neither developed a systematised doctrine of creation, but they 
did not entirely neglect it either. Creation was a peripheral issue for the reformers (: 127). 
Santmire observes that the Reformers were preoccupied with, "celebrating the gracious 
condescension of God to the sinful human creature" (: 127). 
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Modern theology also focused on the human individual's personal experience of God. 
Schleiermacher believed the Christian faith is based on a central proposition: the human 
being's, "feeling of absolute dependence" 18 (Kung 1994: 167). This makes faith dependent on 
religious experience. Schleiermacher does not start with the historical story of the bible, but 
with the consciousness of Christ's redemption (: 175). 
Karl Barth continued in the same vain as the reformers, by asserting that theology should 
rather be defined as "theanthropology" (Hendry 1980: 18). Barth parts company with 
Schleiermacher, because he believes God interacts with the world within human history and 
not only in the field of human subjectivity. For Barth the bible attests to this. 
These insights show that history and nature have been divorced in Christian theology. A 
challenge for an ecological theology is therefore to show how these two concepts may be 
integrated. 
3.3 Theology 
3.3.1 The God-world relationship 
There are four views on the G-W relationship: theism, deism, pantheism and panentheism. 
N. Gregerson uses the following formulae to articulate these: 
Panentheism: G>W 
Acosmic theism and deism: G/W 
Pantheism: G=W (2004: 19). 





Interestingly, Tillich maintains that "feeling" in this phrase should not be understood in a psychological sense, but as an 
awareness of that which transcends (1968: 47). 
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Theism, sometimes referred to as monotheism, is the view that God created the world out of 
nothing, remains in it, but governs it through His sovereignly (Peters 1992: 123). While God is 
personal, He is distinct from creation. Theism affirms God's immanence and transcendence. 
This view functions in a monarchical model of the G-W dynamic. 
With deism, God created the world and gave it natural laws so that it can function 
independently from Him. The universe and God are ontologically distinct. God leaves the 
world and does not intervene in its affairs. Deism functions with a mechanistic model of the 
world (Tilby 1992: 44). Both theism and deism emphasise God's transcendence. 
Pantheism is the view that creation emanates from God. God and the universe are the same. 
There is no ontological difference between God and the world; he or she is literally identified 
with the universe and all its parts. This understanding of the G-W relationship may be 
partnered with polytheism and monism (Peters 1992: 123). 
Several ecological theologians endorse panentheism . Panentheism is a term coined by K.C.F 
Krause in the early nineteenth-century (Pailin 1989: 76). Krause believed finite entities are 
included in God, but they do not entirely constitute God. They have a degree of independence 
from God, but exist in Him or Her as "one universal life" (: 76). God is independent from finite 
reality, but also contributes to it. Finite beings influence God and God affects the world. 
Panentheism is therefore the view that God is in the world and the world is in God. 
It may be described as a middle position between theism and pantheism (Macquarrie 1984: 
15). In this manner panentheism attempts to maintain God's transcendence and immanence. 
Macquarrie prefers the use of the term "dialectical theism", as this makes use of the word 
dialectic, which is a movement between two opposites (: 14). Moreover, dialectical theism is 
preferable, because panentheism is often confused with pantheism. 
Macquarrie insists that both pantheism and theism are guilty of overemphasis. Theism 
emphasises attributes that relate to God's transcendence and these include, "externality, 
19 (Boff 1995, 1997; Moltmann 1981, 1985, 1989; McDaniel 1989; Edwards 1999, Deane-Drummond 1996, Gebara 1999). 
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immutability, impassibility, eternity" (: 53). Theism does consider divine immanence and 
God's involvement in history and creation, but these are underplayed. Pantheism overvalues 
divine immanence to the point that God is completely identified with creation. Panentheism 
views God as being fully transcendent and immanent. Macquarrie does not see a logical 
problem with it, because God's logic differs from the logic of the finite. 
For Moltmann God is part of the evolutionary process in terms of immanence, but He (sic) also 
transcends it (1985: 206). It is possible to reflect on God beyond the world if God can be 
perceived as immanent. In this manner God does not become a product of the evolutionary 
process, as God transcends this, but She or He is a part of it through divine immanence. 
Bouma-Prediger insists ecological theologies must emphasise the notion that God's 
immanence depends on God's transcendence (1995: 287). This means immanence and 
transcendence are not contradictory terms. God may only be intimate with creation, if She or 
He transcends it. This is reasonable, because God can experience the totality of the world, but 
is not overcome or exhausted by it. 
For Edwards transcendence and immanence are not "polar opposites", but presuppose one 
another (2004: 200). For God to be present in creation in the manner that God is, She or He 
needs to be transcendent to it. There is thus an ontological distinction between God and 
creation. It is this distinction that allows God to be intimate with creation. 
Conradie maintains numerous ecological theologies over emphasise God's immanence in 
creation. (2005a: 295). This prevents deism, but a distinction between God and creation does 
not imply that creation is alienated from God. A transcendent God is not a God who is 
uninvolved or unconcerned with creation. God's transcendence is necessary for the integrity 
and freedom of creation. While the earth and cosmos are derived from God's being they 
remain distinct from Him or Her. The distinction between God and creation should thus be 
acknowledged and not denied. 
Boff affirms these insights when he writes, 
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God is not identified with the cosmic process..., but God is identified in the cosmic 
process..., the universe is not identified with God..., but is identified in God (1997: 147) 
Italic's Boff s. 
An important characteristic of panentheism is the notion that God is the cosmos, but is also 
greater than it (Peterson 2001: 399). God is the cosmos and yet is not the cosmos. God is 
connected to the world and is distinct from it. G. Peterson differentiates between "weak" and 
"strong" panentheism (: 399). The former relates to God's presence with the world20, while the 
latter identifies the world in God. Weak panentheism thus focuses on God in the world, while 
strong panentheism stresses the world in God. The main issue for panentheism is how to 
articulate the preposition en in panentheism. Panentheists use three metaphors to describe the 
21 
en . 
The locative metaphor emphasises that God and the world have different areas of space (: 399-
400). The world is seen as in God and vice versa, although those who endorse this metaphor 
focus on the world in God. According to this approach the world is a like a small circle 
surrounded by a larger one which is God. God is considered to be the whole and the world the 
part. The whole part relationship is also understood in terms of a hierarchy of complexity. 
Divine agency is therefore understood in terms of top-down causation. This metaphor is a form 
of strong panentheism. 
The mind-body analogy suggests, "God is to world as mind is to body" (: 400-2). The analogy 
uses a holistic anthropology to understand divine agency. It was shown in the previous section 
on anthropology that the soul-mind-body interaction is described in terms of bottom-up and 
top-down causation. This analogy is a type of weak panentheism. 
Peterson argues with the substance metaphor that the locative metaphor and mind-body 
analogy view God and the world as separate and thus describe "a kind of substantival 
relationship" between the two (: 403). Peterson appears to be arguing that both approaches 
have ontological implications, except that they don't use the language of Greek metaphysics22. 
R. Page uses the term "pansyntheism" to describe the notion of the copresence of God and the world (2004: 222). 
21 it should be noted that panentheism functions well with metaphorical language. A metaphor that describes God, invariably 
speaks of God's transcendence (the is not of God) and His or Her immanence (the is of God). 
Clayton argues that while Classical Philosophical Theism and panentheism have ontologies, the former is based on 
substantive metaphysics and the latter on relational ontology (2004b). 
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Is panentheism viable for an ecological theology? Panentheism attempts to make the 
relationship between God and the world a closer, more intimate one. Theism and deism over 
emphasise God's transcendence. The consequence of this a worldview characterised by 
"acosmism" (Macquarrie 1984: 40). 
Hessel believes such thinking separates God from nature with the result that God's "living 
presence in creation" is underplayed (2001: 187). This means that creation is devalued and 
loses its sacred nature. For Granberg-Michaelson it is important for an ecological theology to 
stress the holiness of creation (1994: 103). The immanence of the Spirit may prove fruitful in 
this regard, as this elevates the sacredness of creation23. Panentheism may prove to be useful in 
this manner. 
An advantage in using panentheism in an ecological theology is it implies that if the world is in 
God then it must share the same value that God has (Peterson 2001: 397; Brierley 2004: 11). In 
regard to evil, many panentheists would affirm Augustine's privative understanding of evil. 
This means that evil is the absence of good and is something that is infectious to the world. 
God operates through the good in the cosmos to bring it to its full glory. 
For Moltmann panentheism encourages an ecological approach to "God, man and the world in 
their relationships and indwellings" (1981: 19). He insists the reason for the exploitation of 
nature is due to an overemphasis on divine transcendence where there is a clear distinction 
between God and the world. To overcome this distinction, Moltmann believes the notion of the 
presence of God in the world and the world's presence in God needs to be appropriated (1985: 
13). Like Macquarrie, Moltmann maintains there should be a dialectical relationship between 
God's transcendence and immanence and that after having created the world God remains in it 
and it in Him (sic) (: 182,98). 
Macquarrie provides two guidelines for any doctrine of God and as we will see later in the 
study these two insights have important implications for the doctrine of creation and divine 
agency (: 55). The first is that God must be spiritual. Physical reality orientates itself to that 
which is beyond it. The second is that God is creator of the universe and also its goal. This 
This implies that the Spirit is involved in the sanctification of the universe and not just human beings. Sanctification 
literally means, "making holy" (Gaybba 2004: 222). 
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means that God is not an emergent process. God meets the process in this regard. In other 
words God is the Spirit who through divine immanence is a part of the evolutionary process, 
but through divine transcendence confronts and meets it. The issue now is divine agency. 
Having created the cosmos, how does God continue to relate to it (i.e. providence) from a 
panentheistic perspective24? 
P. Davis believes panentheism best assists us to understand God's relationship with the 
physical universe and rejects divine intervention or non-intervention (2004: 96-9). The notion 
of creation being open-ended provides place for divine agency. According to Davies, God 
selected a range of laws that allow matter to be complex and self-governing. God continues 
creating the universe without violating these laws and thus allows creation a measure of 
creative freedom. 
According to Peacocke, God assists creation (animate and otherwise) to actualise its 
possibilities for becoming something more complex. God has thus "gifted" creation with laws 
that allow it to evolve and grow, however God has imposed "boundary conditions that limit 
how complex something can become (2004: 143-4). In order to do this God needs to be in 
creation. 
According to Polkinghorne, systems in the cosmos are influenced by "energy transactions" 
(i.e. physical processes) and by "active information" (in Clayton 1997: 204). God influences 
the world in the latter manner. This preserves the spiritual nature of God. In other words it is in 
the Spirit that God provides creation with the data it needs for becoming. God thus acts on the 
evolutionary process as Spirit. 
3.3.2 The Spirit's role in the cosmos 
Boff, Edwards and Moltmann signify the cosmic presence of the Spirit. 
Boff believes the Spirit guides creation towards, more convergent and interrelated diversities" 
(1997: 153). The Spirit is thus involved in the evolutionary process and is God's immanence in 
The study uses insights from theologians working in the area of science. 
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the world. The Spirit brings balance and order to the cosmos. This makes creation coherent. 
Creation is able to move to "self-transcendence" when the Spirit communicates with it (: 163). 
Edwards speaks of the "Life-Giving Spirit as the Power of Becoming" (2001: 47). He garners 
support from scripture for the idea that the Spirit gives life and uses Rahner's notion of "active 
self-transcendence" to describe how the Spirit is involved in the evolutionary process (: 50). 
Self-transcendence occurs within creation itself, but it is God who activates or energises this 
capacity to move beyond what an entity is. God is thus continually present in creation. 
Edwards views this empowering of self-transcendence as the work of the Spirit. He maintains 
that the Trinity is immanent in the Spirit. The Holy Spirit is present in all creatures and brings 
them into relationship with others (: 53). It has a unique relationship with each of them. For 
example the presence of the Spirit in a rock is different from its presence in a human being. 
While the Spirit brings everything into communion, it allows creatures to maintain their 
identity and distinctiveness. The Spirit therefore empowers the evolutionary process and 
unifies diverse beings. It is because God is transcendent that God could be present in creation 
in such a manner. 
Moltmann views the cosmic Spirit as operative in the created order. The Spirit is evolution's 
principle and thus provides the creative capacity inherent in creation (1985: 100). While the 
Spirit produces new types of interaction during the evolutionary process, it harmonises these 
and therefore allows entities to co-operate. The Spirit therefore unifies reality, as everything 
has the one Spirit. While it brings coherence, unity and order to creation, the Spirit allows the 
various beings in created reality to maintain their uniqueness. Moltmann writes, 
Self-assertion and integration, self-preservation and self-transcendence are the two sides of 
the process in which life evolves (: 100). 
The Spirit allows this self-transcendence and capacity for change. The Spirit "penetrates" the 
world and thus provides it with the potential to change and evolve (: 12). 
3.3.3 The cosmic scope of Christ 
Sittler, Edwards and Moltmann endorse a cosmic Christology. 
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J. Sittler elucidates a cosmic Christology that focuses on a functional, as opposed to an 
ontological Christology (Bouma-Prediger 1995: 95). He believes that the synoptic gospels 
endorsed the former and John's gospel, the latter. In other words Sittler focuses more on what 
Christ does than what he is, because what he does provides a clue to his identity. Sittler uses 
Col. 1, Eph. 1 and Rom. 8 to support his cosmic Christology. He believes everything is open to 
Christ's redemption, because they live in him. While grace occurs in creation, Christ is the 
concentration thereof (: 98). Grace is incarnated in Christ in a special manner. In other words, 
Sittler is including the notion of cosmic redemption with the uniqueness of Jesus into his 
theology. This an attempt to negate the redemption-creation dichotomy mentioned previously. 
Edwards draws on Wisdom Christology as a framework for his cosmic Christology (1995: 69). 
The Wisdom tradition affirms that creation occurred in and through Christ (I Cor. 8:6; Col. 
1:16; Jn. 1:3) and that things will be transformed through him as well (Col. 1:20). A Wisdom 
Christology views creation and incarnation as part of God's single divine plan (: 71). Sin did 
not make the incarnation necessary. The incarnation was always a part of the divine plan. In 
this manner creation and redemption cannot be separated. Wisdom Christologies do not 
undermine the role of sin in the world. They emphasise that grace and creation are connected. 
Edwards draws on the hymn in Col. 1:15-20 to further his argument (: 80-3). The first stanza in 
this hymn (vv 15-18a) understands creation as in Christ, while the second stanza relates to 
Christ's resurrection and the reconciliation of the cosmos. This clearly gives Christ universal 
meaning. Not only are all things in Christ, they are also "for him" (Col. 1:16). This means all 
creation is orientated towards Christ. Edwards views wisdom as, "Divine Art at work in 
creation 'luring all things to be, and to become" (: 85) 
Jesus as the divine Wisdom therefore reveals God's purposes and work. It is through the 
resurrection that Christ is recognised as Wisdom's works of cosmic reconciliation and 
incessant creation (: 85). Christ is thus at work transforming the cosmos through its 
evolutionary procedures and is also imparting grace to it. This means that creation is yet to 
reach its goal. It is not just human reality, but the entire universe that will be transformed by 
Christ. 
Moltmann endorses a cosmic Christology and like Edwards and Sittler attempts to reconcile 
creation and redemption. He interprets Christ in three ways. Christ is "the ground of the 
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creation of all things" (creation from the beginning), Christ is "the driving power in the 
evolution of creation" (creation that is incessant) and finally, Christ is "the redeemer of the 
whole creation process" (novel creation) (1994: 94). 
In regard to creation in the beginning, Moltmann makes it clear that the triune God is involved 
in creation, because "the Father creates through the Son in the Holy Spirit" (1985: 98). We 
have already elaborated on the cosmic Spirit in creation. The focus is now on the Son's role in 
creation. For Moltmann creation occurs through the Word and the Spirit (1994: 96). He is 
clearly using Jn. 1 and Gen. 1 here. God generates the diversity in creation through the Word 
and binds them together in the Spirit. 
Moltmann uses the thought of Teilhard de Chardin to elucidate the notion of Christ as the 
driving force of evolution. Teilhard views Christ as "the evolver Christ" (: 99). He understood 
redemption as creation's completion and the incarnation as God locating Godself into the 
evolutionary process. The incarnation was the start of something radically new, the beginning 
of the "Christification" of the cosmos (: 101). It was God ahead of the process of evolution and 
not God falling from heaven. In other words, as the researcher understands it, through Christ 
God moves from the future towards creation and draws it towards Godself. Creation finds its 
fulfilment in the Omega Point. Christ is this Omega Point. The cosmic Christ is thus 
orientating creation towards himself. Moltmann rightly observes that Teilhard was overly 
optimistic about evolution. For evolution to occur there has to be selection (: 103). In other 
words within the evolutionary process there will be its victims, those who are not strong 
enough to survive. It is for this reason that Moltmann views the creation process as 
eschatological. Creation will only be perfected in the future. This means all things from the 
past will be brought into the glorious kingdom of God. In this way all things will be restored. 
Christ is the redeemer of evolution, because according to Col. 1:20, he reconciles all the things 
of the earth. Creation will be fully redeemed when Christ comes in glory. He will gather up all 
that has demised and bring them into God's kingdom. 
3.3.4 The Trinity 
Up to this point, the study has focused on what is specific about the Spirit and Christ. A 
concern with such an approach is that it is the Trinity that creates and works in creation. The 
triune God initiates creation's processes and then continues to work in these so as to bring 
creation to fulfilment and glory. Conradie insists it is important for ecological theologies to 
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articulate the relationship between the Spirit's work and Christ's work (2005a: 302). In other 
words an ecological theology should be Trinitarian by nature. 
For Edwards the Trinitarian Persons are all involved in creation and redemption in a co-
ordinated, unified manner and each has its proper role (2001: 57). Edwards draws on the 
theology of appropriation to support this view. This theology indicates that any work of the 
Trinity is not exclusive to any one of the persons, however Edwards believes this theology still 
needs to signify what proper roles the three Persons have. For instance in regard to creation, 
the proper role of the Spirit differs from those of the Father and Son. The approach of this 
study with its focus on the roles of the cosmic Spirit and Christ appears to be viable. 
The Spirit is the immanence in creation of the triune God. It guides creation towards diversity 
by activating its inherent evolutionary processes. The Spirit brings thing into communion and 
thus allows order and harmony, without nullifying diversity. It is the cosmic Christ who is the 
source of diversity and grace. The Spirit therefore guides creation towards Christ. Christ is the 
focal point of creation. He is its reconciler. In this manner creation and redemption are 
reintegrated. The Father creates through the Son and in the Spirit. The three Persons therefore 
have a co-ordinated relationship in regard to creation and redemption. 
This relationship between the three Persons can be understood in terms of the immanent 
Trinity. The doctrine of perichoresis or mutual interpenetration elucidates the social doctrine 
of the Trinity (Moltmann 1985: 16ff). This doctrine intimates that there is mutual indwelling 
between the three Persons of the Trinity. This results in a communal Godhead. The biblical 
basis for this is from John where it says, "I am in the Father and the Father is in me (14:11) 
and "I and the father are one" (10:30). Perichoresis shows that there is an intensity of life in the 
Godhead where the transfer of love is at its greatest. There are no relationships of 
subordination in the Trinity. Perichoresis shows how the three Persons relate to each other and 
share in the divine life while keeping their individuality. 
God's being is thus constituted by relationship. This has an important inference for 
understanding created reality and Edwards writes, "If God's being is radically relational, then 
this suggests that reality is ontologically relational" (2004: 204) (emphasis Edward's). This 
means that creation as a whole is based on relationships. This indicates a view of life where all 
things are interrelated and diverse. 
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Conclusion 
The conclusion to this chapter is in the form of thirteen theses. The researcher has placed them 
in point form for ease of reading. 
The following tentative metaphysical assertions can be made based on the above insights vis-a-
vis cosmology. 
/. An ecological cosmology should be able to demonstrate the unity and diversity in the 
universe, by using a hierarchy of complexity to avoid reductionism. An ecological theology 
should explain how bottom up and top down causation works in its cosmology. 
2. An ecological cosmology should highlight the dynamic and relational nature of reality. 
3. An ecological cosmology should be theocentric in order to overcome an overtly 
naturalistic or monistic cosmology. 
The following are tentative requirements for a Christian ecological anthropology. 
1. An ecological anthropology should emphasise the relational aspect of human life. 
2. It should also be holistic and indicate how human beings are unified with the natural order 
and yet different from it. In this regard a complexity hierarchy should be presented that 
avoids reductionism. 
3. An ecological anthropology should incorporate a theocentric anthropology. 
4. It should provide a definition of sin that takes natural reality seriously. 
5. These insights indicate that a Christian ecological anthropology should take ecojustice 
seriously where the rights and values of both the human community and the created 
community, of which it is apart, are affirmed. 
6. An ecological anthropology should focus on nature rather than history. This means that 
creation is included in a salvation process. 
The following tentative requirements can be made for an adequate Christian ecological 
theology. 
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/. An ecological theology should endorse a form ofpanentheism where divine transcendence 
and immanence are articulated in the evolutionary process, however it should be noted 
that God's presence is as a result of God's otherness. In addition to this divine agency 
should be clearly presented. 
2. An ecological theology should give attention to the role of the cosmic Spirit in the 
evolutionary processes of creation 
3. An ecological theology should articulate Christ's relationship with the entire cosmos, 
where salvation and creation are integrated 
4. An ecological theology should include a Trinitarian reflection where the proper roles for 
each Person in regard to the God-world dynamic are expressed. 
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Chapter 4: An evaluation of Sallie McFague's body of God 
cosmology 
Introduction 
This chapter provides a critical analysis of Sallie McFague's cosmology. It will explore her use 
of the term postmodern science in order to determine whether or not such a term is necessary 
considering the tension between the sciences and postmodernism. McFague makes use of 
scientific accounts of reality. It is important to understand her position on the science-theology 
relationship. She maintains that there are two dominant metaphors for understanding the 
universe: the machine and organic models. She argues for organism over mechanism by means 
of the common creation story. The study analyses her arguments vis-a-vis mechanism and 
organism by using the cosmological criteria already formulated. The study will attempt to 
establish the faults in McFague's cosmology and embodiment metaphysic. The researcher will 
then attempt to modify the body of God cosmology and metaphysic. In closing, this chapter 
ascertains whether or not McFague's cosmology is theocentric. 
4.1 The term postmodern science 
Sallie McFague's body of God cosmology is informed by insights from contemporary science 
(1993a: ix). She insists her cosmology is theological and not primarily scientific. This is 
iterated throughout her work on cosmology. McFague makes extensive use of the term 
postmodern science. 
According to the researcher's understanding, postmodernists are not preoccupied with 
scientific accuracy25. The purpose of science is to explain, predict and control. The scientist 
proceeds inductively by starting with the world of sense in the form of experiments and then 
acquires data concerning the object under investigation. All judgement is reserved so that the 
scientist can generate a blank state in the mind (i.e. the cogito) and thus remain impartial 
25 This information was gathered from Professor A. O Balcomb (UKZN) in an email correspondence on the 2006/09/04, 
09:32 AM. 
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(Greer 2003:222). He or she then forms a theory or explanation from the data. This theory is 
tested, analysed and integrated with other theories relating to the object under investigation. It 
is then brought back into the world of experiment and its predictability tested. 
Postmodernists focus on the use of language. It was noted before that postmodernism is 
characterised by what Greer calls, "a turn to language" (2003: 226). Different communities 
have different languages and linguistic referencing. Truth is therefore derived from culture and 
religion. Language assists human beings to identify and organise their thoughts. It includes the 
use of symbolism, which creates meaning for diverse communities. Because of the multiplicity 
of religious and cultural groups, languages differ. In other words, communities think 
differently. A symbol may thus mean different things in different groups. This signifies the 
idea that there are multiple understandings of truth in the world. The postmodernist is thus 
concerned with articulating how languages differ and why there are such diverse truth claims. 
Postmodernism is thus focused on perception and what makes human beings interpret the 
world in the way that they do (: 227). 
To use the term postmodern science therefore seems to be ambiguous, granted the tension 
between scientific and postmodern approaches to understanding reality. The former is acultural 
and relies on the clearing of the mind when explaining reality. The latter takes culture seriously 
and shows how language determines the human being's interpretation of reality. To assert that 
science is postmodern implies that it should take culture into account when explaining reality, 
but this is not congruent with scientific method. The researcher suggests contemporary science 
to be more suitable. This term appears to avoid the problems relating to postmodern science. It 
implies that the theologian may use the latest views from science with which to theologise. 
4.2 The role of science in the body of God model 
McFague believes that science cannot be the foundation of theology (1991a: 26). Scientific 
understandings of reality are partial and continuously evolving. Scientific accounts of reality 
are therefore not absolute or permanent. New images of reality as presented by science are the 
best current ones available. McFague therefore gives science as a resource for theology a 
modest position. By stressing this McFague does not privilege science above theology. Science 
provides one particular account of how the universe functions. These are important 
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observations from McFague, because understanding science and theology in this manner may 
prevent foundationalism and essentialism. 
McFague iterates that science cannot "dictate" to theology, but the relationship is rather one of 
"eavesdropping"(: 29). This means that the theologian needs to listen to public scientific 
discourse. In this manner the theologian will remain scientifically lucid in order to choose 
insights from science that are able to enlighten elements of the Christian tradition. McFague's 
reflection is reasonable, because the contemporary theologian is located in a scientific context. 
Theology is contextual and therefore needs to take scientific reflection seriously. 
McFague applies a dialectical approach to the science-theology relationship (1993a: 83). This 
means that there is a movement between the two poles of reason-science and faith-revelation. 
McFague thus attempts to keep a balance between science and faith. Two circles may be drawn 
to understand McFague's approach. One is the theological circle and the other, the scientific 
circle. The theologian operates in the theological circle and the scientist in the scientific circle. 
McFague attempts to keep the two circles separate without allowing those in them to ignore 
each other. She attempts to integrate scientific insights into theological reflection and argues 
for a theology of nature as opposed to a natural theology (: 73-8). 
Barbour believes that integrating the content of science and theology is possible (1990: 23-9). 
He shows that a natural theology operates exclusively from reason and science, being less 
emphatic about revelation or religious experiences. A theology of nature on the other hand is 
not premised on science and begins its reflection from revelation and experience. However, a 
theology of nature does acknowledge that some Christian teaching such as, "the doctrines of 
creation, providence and human nature" may be changed after considering the "broad features 
of science" (: 26). Barbour thus affirms McFague's approach to the science-theology 
relationship. 
However, McFague critiques Barbour in this regard (1996a: 24). She makes the important 
point that the doctrines of creation, providence and anthropology are central to Christian 
theology. It would require a large degree of revision to modify these important doctrines if 
Barbour's approach is taken too far. McFague is thus indicating that a much more balanced 
and careful approach is needed when scientific and theological content is integrated. Too much 
revision to these doctrines may result in the theologian standing outside the theological circle. 
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Other theologians assert that scientific insights are essential for ecological theology and thus 
affirm McFague's position on the need for scientific input in theology. Cosmology is informed 
by science, philosophy and religion. In other words to construct an adequate and broad 
cosmology insight from many areas of reflection is required. 
Conradie asserts that it is possible to speak of scientific cosmology and religious cosmology 
(1997: 214). Both produce descriptions of the universe, but the latter includes a strong 
emphasis on morality. It is for this reason that there needs to be dialogue between the two. 
Conradie writes, 
The environmental crisis is functioning as a global antenna indicating that the strict 
demarcation between science and religion is defective (: 220). 
Moltmann asserts that insights from the sciences are needed in order to address ecological 
issues. He therefore insists that a community needs to be forged that is composed of scientists 
and theologians each bringing their own insights vis-a-vis cosmology (1985: 13). 
4.3 McFague's counter to a mechanistic understanding of the universe 
McFague believes there are two predominant cosmological models: machine and organism 
(1993a: 15). The mechanistic model utilises atomism and reductionism to articulate the 
universe. With this model the parts of something are considered to be primary. It is shown how 
these parts influence the whole. In other words mechanism takes bottom-up causation 
seriously. Things are understood at the most fundamental level with the consequence that they 
become nothing more then their most basic parts. 
McFague provides a polemic of the machine model (: 33-4). She believes it enforces the notion 
that nature is simply composed of non-living things. Such a view justifies the manipulation of 
nature. This metaphor has thus led to a distorted anthropology. It encourages the view of a self 
objectified from nature and thus permitted to dominate it. The consequence of this is a loss of 
any sense of connectedness to nature. 
Moreover, McFague maintains the machine model is highly individualistic (1987: 7). The 
objects, things or entities that are located in the universe are viewed in a substantive manner. 
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This means that they are seen as separated from each other and relate only in an external 
manner. Mechanism stresses the immutability of the natural world. Entities do not have an 
inherent capacity for novelty and change. McFague therefore indicates that central to the 
machine model is the idea of predictability. She takes issue with this model, as it does not 
accept what is central to postmodern science: the notion that the universe is dynamic and 
relational. Moreover, a mechanistic view of reality does not iterate that notion that things or 
entities are constituted by internally based relations. It is apparent that McFague stands in 
opposition to much of the Western views in classical or modern science and philosophy. She 
opposes static, atomistic and reductionistic views on reality. 
Is McFague's critique of mechanism justified? She makes the important point that the machine 
model is reductionistic. At the ontological level this means all things can be reduced to the 
most basic parts of nature. This model therefore assumes a kind of essentialism or 
universalism. It was shown previously that an ecological theology takes both unity and 
diversity seriously. Metaphors of nature that demonstrate commonality and individuality are 
thus applicable for ecological theologies. The machine model emphasises simplicity at the 
expense of complexity. In this manner the rich diversity that is observable in the natural world 
is negated. 
The machine model is reductionistic at the epistemological level as well. Reductionists are 
continually seeking a theory that will be able to explain everything in the universe, whether it 
is a "Grand Unified Theory" or "Theory Of Everything" (1993 a: 91). This epistemological 
approach is therefore thoroughly unpostmodern, because it does not appear to take various 
cultural and religious interpretations of reality seriously. It believes the scientific approach is 
the only hermeneutic. 
In addition to this, mechanism only describes upward causation. In this manner higher levels 
are simply the output from lower levels. While this may be constructive in regard to describing 
how higher levels come about, it is inadequate when considering how higher levels interact 
with lower levels. No consideration is made as to how the whole interacts with and may 
influence its parts. The machine model can therefore not be used as a root metaphor for an 
ecological cosmology, as it does not take downward causation seriously enough. The machine 
model is incompatible with point one of the cosmology criteria. 
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The machine model also views reality in a very static manner. The universe is understood as 
entirely predictable, because the natural laws that govern it can be understood and explained. It 
was noted before that natural laws do exist within the natural order and these can be explained. 
However, it was also indicated that there is a strong degree of openness and chance in nature. 
This indeterminism 6 occurs in conjunction with these natural laws. Natural laws are of such a 
nature that they allow for a dynamic universe. Mechanism does not facilitate the notion of a 
dynamic universe. 
And, the machine model only takes external relations into consideration, while ignoring the 
idea that the entities in the universe are internally related. Such an approach does not 
appropriate the idea of things being constituted by their relationships. Entities are separated 
from each other and are unable to generate change within themselves. McFague believes this 
dualistic, hierarchical manner of viewing reality is inadequate (1987: 11). Dualism promotes 
individualism and not relationship. The machine model is highly individualistic and thus 
nullifies the notion of a cosmic community. It was noted before that a relational view of the 
universe sees things as part of a community. This cosmic community metaphor is thus in 
consonance with an ecological cosmology. The machine model views the universe in a static 
manner and does not underscore the notion of a cosmic community. It is therefore opposed to 
point two of an ecological cosmology. 
Another problem with the machine model is that it views nature as entirely self-sufficient with 
natural laws controlling and regulating it. This makes the need for divine agency minimal and 
even unnecessary. According to such a view the only adequate understanding for the G-W 
relationship is deism and if no God-concept is assumed then an atheistic outlook is 
appropriated. When mechanism is taken to its logical conclusion, a naturalistic view of reality 
transpires. God then becomes the product of the evolutionary process or does not exist at all. 
The machine model therefore does not appear to be theocentric. It may tend towards an 
anthropocentrism that enforces a form of naturalistic humanism. If nature is predictable, then a 
utilitarian understanding of the natural order assumes supremacy. The machine model may 
also become cosmocentric where things are nothing but atoms and molecules. In this manner 
everything is understood only according to physical and biological processes. 
Determinism is the view that an event could only have happened in the manner that it did, in other words it is "determined 
(Reese 1999: 170). This position compromises free will. Indeterminism is the opposite of determinism. 
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The researcher is therefore in agreement with Sallie McFague in regard to the mechanistic 
model. Mechanism does not conform to the study's cosmological requirement and can thus be 
deemed insufficient as a root metaphor for a Christian ecological cosmology. 
4.4 The relational cosmology of the body of God model: the universe as organism 
McFague believes that postmodern science presents a view of the universe that is contrary to 
the mechanistic model (1991a: 25, 1993a: 31). According to postmodern science, reality is 
both diverse and unified. In addition to this reality is understood in a dynamic manner where 
internally based relations are stressed in opposition to individualism. Everything that is found 
on the earth has a common history and is related in some manner. Postmodern science 
therefore offers McFague the holistic cosmology that is required for the body of God 
metaphor. Such a cosmology views things as radically interrelated and the researcher believes 
such a cosmology may be referred to as a relational cosmology. 
McFague uses the organism metaphor to elucidate this holistic, relational cosmology (1987: 
10). An organic model begins with the whole and studies the interrelatedness and 
interdependence of the parts. It draws on holism and should demonstrate both upward and 
downward causation (1993a: 15). The organic model therefore appears to be an antithesis of 
the machine model. McFague therefore favours the organic model for the body of God model. 
The body of God model is thus informed by another metaphor: the organic model for the 
universe. It is thus important to understand and critique McFague's use of this model, because 
it informs her anthropology and theology as will be shown. 
According to McFague the organic model is not a novel idea having been in existence for 
centuries and denotes it as "the classical organic model" (1993a: 30). McFague identifies 
problems with this understanding of the organic model. She believes that it is overly 
spiritualised and hierarchical. In other words the issue that McFague has with this model is that 
it promotes dualistic hierachicalism. In the Christian tradition matter was viewed as inferior to 
spirit. The result of this was a negative attitude to the physical sphere of life and thus a low 
view of creation (: 35). 
It is because of the classical organic model's hierarchical nature that McFague has opted for a 
revised version of it. E. Johnson also takes issue with the notion of hierarchy. She relates 
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hierarchy to dualism (1993: 10-1). Dualism dichotomises reality into two spheres and 
hierarchy then ranks them in order of value. Such a dualistic hierarchy culminates in the 
subordination of the lower sphere to the higher. This becomes a relationship of control and not 
coordination. Johnson asserts that dualistic hierarchies understand human beings to be 
disconnected from nature and superior to it, men are more important than women and God 
completely transcends the world. Hierarchies of dualism allow human beings to dominate 
nature and should thus be opposed. 
The organic model that McFague uses stresses not harmony and hierarchical structure, but 
change and relationship. She is eager to iterate a relational cosmology and writes, 
The model is most appropriate to life, and hence the qualities of life - openness, 
relationship, interdependence, change, novelty, and even mystery - become the basic ones 
for interpreting all reality (1987: 10). 
The concepts of change and relationship are thus central to the body of God cosmology and 
stand at its core. Such a holistic-evolutionary receptivity implies that entities in the universe 
are formed by their relationships (: 8). No longer are they separate, substantive individuals, but 
are located in a system where they interact with each other in dynamic relationships. 
McFague's holistic-relational cosmology stresses relationship and change and therefore does 
not dichotomise animated and inanimate beings. It attempts to avoid dualisms of any kind. 
According to this holistic view of reality, everything is inherently relational. If entities are 
characterised by their relationships, they are not static. In the organic model these relationships 
allow entities in the universe to undergo change. Relationship and change are thus two sides of 
the same coin. One cannot exist without the other. In order to change something needs to be in 
relationship. McFague maintains that postmodern science has shown reality to be 
indeterministic (: 10). 
The organic model, which draws on postmodern science, demonstrates a strong sense of 
change in the universe. Things are incomplete and relative (1993a: 105). They have the 
capacity for relationship within themselves and thus openness to other things. Reality is 
characterised by process and development, and is thus viewed as complex. This is in 
opposition to the machine model, which understands reality as simple and predictable. 
With the organic model reality is less predictable. Relationship and change are indicative of 
the least complex to the most. A dynamic and relational view of life is thence apparent from 
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the subatomic through to the entire universe. With the organic model things are closely 
bonded. McFague writes, 
the organic or evolutionary, ecological model is one that unites entities... by symbiotic, 
mutual interdependencies, creating a pattern of internal relations (1987: 11). 
The organic model stresses that relationship is the basis of existence. According to these views, 
entities do not choose to enter relationships, as they are in them already. Thus relationship is 
reciprocal. It is about give and take. In other words entities are acted upon and then respond by 
acting in return. The entities in the universe are thus understood as subjects, as well as objects. 
McFague uses Brian Swimme's notion of "cosmic genetic relatedness" to further her case for a 
relational-organismic cosmology (1993a: 106). Swimme makes use of the ancient wisdom of 
tribal societies to describe the relationship that exists between all things. While he has a high 
regard for this wisdom, he notes that not even the cosmological myths of these tribes are able 
to articulate the internal relatedness of all things that have existed since the beginning of time. 
He believes that in addition to these myths the scientific idea of cosmic genetic relatedness is 
crucial to show the degree of relatedness between everything. McFague maintains that 
Swimme's concept needs to permeate current thinking on cosmology, as this will culminate in 
a holistic awareness of the universe. 
Moltmann endorses a relational and dynamic view of the universe and thus supports 
McFague's sentiments. He refers to the universe as an "open system" (1985: 199; 1979: 190). 
In such a system there is an opportunity for change and future actions are not entirely 
determined by past ones. An open system also has the potential to communicate with a 
multitude of other systems. Finally, the system in its final condition differs from what it was in 
its initial state. 
Moltmann integrates his theory of open systems into his doctrine of creation (1985: 193-208). 
According to Moltmann the doctrine of "creatio originalis" or "creation in the beginning" 
should be viewed as "creatio mutabilis" (: 207). In this manner creation is understood to be an 
open system that is future and goal orientated. Such a system is not closed off from its context. 
The members of a system are aligned towards each other and the future. Moltmann's doctrine 
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of creation clearly shows a dynamic and relational view of the natural world and affirms 
McFague's understanding of it. 
McFague's stress on relationship is apparently due to her ecofeminist bias. S. Rakoczy notes 
that ecofeminism develops images that articulate the relationship that exists between humanity 
and all of nature. One such image is the "web of life" (2004: 313). This image describes reality 
in terms of relationship. Everything in nature, including humanity, is in relationship. The web 
of life image indicates that nature in its entirety is characterised by interconnectedness, 
interdependency and diversity. 
The body of God cosmology is thus in agreement v/ith point two of the study's cosmology 
requirements, as it stresses and describes how the universe is both relational and dynamic. The 
challenge for McFague's body of God cosmology is whether or not it can incorporate the 
notions of change and relationship into a hierarchy of complexity that demonstrates upward 
and downward causation. 
4.4.1 The Organic Model qualified by the Common Creation Story 
Another concern for McFague vis-a-vis the classical organic model is that it appears to support 
essentialist thinking. To avoid this she believes this model needs qualification by what she 
terms, the "common creation story" (1991a: 31). McFague is optimistic about this narrative 
and asserts, 
For the first time in several hundred years we have the possibility of thinking holistically... 
and this possibility is being given to us by the 'common creation story', coming from the 
sciences (1991a: 23). 
McFague claims that if the classic organic model is understood in light of the common creation 
story, the unity and diversity in the natural order may be affirmed. As will be shown, a positive 
aspect of the common creation story is that in addition to stressing the categories of unity and 
diversity, it also presents a further argument for the notions of relationship and change. There 
are several characteristics of the common creation story. 
First, the magnitude of space and time in the common creation story are so enormous they are 
difficult to comprehend. There are billions of galaxies in the universe which itself is about 
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fifteen billion years old (: 32). Human beings arrived late on the evolutionary scale. If the time 
of the universe were viewed as the metaphor of a cosmic clock, then human beings appeared a 
few seconds before midnight. 
Second, the common creation story is historical (1993a: 105). In other words it is a narrative 
with a beginning, middle and end. The historical nature of the universe makes it dynamic, 
changing and indeterministic. The common creation story thus supports the organic model, 
because it highlights a dynamic, evolutionary view of reality. The open-ended nature of the 
universe is thus important, where novelty is generated through the interaction between chance 
and law. Time cannot be reversed. Creation is incomplete and continuous. 
A third feature of the common creation story is the notion that things in the universe are 
interrelated and interdependent (1992a: 51). Because this story is common, all things have a 
single ancestry. However, McFague adds a qualifier here. While all things are interrelated, the 
degree of this relatedness is affected by proximity. Space and time are thus factors that 
influence interrelatedness. The sense of relatedness between things on earth will thus be higher 
than that between entities on earth and the planets. While the common creation story 
emphasises unity, it also presents individuality as a central cosmological characteristic. The 
evolutionary process is orientated towards diversity and thus has direction. McFague asserts, 
what characterises the common creation story above all else is the history of change from 
a simple beginning to its complex present diversity (1993a: 46). 
This unity and diversity comes about through relationship and interdependence. By being in 
relationship, entities become diverse and complex individuals. The common creation story is 
thus emphatic about increasing complexity in relation to the entities and things of the universe. 
Variety and simplicity are thus crucial for the common creation story. These two concepts are 
cosmic phenomena. 
H. Schwarz affirms the third feature of the common creation story. He maintains that life at its 
most fundamental level is coherent and unified. Living things are intimately interrelated, 
because the "building blocks of life are widely uniform" (1977: 81). Life is a general term that 
includes animate and inanimate beings. While there is a strong sense of unity within nature, 
- 6 8 -
there is also a sense of peculiarity and individuality. Even at the anthropological level, each 
human being has a unique personality and visible uniqueness. 
A fourth characteristic of the common creation story is the idea that there are multiple levels of 
complexity in the universe (1993a: 106). There is thus an increase in complexity from their 
lowest level to the highest. With this augmentation of complexity comes an increase in 
subjectivity. McFague contests that while not much can be said about subjectivity at very low 
levels of complexity, it certainly increases in animals and human beings. For McFague life is 
characterised by levels of organisation. Higher levels cannot be reduced to lower ones. While 
there is continuity between the simple and the complex, higher levels are dependent on lower 
levels. The more complex something is, the more vulnerable and dependent it is on the levels 
below it. 
The common creation story's final feature is that it has a "public character" (1992a: 52). 
Creation stories from the world religions can only be appropriated when one is an adherent of 
that particular religion. It is not necessary to be a follower of any religion in order to accept the 
common creation story. Any individual can use it as a resource. The primary reference points 
of the common creation story are a Creator and the earth (: 52). The focus of the story is 
therefore not on any culture and religion. This is a helpful observation from McFague 
particularly if the issue of religious pluralism is taken into account. Much study needs to be 
done in regard to the relationship between religious pluralism and the natural environment. 
The common creation story is in agreement with point two of an adequate ecological 
cosmology. It shows reality to be characterised by change and relationship. This is particularly 
true of the first three features. The first characteristic signifies the time factor involved in 
creation. The universe is incredibly old. It differs from it was at its genesis due to its capacity 
for novelty. Johnson affirms this idea, 
About 15 Billion years ago a single numinous speck exploded in an outpouring of matter 
and energy, shaping a universe that is still expanding (2000: 13). 
The expanding nature of the universe shows that it is dynamic. In relation to the second 
characteristic, the picture of reality presented by the common creation story is contrary to the 
deterministic-mechanistic-static view of the universe presented by Newton and his disciples. It 
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also differs from many creation narratives, such as those in Genesis, which show creation to be 
final and complete (McFague 1991a: 32). The third feature highlights the relational, dynamic 
nature of the universe. There is a profound relationship between all entities in the universe and 
on the earth. Entities are interrelated and interdependent, having been internally related from 
the beginning of time. This means there is interrelatedness between members of the same 
species, as well as across species. All the members of an ecosystem are thus involved in 
dynamic interactions and are formed by these interactions. 
How does the common creation story relate to point one of the cosmological criteria? It does 
highlight the unity and diversity in the universe. The organic model qualified by the common 
creation story stresses radical sameness and difference. McFague thence refers to "ecological 
unity" (1993a: 55). Ecological unity means there is a sense of kinship27 among the things of 
the universe and on earth due to their common ancestry from the beginning of time. Ecological 
sensibilities show reality to be both complex and diverse. The organic model qualified by the 
common creation story is thus organic, because it highlights internal relations and ecological, 
as it demonstrates difference. The common creation story therefore makes the organic model 
ecological. It thus appears reasonable to denote McFague's cosmology as an ecological-
organic cosmology. The third characteristic of the common creation story in particular 
emphasises unity and diversity. While entities in the universe and on the earth have a common 
origin, they exhibit particularity due to a growth in complexity. Stars and tree leaves are 
related through their common origin, but neither two exploding starts nor two tree leaves are 
identical (1991a: 32). Entities in the natural order cannot be conceived as separate. Moreover, 
one particular individuality cannot be considered as the only or normative individuality. It was 
shown before that there is interrelatedness at the micro and macro levels of various species. In 
other words any form of specieism is not possible according to this feature of the common 
creation story. Unity and diversity are thus characteristics of entire ecosystems. McFague is 
thus dealing with the perennial ontological question of the one and the many. 
Thinkers who favour the former tend towards a monistic perception of reality; those who align 
themselves with the latter believe ontological pluralism is a sound description of reality. By 
using insights from contemporary science, McFague is attempting to avoid monism, which 
The metaphor of kinship supports ideas of relationship and mutuality. In this sense mutuality becomes the paradigm for 
understanding reality (Johnson 1993: 30). 
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appears to negate the freedom (however small that may be) of the entities in the universe. On 
the other hand, she does not appear to endorse ontological pluralism, which seems to lose the 
connectedness amongst things. 
In addition to this the common creation story is in opposition to the static cosmologies of both 
Greek philosophy and modern science. McFague's system of thought takes individuality and 
freedom seriously, while highlighting a sense of cosmic community. The evolutionary process, 
which allows a transition from the simple to the complex, is a process that affects all the 
entities and systems in the universe (1993a: 43). There is therefore not a multiplicity of 
creative processes functioning in the universe. Each system does not have its own unique 
process of development and change. There is only one evolutionary process that affects both 
animate and inanimate beings. 
These insights from McFague appear to be in agreement with point one of the cosmological 
reflection, as they stress unity and diversity. However, there is a concern here. It was 
articulated before that in order for a cosmology to demonstrate unity and diversity, there needs 
to be a clear hierarchy of complexity in it. This is needed to avoid ontological reductionism. 
Such a hierarchy of complexity should then express how downward and upward causation 
function in a dynamic universe. Not only are systems influenced by their parts, they in turn are 
able to act on their constitutive parts. The scientific basis for this came from Peacocke's 
monistic emergence and whole part influence hypotheses. 
It was signified before that McFague is deeply suspicious of the concept of hierarchy. Her 
concerns are noteworthy in this regard, particularly when dualistic hierarchies are considered. 
Such hierarchies are oppressive, as they legitimate the oppression of women and nature. 
McFague's ecofeminism is therefore necessary to expose these types of hierarchies. The 
researcher is thus fully in agreement with McFague and other ecofeminists in relation to 
identifying hierarchies of domination, control and power28. 
Berger and Luckmann with their contribution to the sociology of knowledge show how cosmologies ("symbolic universes") 
are used to structure society (1966: 97). 
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But is there a clear presentation of a hierarchy of complexity in Sallie McFague's cosmology? 
By stressing the holistic, dynamic, relational aspect of reality McFague makes a concerted 
effort to overcome dualistic hierarchies. She believes this view of the universe has justified the 
superiority of the one over the other (1992a: 48). According to such a view one species gains 
prominence over another. At the anthropological level this means human beings are superior to 
other species and are thus allowed to dominate creation. McFague notes that dualistic 
hierarchies allow ontological, epistemological, gender and psychological dualisms (1987: 4). 
The result of this is that matter does not have spirit, things are viewed as objects instead of 
subjects, men are superior to women and the mind is no longer a part of the body. For 
McFague several metaphors in the Christian tradition have become central in its doctrine. 
These metaphors stress hierachicalism, imperialism and dualism (: 19). McFague's treatment 
of dualistic hierarchies is praiseworthy, because these are contrary to a holistic sensibility and 
thus not favourable for an ecological theology. 
Elsewhere McFague is more positive about hierarchy. She signifies the complexity that 
characterises reality. An evolutionary perspective shows there to be a hierarchy of complexity 
and organisation. McFague affirms this sentiment and thence refers to a "hierarchy of levels of 
organisation" (: 10). All these levels exhibit the capacity for both relationship and change. 
McFague goes further and makes reference to relationships that occur in structures. McFague 
is thus alluding to the notion that there is a hierarchy of complexity in the natural order. 
Moreover, she implies that there may be a holistic hierarchy functioning in the universe, but 
does not pursue this idea any further. McFague argues instead for a cosmology that is 
characterised more by relationship and change than a holistic hierarchy. Her emphasis on a 
relational cosmology is fuelled by the desire for a holistic life-view that, "overcomes 
oppressive dualisms and hierarchies'" (: 27) (emphasis the researcher's). The problem with 
McFague's cosmology at this point is that it has not explored the notion that a hierarchy may 
be holistic. McFague focuses only on dualistic hierarchies. 
In relation to the fourth feature of the common creation story, McFague once again 
acknowledges there is the possibility for a hierarchy in the natural order. She refers to this as 
the "multilevelled character of the universe" (1993a: 106). This feature iterates the complexity 
of nature and also assists McFague to lessen any forms of reductionism in her cosmology. For 
McFague life in general is characterised by organisation thus making any distinction between 
animate and inanimate beings negligible. A significant point in the fourth characteristic of the 
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common creation story is the idea that higher levels are dependent on lower levels. While there 
is continuity between the two, the more complex something is the more dependent it is on the 
levels beneath it. She refers to this as, "inverse hierarchicalism" (: 46). Even though this form 
of hierarchy seems to promote a more democratic understanding of life it still does not endorse 
a hierarchy of complexity. These thoughts from McFague seem to imply that while she does 
take levels of complexity and organisation into consideration, she appears to downplay the 
notion of hierarchy in her cosmology. There is a tension in McFague's cosmology here. While 
this cosmology does acknowledge levels of complexity in the natural order, it is also 
suspicious of the notion of hierarchy. While McFague does allude to the role that a hierarchy 
may have in a cosmology she is not emphatic about this. A hierarchy of complexity is 
therefore a peripheral issue in McFague's body of God model. The central concern for the 
researcher vis-a-vis McFague's cosmology is it does not stress the function of a complexity 
hierarchy. It was shown previously that if such a hierarchy is non-existent in a cosmology then 
there is the danger of reductionism. 
McFague does note that a holistic cosmology such as the organic model should illustrate 
upward and downward causation. The machine model is only able to explain upward 
causation. Even though McFague favours the organic model qualified by the common creation 
story, she does not present a coherent description of causation in her cosmology. This may be 
due to an over emphasis on the concept of relationship. McFague does, in fact, argue against 
reductionism. 
She maintains that a reductionistic sensibility is unable to appropriate the mysteriousness and 
complexity of the universe. It is viewed as simple and thus predictable. Reductionists are of the 
opinion that there is one ultimate theory to explain the universe and their project is to discover 
this particular theory. The metaphysical aspect of this epistemological approach is denoted as, 
"scientific materialism" (: 92). This metaphysic argues that objects in the universe are nothing 
but molecules and atoms. Scientific materialism thus understands and explains objects only 
according to their constituent parts. McFague rightly takes issue with such an approach. She 
believes it makes the false assumption that it is the only way reality may be constructed. 
Scientific materialism therefore does not take into account the notion that constructions of 
reality are partial and is therefore contrary to postmodern sensibilities. McFague argues that 
such an explanation of reality does not take diversity seriously and attempts instead to unify 
things. A metaphysic based on holism is able to appropriate insights offered by reductionism, 
- 7 3 -
however a reductionistic approach cannot take the holistic notion of a complex universe 
seriously. McFague appears to be implying that a holistic cosmology such as the organic 
model can in fact demonstrate upward and downward causation, whereas an atomistic 
cosmology cannot. She thus rejects atomism, however the very same charge may be brought 
against McFague's cosmology. 
The credibility of McFague's cosmology seems to hinge on the issue of a complexity 
hierarchy. The error in this particular cosmology is that it does not demonstrate how a holistic 
cosmology such as the organic model may be hierarchical by nature. McFague's cosmology 
may thus be accused of reductionism. It appears to the researcher that unless a cosmology is 
based on a complexity hierarchy, it will invariably reduce the systems in it to a select few 
parts. McFague does not appear to demonstrate clearly enough how top-down and bottom-up 
causation functions in her cosmology. Reductionism becomes more of an issue when 
addressing McFague's embodiment metaphysic. 
4.4.2 The body of God model's embodiment metaphysic 
Sallie McFague takes issue with much of Western philosophy's views on metaphysics and 
ontology. This tradition tended to view reality in terms of static substances. McFague rightly 
argues that the ecological perspective on reality does not view things in the universe as, 
"separate, static, substantial individuals" (1987: 7). Things are not in external causal 
relationships as the substantive philosophies imply, but are internally related and relationship 
constituted. The evidence against such substantive ontology comes from postmodern science 
and this was described before. 
McFague critiques the classical organic model for being spiritualistic (1993a: 35). The 
Christian version of this was that the church is the body of Christ. However the result of this 
spiritualised thinking was the exclusion of nature and physical reality. Sex was thus viewed 
with suspicion and because women were associated with nature, they too were marginalised. 
This attitude towards physical reality resulted in a disdain towards the body. Christians are 
called to be members of Christ's resurrected body. The problem with this is that Christ's body 
is understood in only a spiritual sense. Such a view of the body goes hand in hand with a 
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derogatory understanding of creation. McFague writes of the Christian version of the organic 
model, 
What it neglects is the rich, diverse, physical plenitude of creation- in other words, it 
neglects just about everything (1993a: 36). 
It is for this reason that McFague decides to pursue a body model (: 13-25). This is therefore 
another metaphor that accompanies the world as God's body. The idea of embodiment is at the 
heart of McFague's understanding of reality. It seems reasonable to denote this as an 
embodiment metaphysic. McFague's project is praiseworthy. The body and nature have been 
closely associated in the Christian tradition, because they both relate to physical reality. In 
order to change how human beings view creation a more positive understanding of the term 
body is thus required. McFague argues that an ecological theology requires human beings to 
acknowledge embodiment and then change the way embodiment is understood. She suggests 
that the body functions as a lens through which reality is viewed and as such is used to 
construct society (: 24). 
McFague believes it is important to affirm that human beings do not have bodies, but are 
bodies. She maintains that there is continuity between body, soul and mind (: 16). This is an 
anthropological issue and will be dealt with more fully later. The point that McFague wants to 
stress is that not only human beings are embodied, but the entire creation as well. The problem 
as McFague understands it is that embodiment has only been made applicable to human beings 
and animals. She maintains that the notion of embodiment needs to be extended to the entire 
universe. The body model therefore affirms the notion of universal embodiment. 
For McFague anything that is matter and occupies space can be considered a body (: 17). It is 
thus possible to refer to the body of a bird, the body of a sand dune and the universe's body. 
Atoms and rocks are also bodies. McFague acknowledges that the model of the body uses the 
bodies of animate things as a reference point. Human beings are able to understand other 
bodies, because of their own embodiment. However, this does not mean that the term body is 
only relevant to animate beings. McFague's logic here is that the organic model as qualified by 
the common creation story shows reality to be interconnected. This means that things share 
something in common. If human beings have bodies, then other things will also. The value of 
the body model is that it unites bodies (: 18). This makes the body model ecological, because it 
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emphasises relationships between bodies. Moreover, McFague argues that this model finds 
alliance with liberation theology, because bodies are prioritised (: 23). She insists, 
salvation for our planet means, first of all, the health and well-being of the body of the 
world and the many bodies that constitute that larger organism (1993a: 23). 
McFague's embodiment metaphysic appears to be a valuable resource, as it values physical 
reality. This promotes a sense of value for creation and thus care and justice for it. However, 
the issue of reductionism again becomes an issue. A central concern with McFague's 
embodiment metaphysic is how it relates to her evolutionary, ecological cosmology. 
According to the body of God cosmology reality is characterised by relationship, change, unity 
and diversity. 
The body model emphasises relationship and unity. Bodies are located in physical reality and 
thus function as interfaces between entities in the universe. This implies that entities are able to 
be in relationship. Embodiment therefore connects subjects together and allows intimacy. This 
connectedness presents "all life-forms in networks of shared suffering and joy" (: 18) 
(Emphasis the researcher's). It was highlighted previously that the body model unifies bodies. 
How does this relate to change and diversity? Are bodies able to change and how do they 
express individuality? McFague does not appear to be clear on these issues. This lack of clarity 
may be due to her under emphasis on a complexity hierarchy in the body of God cosmology. If 
the body of God cosmology did incorporate a hierarchy that demonstrates increasing 
complexity and organisation then the body model may be able to indicate how bodies change 
and what makes them particular. 
McFague attempts to overcome this problem with the fourth feature of the common creation 
story. She asserts that substance is an inadequate manner of describing reality and thence 
proposes that, "life is a type of organisation" (: 106). Moreover, she affirms the notion of 
subjectivity in all things. McFague acknowledges the postmodern scientific insight of the 
continuity between matter and energy, which negates a dualism between spirit and flesh and 
thence mind and body (: 16). These insights are not pursued any further. If McFague were to 
argue for the notion of universal subjectivity then she may be able to show how bodies differ 
from each other and how they are have an increasing capacity for change. Human beings for 
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example are bodies with a complex mental infrastructure that allows for an extremely high 
degree of subjectivity. They are therefore able to make decisions and form opinions about 
reality. Human beings have a high capacity for novelty, because they can make decisions that 
allow them to change. They are in continuity with creation by virtue of their embodiment, but 
different from it due to their high level of subjectivity. McFague believes matter is the source 
of mind and thus privileges the former over the latter (: 46). The problem with McFague's 
embodiment metaphysic is that it fails to show how bodies change and how they differ from 
each other. The result of this is that everything in the universe is reduced to body. McFague 
herself suggests that an over emphasis on body may result in reductionism when she asserts, 
in the organic model (or 'mutualistic' model-a term that avoids the suggestion of reducing 
life to bodies which is implied in 'organic') all entities are subjects as well as objects 
(1987: 11) (Emphasis the researcher's) 
McFague may argue that the body model is a metaphor and thus not a description of reality. A 
metaphor uses what is familiar to human beings so that they may understand what they cannot 
experience. But what is familiar to human beings is that they consist of body and mind in 
continuum. It thus appears reasonable to assert that if human beings are body-mind and are 
interconnected with nature, then everything in the universe is body-mind. 
4.4.3 A modification of McFague's cosmology and metaphysic 
4.4.3.1 K. Wilber's notion of holoarchy 
The researcher will now attempt to modify McFague's cosmology by applying the notion of a 
holistic hierarchy to it. By doing this it may be possible to counter the charge of reductionism 
levelled at McFague's cosmology and still remain faithful to holism. Key insights from Ken 
Wilber will be used in this regard. 
Wilber notes that various ecologists29 and ecofeminists have a derogatory understanding of 
hierarchy, because it ranks reality and this legitimises notions of supremacy. These theorists 
respond to this by proposing a view of reality that does not rank things and thus promotes 
pluralism and egalitarianism. This view is termed "heterarchy" (Wilber 1995: 16). While 
Wilber is using ecohgist broadly. This means that ecological theologians such as Sallie McFague are included here. 
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McFague does not use the term heterarchy, her cosmology seems to imply it, because of its 
focus on relationship. An egalitarian view of the universe sounds promising, as it stresses the 
equality and intrinsic value of all creatures. Those who follow such a train of thought may 
oppose hierarchy, but the problem with this is that the sciences signify the notion of a natural 
hierarchy within the natural order. Egalitarian thinkers are correct to oppose social hierarchies 
that lead to domination, but face opposition when denying a natural hierarchy. This is a 
problem in McFague's body of God cosmology. While McFague stresses the need to take 
insights from contemporary science seriously, she is not emphatic about a central conjecture 
from the sciences: there exists a natural hierarchy of complexity. 
Wilber raises this issue as well. He maintains science connects wholeness and hierarchy (: 16). 
Wholeness and hierarchy cannot exist independently from each other, as the latter organises 
the former. While a whole may be constituted by the interactions of its parts, it is not on their 
level. Wilber believes that hierarchies as understood from the perspective of the natural 
sciences; demonstrate an increasing capacity for wholeness (1998: 67). A hierarchy is not 
reversible. Holism increments as the hierarchy is ascended. For instance human beings contain 
cells, but cells don't contain human beings. A whole is able to transcend and include its parts. 
Wilber describes this agency as enfolding. A senior unit is thus able to enfold its constituents 
and then add something novel. When this occurs the unit emerges into something particular 
that differentiates it from its lower levels. In this manner higher levels are unique in 
comparison to their lower levels, because they have something not found in their predecessors. 
Such an approach remains faithful to an ecological sensibility, because the whole is greater 
that the sum of its parts. For Wilber the term greater is synonymous with hierarchy. Hierarchy 
is fundamentally a principle that structures reality (1995: 18). Hierarchies do not have a linear 
design, but may be better described as nested. In other words hierarchies may be understood as 
a series of concentric circles. This means that they run in multiple directions. These insights 
show reality to be dynamic. 
This raises the issue of causation. A whole is able to influence how its parts function. It 
provides principles of integration and structure that connect the parts together. Without these 
principles the parts become fragmented. The whole therefore allows its parts to have 
commonality with each other. In this manner a whole may be understood as a unifier of the 
parts. The interaction between a whole and its parts that has been described thus far is a form 
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of top-down causation (: 20). An example of this would be when a human being decides to 
wave his or her hand at someone. The mind tells the hand to move by means impulse 
conduction pulses that run to atoms and molecules in it. The mind in this instance is a whole 
and the atoms and molecules are parts. The former is a higher level organisation and the latter 
a lower level unit. 
There is also upward causation in hierarchies. It was noted before that a whole also includes its 
parts. In other words the whole is constituted by its parts and includes their function. For 
example an organism embraces cells that embrace molecules that embrace atoms (: 21). The 
process cannot be reversed so that an atom cannot embrace a molecule, and so forth. 
Causation within a hierarchy can be further described in relation to Wilber's understanding of 
"holons" (1998: 67). Wilber maintains that it is best not to refer to wholes and parts, but rather 
whole/parts. He uses Arthur Koestler's word holon to denote whole/part and thence uses the 
term "holoarchy" as a synonym for hierarchy (: 67). Holoarchies demonstrate increasing 
wholeness, unity and integration. They change by means of integration and differentiation. 
Holons exist by maintaining their own identity and fitting in with the holons in their 
environment. When it is a whole a holon has its own unique agency and as a part it is in 
communion. 
A holon's agency is its capacity to assert, preserve and assimilate (1995: 41). In other words a 
holon's agency relates to its wholeness or its individuality. A holon's communion is its ability 
to participate, bond and join. Communion is thus a holon's relationship to its senior unit. A 
holon requires a balance between agency and communion. Any imbalances between the two 
occur could result in the death of the holon or a "structural deformity" (: 41). 
Holons emerge within holoarchies and in this process are able to transcend and include their 
lower level (: 46-56). In this manner a holon is beyond the system beneath it and within the 
one above. In its transcendent mode a holon limits the freedom of the level beneath it. In other 
words a holon can restrict its lower levels indeterminacy. A lower level holon can also set 
possibilities for the higher levels. This means that while a higher level holon can generate 
novelty and thus differentiate itself, it cannot defy the rules set by lower levels. This 
demonstrates causation in holons. 
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Wilber maintains that there is a heterarchy within a hierarchy (: 20). Elements within a 
particular level function according to a heterarchy. This means that the elements that are part 
of a particular level operate in an egalitarian manner. None of the parts in this society are 
supreme or dominant. There is thus a network of lateral relationships within levels. Relational 
exchanges thus occur in regard to same level relationships. The parts in this sense exercise 
their communion. There is therefore a heterarchy within a level and a hierarchy between levels. 
Holons are therefore in egalitarian relationships with other holons on the same level. Wilber 
writes, 
each level of these holons (i.e. every holon) maintains its existence through relational 
exchanges with same-depth holons in the social (or macro-) environment (1995: 67). 
These insights from Wilber provide a necessary description of holistic hierarchy. McFague's 
body of God cosmology can be adapted with Wilber's views on hierarchy. In this manner the 
body of God cosmology can maintain its stress on relationship and then introduce the notion of 
a complexity hierarchy. 
The researcher suggests that the concept of holons be applied to the body model. Body then 
becomes synonymous with holon. This would then articulate how bodies change and how they 
are diverse. A body thus transcends and includes its lower level bodies. It therefore has the 
ability to limit its lower-level bodies (i.e. agency) and also be incorporated into its higher-level 
bodies (i.e. communion). A higher level body is able to add something novel to itself that 
differentiates it from the bodies, which constitute it. It was noted before that bodies might have 
subjectivity. The degree of subjectivity will therefore determine the degree of novelty that a 
body has. A stone body has low subjectivity and thus simply reproduces its stone data. A 
dolphin body can make decisions about how to catch its prey. A human body can choose to 
enhance its personal relationships in order to grow as a person or fight poverty to improve the 
living conditions of other beings. 
Moreover, a body at any particular level in a hierarchy limits the bodies below it and 
constitutes the bodies above it. As a whole a body is an agent and as a part it is in communion. 
This highlights downward and upward causation. This reflection therefore demonstrates how 
bodies may change in McFague's embodiment metaphysic and how causation could function 
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in her relational cosmology. In this manner the body of God cosmology can be both holistic 
and hierarchical. 
McFague's concern for relationship is also signified. A body that is at the same level as other 
bodies is equal to and in a relationship with them. These same level bodies are thus in a 
heterarchy. McFague concern for relationship is thus interpreted into the notion of heterarchy 
within hierarchy. The egalitarianism that she stresses may thus be located within a complexity 
hierarchy. 
4.4.3.2 The panpsychism of process philosophy 
A modification of McFague's embodiment metaphysic is also possible by using insights from 
process philosophy in order to lessen or prevent reductionism. She appreciates process 
perspectives, so it seems reasonable to use views from this particular school of philosophy (: 
74). 
For Whitehead the universe is composed of events. These events are not static or immutable, 
but in a process of change. Whitehead denotes these events as "actual entities", "actual 
occasions" or "moments of experience" (1978: 18). Actual occasions are the building blocks of 
reality and are thus indivisible. 
Actual entities are dipolar by nature (Cobb 1965: 42). They have a physical pole for 
prehending30 other actual entities and a mental pole for prehending eternal objects31. It is with 
the prehension of eternal objects that novelty is facilitated. The more complex an actual entity 
the greater its database of eternal objects. A piece of wood for example has far less possibilities 
for becoming than a human being. It therefore simply reproduces its wood data. 
Because every actual entity in the universe has a mental pole process thinkers endorse 
"panpsychism" (Ford and Kline 1983: 184). Ford and Kline make the significant observation 
Prehension describes the manner through which actual occasions influence one another and how they proceed through 
change (Massey 1982: 4). At its most basic level, prehension is the absorption of data by an actual occasion. 
31 Eternal objects are what J. B Cobb calls, "forms, relations, or qualities in abstraction from any particular embodiment" 
(1965: 34). In other words eternal objects are those phenomena that remain constant. They are the possibilities available for 
becoming. Examples of eternal objects are colours, sounds, scents and geometric shapes (Mellert 1975: 23. Eternal objects are 
thus similar to Plato's forms. 
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that mentality must be distinguished from subjectivity and rather be understood as the level of 
innate novelty in an actual occasion. 
These insights from process philosophy are applicable for McFague's embodiment metaphysic. 
A body may be understood as an actual entity. The advantage to this is that there are varying 
degrees of mentality in the bodies that make up the universe. Such an approach also seems to 
give a description of how bodies are dynamic and relational. Moreover, a process modification 
of McFague's embodiment metaphysic is able to demonstrate the uniqueness and complexity 
of the bodies in the universe. Bodies with a high mentality are able to make more decisions 
vis-a-vis their becoming. Human beings are highly complex beings with a large mental 
infrastructure. However, they differ from other bodies, because of their ability for self-
consciousness. The value of this modification is that it does not reduce everything to the level 
of embodiment. Entities are more than their bodies. 
4.5 Is McFague's cosmology theocentric? 
Is it possible to use scientific insights and remain theocentric? J. Moltmann incorporates 
scientific cosmology into his theology, while still maintaining a theocentric perspective. By 
drawing on evolutionary theory, he refers to the "history of nature", where the universe is not a 
"closed system", but one that is open (1985: 199). Moltmann's integration of the concept of 
open system into his doctrine of creation has already been described. What is important at this 
point is Moltmann's assertion that the goal of creation is towards God's glory. Moltmann 
insists that the world as an open system is "open to God" (1985: 205). God thus offers 
possibilities to open systems so that they may change. This specifies that in terms of bottom-up 
causation, Moltmann can assume a naturalistic position, but in regard to top-down causation he 
maintains a theocentric position. 
The researcher believes a theocentric position should be prioritised as opposed to a 
cosmocentric or anthropocentric one. A cosmocentric perspective may result in a romanticised, 
naturalistic view of creation where it is glorified. The anthropocentric alternative may promote 
utilitarianism. Either approach simply means that theological reflection is unnecessary. 
It was shown previously that McFague uses insights from contemporary science for her body 
of God cosmology. She believes science cannot be the foundation of theological reflection and 
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functions as a resource for theology. Theologians should listen to scientific discourse and use 
these insights to modify Christian doctrine. In this manner doctrines such creation, the G-W 
relationship, divine providence and so forth may be elucidated. However, the danger with this 
is that a theology may become overly dependent on a particular scientific or philosophical 
system. This is apparent in various forms of natural theology, where reason is given higher 
priority over revelation. In this manner theology is reduced to the scientific or philosophical 
system on which it is based. McFague thus avoids this tendency and uses science as a resource 
rather then as the foundation for her theology. In this regard she appears to maintain a 
theocentric position. 
McFague believes that the science-theology relationship needs to articulate the conception of 
"divine purpose" in the universe's processes (1993a: 74). To do so would mean understanding 
the universe's history meaningfully. McFague's approach seems encouraging. Scientists may 
be able to show how the universe came into being and how it functions. It is the theologian's 
task to show why the universe was created. 
The world as God's body is influenced by what McFague calls, "an earthly theological 
agenda" (1991 b: 12) . The common creation story encourages human beings to think from a 
holistic perspective. Theologically this means that human beings are not alien to the earth, but 
part of it. Moreover, God is immanent in the universe's processes. McFague believes that 
theologies based on these insights emphasise a cosmocentric rather than an anthropocentric 
perspective, however this does not mean that theology is not to be theocentric. What this 
statement implies is that God is concerned not just for humanity, but "all of creation" (: 14) 
(Emphasis McFague's). This means that redemption encompasses the totality of creation. By 
stressing God's immanence in the processes of the created order, McFague preserves a 
theocentric position in her cosmology. 
McFague maintains that thinking holistically means that both human and all of creation's well 
being are important. She encourages "biocracy" instead of democracy in this regard (1991a: 
36). This appears to be a form of cosmocentrism, however the issue here for McFague is 
This article may also be found in: MacKinnon, M. H and Mclntyre, M (eds). 1995b. Readings in Ecology and Feminist 
Theology, pp 327-333 
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governance. She is implying that concern for non-human beings needs to be central in the 
legislative process and is thus not arguing against theocentrism. 
McFague believes theological reflection on cosmology is concerned with detailing how 
creation is God's work (1990: 202) . The task of theology is to experiment with models and 
metaphors that deal with the G-W dynamic. The purpose of this project is to bring about a 
theocentric perspective that includes a concern for life in its totality. McFague believes an 
analysis of the world as God's body is necessary to maintain a theocentric sensibility. She 
writes, 
This exercise would take place at the juncture between a theology of nature and a 
theocentric or life-centred ethic (1990:2003) (Emphasis the researcher's). 
Conclusion 
McFague's use of the term postmodern science is ambiguous. Science assumes an acultural 
position when observing reality, while postmodernism stresses that culture and religion assist 
human beings to construct reality. The researcher suggested the term contemporary science 
rather than postmodern science. McFague use of scientific insight is acceptable, because she 
does not believe science can be theology's foundation. Scientific insights may be integrated 
into Christian doctrine so these teachings are elucidated. McFague's polemic of the mechanism 
model is warranted, as such a worldview does not comply with an ecological cosmology. It 
was found that her use of the organic model as qualified by the common creation story 
encourages a relational and dynamic view of the natural order and is in agreement with point 
two of the cosmological criteria, however the central concern for the study is that McFague's 
cosmology does not stress a complexity hierarchy and is thus prone to reductionism. 
McFague's embodiment metaphysic also appears to be reductionistic and fails to demonstrate 
how bodies are diverse and dynamic. These two observations make the body of God model 
incompatible W\t\\point one of the study's ecological cosmology, however it was 
recommended that the reductionism in the body of God cosmology might be nullified by 
applying Wilber's holoarchy concept to it. The researcher also suggested that process 
philosophy's notion of panpsychism may be integrated into McFague's embodiment 
This is also found in: McFague, 1992b. Liberation Theology. An Introductory Reader. Dadorette, C (Ed), pp 269-289. 
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metaphysic in order to overcome ontological reductionism and to show how bodies are 
dynamic and diverse. It was argued the body of God model is theocentric and thus in 
agreement with point three of the studies cosmological criteria. 
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Dei perspective, but from that of postmodern science. McFague believes this approach 
articulates humanity's position in creation. 
In her explanation of the common creation story, McFague requests a, "decentering and 
recentering of human beings" (: 108). According to this story, interrelatedness and dependency 
characterise humanity's relationship with creation. By decentering human beings McFague 
rejects the anthropocentrism of the Christian tradition. Human beings are located in a 
community where other life-forms exist. In this community all life-forms are related to each 
other in complex ways. Earth is a "common home" to millions of species of which human 
beings are one (: 109). While human beings are interrelated and interdependent with animate 
and inanimate beings, they are also dependent on the forms of life below them. McFague thus 
believes that humanity needs to accept its unique position vis-a-vis the entire natural order. 
The notion of dependency thus provokes human beings to see the natural order differently: 
they are not the centre of it, they cannot use it for their benefit and they are not superior to it (: 
111). McFague writes, 
we are part and parcel of the web of life and exist in interdependence with other beings, 
both human and non-human... We both depend on the web of life for our own continued 
existence and in a special way we are responsible for it (1988a: 671). 
The notion of human responsibility for the well being of creation is a thought that permeates 
McFague's body of God anthropology. She argues that human beings alone know the common 
creation story and therefore possess the ability to destroy creation. Part of this responsibility is 
learning to adopt a "loving eye" for the natural order (1993a: 127). The loving eye metaphor 
provides a good description of McFague's body of God anthropology. This metaphor intimates 
the notion of acknowledging and accepting the other's difference. 
The loving eye stands in opposition to another metaphor, the "arrogant eye" (1997a: 187). The 
latter is the formal, Western manner of viewing creation where there is a strict subject-object 
dualism. McFague believes this view is arrogant, as it understands and arranges everything 
from an egocentric perspective. The arrogant eye rejects the notion that the other is different 
and independent to it. It attempts to simplify nature so that it can be controlled. Nature is thus 
objectified and loses its particularity. 
The loving eye stresses that the other is a subject and thus accepts complexity and diversity 
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(: 188). In other words such a view is based on a subject-subject relationship. It accepts that 
there are boundaries between two subjects and in this manner allows them to retain their 
uniqueness. 
According to McFague the loving eye metaphor has much in common with Martin Buber's 
existential philosophy (1997b: lOOff). Buber's subject-subject approach is articulated by his 
notion of the I-Thou. The I-Thou involves developing a relationship with God, other humans 
and nature. When an individual approaches nature or another person in an I-Thou relationship, 
a mystical experience of the divine occurs. While McFague commends Buber for negating a 
subject-object dualism, including nature as a principal relationship and bringing spirituality to 
humanity's understanding of nature, she nevertheless takes issue with his approach. Buber 
appears to bypass the sensory world to a supernatural reality and is also preoccupied with the 
individual's experience of the divine in nature. The researcher believes the point McFague is 
making is that an experience of nature should not only result in a mystical experience of the 
divine; it should also involve experiencing the creation on the sensory level in order to 
appreciate its uniqueness. This means being attentive towards nature. 
The loving eye acknowledges that understanding the other takes time and requires the self to 
be attentive. This is interpreted into what McFague terms an "attention epistemology" (1993a: 
49). This epistemology involves observing the other attentively in order to appreciate it for 
what it is, in other words to validate the other's intrinsic value . Such an approach opposes 
utilitarianism. Knowledge of the other can only be gained when the other's independence and 
individuality is appraised. In other words an attention epistemology functions when the other's 
unique existence is affirmed. This approach takes the notion of "embodied differences" 
seriously (: 52). McFague asserts that to love the natural order, human beings need to be 
attentive towards it (1995a: 179). 
There is support for McFague's relational anthropology. I. Gebara considers "relatedness" to 
be the principal reality of everything (1999: 83). All beings are constituted by it. Gebara 
speaks of the, "connection, the correlatedness, the interdependence that exists between and 
among all things" (2002: 133). This means that human beings are more then their subjective 
N. Habel asserts that the earth has intrinsic worth, because God created it and has chosen it to "mask God's presence" 
(1998: 117). 
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consciousness. They are relatedness. Human beings are formed by their relationships with 
each other and the cosmos. They realise who they are, because of their connection with the 
cosmos. Being a part of the cosmos means viewing it as a subject and not as an object (1999: 
92). Gebara believes it is crucial for human beings to understand themselves as citizens of the 
earth and as creatures with an affinity with its soil (: 90). 
Earthly citizenship relates to the notion of community. Moltmann's notion of the "imago 
mundi" is important in this regard (1985: 186). He believes an interpretation of the human 
being as imago mundi needs to precede the notion of imago Dei. The former stipulates that 
people are communal by nature. They can only exist when in relationship with other creatures. 
Moreover, human beings are able to understand themselves only when in community. 
Moltmann insists the importance for human beings to understand themselves not in terms of 
their superior position in the cosmos, but in relation to their common genesis with and 
evolution in it. Human beings are to fellowship with the creation community. 
H. Sindima, writing from an African perspective, provides a lucid description of community 
(1990: 146). For him community as an awareness that all of creation is coherent. The multitude 
of creatures on the earth are part of each other. Human beings are a part of this community and 
thus share its destiny. The vision of such a community of nature is life in its entirety for human 
and non-human beings. 
The body of God anthropology is thus compatible with point one of the study's ecological 
anthropology, as it stresses a relational view of personhood. The issue now is whether or not it 
provides strong enough arguments against a dualistic-reductionistic understanding of 
personhood and thus an articulation of human particularity. 
5.2 The particularity of the human being 
5.2.1 The soul-mind-body interaction 
How does McFague address the uniqueness of the human species? The common creation story 
argues for unity and diversity in nature. Human beings are therefore a part of creation, but also 
unique in comparison to it. McFague believes human uniqueness is due to two factors: self-
consciousness and responsibility. 
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McFague argues it is self-consciousness and not rationality, which differentiates human beings 
from other beings (1993a: 122). She takes issue with the argument that intellect differentiates 
human beings from animals. Humans have developed the ability to reason logically and have a 
complex linguistic capacity, but the common creation story places them on a continuum with 
animals. However, rationality may be identified in higher animals as well (: 120). Rationality 
in this regard is understood as the ability to prioritise a set of preferences into a structure. 
Higher animals have preferences and this indicates that they have the ability to reason. Self-
consciousness, on the other hand, involves free will and therefore the ability to change a 
context. It is the capacity for the self to meditate on the notion that it knows and on what it 
knows (: 122). Self-consciousness provides human beings with knowledge and thus power. 
McFague correctly observes that human beings are responsible agents, because they possess 
knowledge of nature and thus have power. This power can be used to destroy humanity and 
other species of life or it is may be used to facilitate the creative processes that nature 
possesses (: 108). Human beings are dependent on nature. McFague thence uses the metaphors 
of "guardians" and "caretakers" to articulate how humanity is to exercise its power and 
knowledge (: 109). Human beings are to be responsible agents and care for the well-being of 
all creation. McFague writes, 
we are-basically, intrinsically, and always-interrelational, interdependent beings who live 
in total dependence on the others who compose the body, while at the same time being 
responsible for the well-being of one tiny part of the body, planet earth (2002a: 53) 
(Emphasis the researcher's). 
While McFague argues for the particularity of the human being, she does not do so on the basis 
of a complexity hierarchy. It was concluded previously that the body of God cosmology is in 
danger of reductionism unless a complexity hierarchy is introduced. The charge of 
reductionism may again be levelled against the body of God anthropology. 
McFague argues that self-consciousness distinguishes human beings from other beings. It is 
this mental activity that allows them to reflect consciously and self-consciously on the world 
around them. However, McFague does not describe how mental activity in human beings 
includes the functioning of the brain and thus the body. It seems as though the credibility of 
her argument hinges on how the body and mind interact, but McFague fails to do so. The 
reason for this is that although McFague does accept the multilevelled nature of reality in 
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general, she does not stress a complexity hierarchy at the anthropological level. It was noted 
before that the danger with this is that mental properties become nothing but physiological 
interactions within the body. McFague asserts, 
This picture is a profoundly organic one, but it scarcely supports dualism or conservatism 
...it privileges matter rather than mind, inasmuch as matter is the source of everything, 
including mind (1993 a: 46). 
It was indicated before that downward and upward causation are characteristic of a complexity 
hierarchy. At the human level this means that mind and body interact in terms of these two 
types of causation. McFague does not indicate how this may be so. 
What has been discussed thus far relates to the soul as well. If the notion of emergent 
complexity is utilised in understanding the soul-mind-body interaction then a holistic view of 
personhood may be possible. Conradie maintains it is important to view the soul not as split 
form the body or immortal, but as a part of it. The soul describes the nature of the psyche and 
its capacity for, "interpersonal relationships, language, culture, ethos, worldviews and religion" 
(2005c: 110) 
While these capacities are based on neurological functions, they cannot be reduced to them. A 
soul requires a functioning brain, but this is insufficient. There is more to the dynamics of the 
soul then mere neurological impulses. According to this approach the human is understood as a 
complex, psychosomatic being. A person may thus be understood as a living organism with 
biological process, as well as an individual who is responsible and can make decisions (: 111). 
The soul is therefore not understood as something alien to or incarnated in the body. 
McFague does not appear to address the soul-mind-body interaction adequately. She makes 
reference to the human being as an, "inspirited body among other living bodies", but does not 
take this any further (1993a: 113). To prevent the spirit/soul from being reduced to 
neurological functioning, McFague needs to introduce a complexity hierarchy into her 
anthropology. The difficulty with the body of God anthropology is that while it does oppose a 
dualistic anthropology, it does not describe how soul and body interact. If it did then its case 
against dualistic anthropologies may be stronger. As it stands McFague's anthropology 
struggles to achieve a holistic view of the human being. 
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In addition to these reflections on the soul-mind-body interaction, the issue of human 
responsibility is also relevant. The body of God anthropology does intimate that human beings 
have knowledge and power and are to use this responsibly vis-a-vis their relationship with 
creation. This is a valid and crucial point. But again this is not argued on the basis of a 
complexity hierarchy. It was indicated before that human beings have a highly developed 
mental infrastructure and this gives them power. A complexity hierarchy is thus necessary to 
show why human beings have such power. If such a hierarchy is not stressed the body of God 
may be overly egalitarian. 
According to Conradie, several ecological theologies do demonstrate the distinctiveness of 
human beings without including a hierarchy in their system, however he insists that such an 
approach is overly egalitarian and therefore does not take into account the varieties of 
hierarchies present in ecosystems (2005c: 104). 
McFague takes issue with egalitarianism, because such a view does not acknowledge 
differences (1993 a: 121). Even though the body of God anthropology takes unity and diversity 
seriously it does not indicate how this may be so. Hierarchies are necessary for diversity, 
because as T. Berry notes, "Fish are the best at swimming, birds at flying, trees at creating 
oxygen and humans at reflective thinking" (in Conradie 2005c: 104). McFague therefore does 
not appear to negate an egalitarian worldview and in the process weakens an argument for 
human particularity. This may be due to her emphasis on relationship at the expense of 
hierarchy. 
A consideration of the above critique shows the body of God anthropology not to be in 
agreement with point two of the requirements for an ecological anthropology. It is unable to 
describe the interaction between mind and body and thus does not present a strong argument 
for a holistic anthropology. In addition to this it may be reductionistic and thus provides a 
weakened argument for human distinctiveness. However, McFague's argument for human 
distinctiveness and a holistic anthropology may be strengthened using insights from 
supervenience theory, transpersonal psychology and biblical anthropology. 
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5.2.2 A modification of the body of God anthropology's approach to the soul-mind-body 
issue 
5.2.2.1 Supervenience 
The body of God anthropology's case for a holistic anthropology may be augmented if it is 
raised one level in order to include the notion of mind. This may also assist in reducing or 
negating the reductionism that the body of God anthropology could fall into. It should be noted 
that the approach described in this study falls under the rubric of "interactionist theories" that 
describe the mind-body problem (Gregory 2004:604). These theories stipulate that the mind 
can act on the body and vice-versa. Process philosophy may also be applied to the body of 
God embodiment metaphysic, but the researcher will pursue supervenience theory, as this 
seems to give a clearer analysis of the interaction between body and mind than process 
thought. 
P. Clayton believes that while emergence theories are helpful in describing the interaction 
between mind and body, they are not thorough enough and he thence proposes supervenience 
theory to build on their insights (1997: 249). Supervenience theory asserts that mental states 
rely on biological properties, but are irreducible to them. The mind is thus different from the 
brain. 
Supervenience theory insists that mental properties "supervene" on physical properties (: 252). 
Mental states come to pass from physical states and are not reduced to them. This means that 
the mind cannot be completely described in physical terms. Thoughts are thus not just the 
result of neurological occurrences. In this manner mental experiences are considered to be real 
and not simply the product of the brain. This implies that thoughts and mental events are both 
physical and non-physical. Thoughts are not contained in a mental reality divorced from the 
brain. There is a causal relationship between the brain and mind. Thoughts and mental 
processes emerge from the brain, but are not reduced to them. Moreover, thoughts and other 
mental processes are able to influence the brain's processes (: 254). 
Clayton provides a lucid description of how this process functions (: 255-6). The purpose of 
supervenience theory is to determine how mental states are caused. On the one hand a mental 
state or thought is caused by a physical state in the brain, but it is possible for a mental state to 
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cause another mental state. Some theorists would insist that for a new mental property to 
emerge a new physical state is required, but Clayton argues to the contrary. He believes that a 
mental property can cause a novel mental state (: 256). This newly generated mental property 
is then able to act on physical properties. The result of this is a novel physical state. Clayton 
has thus provided a valuable analysis of upward and downward causation between the mind 
and brain. 
Supervenience theory can then be applied to McFague's embodiment metaphysic. In this 
manner the body of God's case for a holistic anthropology will be stronger, while avoiding 
reductionism. This allows the body of God to endorse a metaphysic that takes bodies and 
physical reality seriously without reducing this reality to nothing but bodies. Moreover, 
supervenience theory provides a framework for human uniqueness, as it highlights the 
complex thought processing that is typical of the human being. 
5.2.2.2 Transpersonal psychology 
The objective of this aspect of the study's anthropological reflection is to demonstrate the 
capacity that human beings have for self-transcendence, in other words the ability to be more 
than just their bodies. This means human beings cannot be understood only in terms of their 
bodies. Transpersonal psychology offers valuable insights in this regard. 
Transpersonal literally means being beyond the personal (Vaughan, Wittine and Walsh, 1997: 
484). Transpersonal Psychology integrates all fields of knowledge and allows for the inclusion 
of the wider context, including spiritual experience. K. Wilber endorses transpersonal 
psychology. 
The main component of Wilber's theory is the "spectrum of consciousness" (1997: 50)35. 
There are seventeen stages in this spectrum of consciousness, each level making it possible for 
the individual to view aspects of reality differently (Adams 2002: 165-179). The levels of 
consciousness are essentially in a hierarchy, with higher levels offering a more comprehensive 
view of reality, but this does not undermine the validity of the lower levels, because what they 
reveal about the world is accurate. Each new level of consciousness includes the one that 
35 This is underpinned by what he calls the "perennial philosophy", which is characterised by the great chain of being 
approach to reality. (Wilber 1996: 124). 
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precedes it. Moreover, each level transcends and includes its immediately lower level. It is not 
necessary to describe each of these levels fully, but what is significant is at the higher levels, 
the human being is able to reach a sense of connectedness with everything, both physical and 
spiritual. An individual no longer has a sense of being a member of a certain species, but 
transcends this and becomes aware of his or her connectedness and relatedness to the whole of 
creation. 
This inherent capacity for self-transcendence is given theological expression by K. Rahner 
(1978: 31-5). He maintains that while human beings are embodied, they are able to move 
beyond their bodies. Rahner interprets this human transcendence as the ability to be open to 
emotion, reason and the, "mysterious infinity" (: 32). This openness occurs within space and 
time, however it cannot be reduced to them. Rahner does not view human transcendence as 
merely an aspect of the soul, which is unrelated to physical reality. While it occurs within 
physical reality, it is not reduced to biological processes. This notion of human self-
transcendence is significant, particularly if personhood is used as an analogue for the G-W 
relationship. The researcher believes insights from transpersonal psychology may be integrated 
into McFague's anthropology in order to avoid reductionism. 
5.2.2.3 In the image of God 
The body of God anthropology does not begin its reflection on what it means to human in light 
of the imago Dei. Human beings are to be understood in terms of the common creation story, 
"rather than as a reflection of divine reality" (1993a: 110). By doing this McFague has 
bypassed a central resource for theological reflection: the bible36. It is understandable why this 
has been done and McFague's attempt to overcome anthropocentrism is praiseworthy. A text 
such as Gen. 1: 26-9 appears to support anthropocentrism, because it seems as though God 
created the universe for humankind's glory. The Genesis reading may thus be used to justify 
the domination of creation by humankind. 
Prior to the publication of The Body of God, McFague does use the imago Dei concept in her reflection on the body of God 
model (1990: 216f). She argues that if God is conscious of God's embodiment then human beings are conscious of their own. 
This means humankind has the potential to care for the universe's body and thus has a "special status and responsibility" for 
it (: 217). McFague appears to have changed her views and links human responsibility not to the imago Dei, but to the 
common creation story. 
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However, it was signified previously in the study that the imago Dei might be interpreted in a 
relational manner. Humankind comes from the earth's dust and is thus an intimate part of it. 
Human beings have the responsibility to care for creation with a gentle and merciful hand. 
Being created in the imago Dei means that human beings are relational beings. They thus have 
the capacity for relationship with each other and all of creation. However, what makes 
humanity unique vis-a-vis the imago Dei is its openness to God. In this manner a Christian 
ecological theology should be theocentric. In addition to the views of human particularity that 
a complexity hierarchy from the sciences may present, an anthropology based on the imago 
Dei highlights human uniqueness in terms of its relationship with the Triune God. McFague's 
attempt to avoid the apparent anthropocentrism of imago Dei theology thus seems to lose this 
notion of human uniqueness. Pannenberg and Conradie both argue for a theocentric 
anthropology that signifies humankind's continuity with creation. 
W. Pannenberg explains the notion of humanity's openness to the world and God. He 
understands the term open to mean humankind's constant search for something beyond the 
world (1970: 8). This search differentiates human beings from animals. Like animals they have 
drives such as the need for food and conditions that bring about a healthy body. In this manner 
humankind relies on its environment. Pannenberg notes that while animals are in bondage to 
their environment, human beings are dependent on God and he writes, "openness to the world 
presupposes a relation to God" (: 12)37. This approach appears to maintain humankind's 
continuity with creation and also stresses its particularity. 
E. Conradie asserts that the idea of created in the image of God has been under emphasised in 
Christian anthropology (2005c: 23). Human beings emerge in the creation narratives of the 
bible and therefore are connected to creation. In other words anthropology needs to be 
understood in relation to the doctrine of creation. To be created means that one is a creature 
and thus part of creation. The fact that God sees and then declares creation to be good means 
that God values physical reality highly. This is in contrast to Platonic, Neoplatonic and Gnostic 
systems of thought, which devalue the physical world. These thought forms support the idea 
that humanity is alienated from the created order (: 24). 
Conradie describes the human situation as a search for the boundaries of existence (2005c: 149). This is done when the 
self is able to transcend his or her environment. 
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Conradie stresses that a Christian anthropology should not have the sciences as its foundation, 
as this could result in a "shallow form" of natural theology (: 10, 14). McFague argues that the 
world as God's body is an attempt to construct a theology of nature and is therefore not 
another form of natural theology (1993a: 75). However, the body of God anthropology 
understands humanity from the perspective of the common creation story and not the imago 
Dei. In other words it does endorse a form of natural theology. For Conradie a Christian 
anthropology must include the doctrine of creation and the doctrine of God (2005c: 10). This 
appears to be reasonable; as such an approach will result in a theocentric anthropology. 
Conradie is particularly concerned with a theology that romanticises or over extends human 
responsibility and writes," a denial of that which transcends this life does not necessarily 
encourage responsibility for this earth" (2005a: 300). While the body of God anthropology 
does stress human responsibility this is not understood from a theocentric perspective. It is for 
this reason that this particular anthropology is in disagreement •w\X\\point three of the study's 
requirements for an adequate ecological anthropology. McFague's anthropology therefore 
needs revision in this regard . 
By under emphasising biblical anthropology, the body of God model loses valuable insights 
vis-a-vis a holistic anthropology. The human being is understood holistically in the Old 
Testament (McKim 1988: 62). The body and soul are fully integrated and the person is viewed 
in a social, corporate manner. The soul, flesh, spirit and heart are viewed as fully integrated 
into the human being. None of these are to be considered the essence of the human being. They 
are viewed as dimensions or perspectives on human existence. 
The soul (nephash-Hebrew) is used to denote parts of the body such as the throat (Ps. 107:5), 
stomach (Num. 21:5) and neck (Ps. 105: 18) (Maimela 1982: 47). This was done by the 
biblical writers to emphasis the integrity of the human being. Soul and body were not 
dichotomised, because the OT writers were unfamiliar with the Greek notion of the soul's 
immortality. For the Hebrews a soul may be dead or poured out into death (Num. 6:6, Is 53-
12). This is probably why such an emphasis was placed on the General Resurrection of the 
dead at the end of time. In this way the dead soul and body are simply waiting to be given life 
It is not within the scope of the study to do this, as this may require substantial theological revision to the body of God 
anthropology. This point merely indicates a weakness in McFague's anthropology. 
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again. In the NT, the wholeness of the person is carried over. The soul (psuche-Greek) is 
associated with bodily aspects such clothing, eating and drinking (Lk. 12: 20). 
Flesh (basar-Hebrew, sarx-Greek) refers to the earthly, creaturely dimension of humanity's 
existence, in other words corporeality (Gen. 2:21, Jn 1:14, Phil. 1:24) (: 48). The body is thus 
viewed as indispensable for human existence, as it is the interface with earthly reality. The 
body is not viewed as inferior to the body and Paul encourages Christians to consecrate their 
bodies for God (Rom. 12:). 
Spirit (ruach-Hebrew, pneuma- Greek) is synonymous with soul (: 49). It is viewed as a gift 
from God that enables humankind to relate to Him or Her (Gen. 2:7, Jn 4:2). The spirit 
therefore assists human beings to relate to that which is extraordinary, but is not the most 
significant aspect of life. Ruach means breath and this again highlights the integrity of spirit 
and body for the OT writers (Gen 2). 
Heart (leb-Hebrew, kardia-Greek) often relates to emotions and feelings (Prov. 14:30, 17:22, 
Ps 27: 7) (: 50). These emotions may lead human beings astray (Jer. 49: 16, Rom. 1:24). The 
heart therefore influences all aspects of human life: emotions, choices, actions, desires, beliefs, 
opinions and sin. God knows people's hearts (Lk. 16:15, Acts 1: 24, Rom. 8: 27). 
Moreover, D. Kinsley argues that the bible does not advocate the idea of human beings 
tyrannising creation (1996: 118). The bible understands the heavens as beyond humankind and 
the Mosaic Law restricts how human beings are to treat the natural order. Restrictions are 
placed on the felling of trees (Deut. 20: 19-20), the land must fallow every seven years (Lev. 
25: 1-7) and human beings are called to treat animals in a humane manner (Deut. 25:4). These 
non-anthropocentric renderings of the bible highlight the need for an ecological anthropology 
to take the bible seriously. 
McFague asserts that it is important for the theologian to image the G-W relationship in a 
manner analogous with human beings (1987: 62). To do this may require a holistic 
anthropology. It was shown before that the body of God anthropology does not seem to 
provide a strong argument against mind/body dualism due to its reductionistic tendencies. This 
is due to an under emphasis on the notion of mind, as well as little stress on a biblical 
anthropology. By introducing the notion of supervenience and transpersonal psychology to 
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McFague's embodiment metaphysic, an attempt was made to strengthen the body of God 
anthropology's case against dualism. It was also argued that the body of God model needs 
more input from biblical anthropology in this regard. 
G. Jantzen argues that a dualism, which disparages physical reality, is not adequate for 
understanding the G-W dynamic (1984: 9). She believes a holistic anthropology is necessary 
for this, but stresses that the interaction between the mind and body needs to be clarified in 
order to be an analogy for the G-W relationship. A holistic anthropology as an analogy may 
highlight a more intimate view of God's interaction with the world. In this manner divine 
agency will be understood as internal and not external. 
These insights have consequences for the body of God anthropology. In its unrevised version it 
over emphasises the body at expense of the mind and therefore becomes an inadequate analogy 
for the G-W relationship. However, in its revised form with the insights from supervenience 
theory, transpersonal psychology and biblical anthropology, the body of God appears to be 
better equipped to provide an analogy for the G-W dynamic. 
5.3 McFague's views on sin and responsibility. 
The value of the common creation story is that it provides a cosmological image of 
humankind's locality vis-a-vis creation. According to this narrative human beings are not at the 
centre of the universe, but are one aspect of it. This provides a non-anthropocentric view of the 
relationship between humanity and creation. Humans are dependent on lower levels of life for 
their existence. This means that humankind has a responsibility for the well being of the 
natural order. This notion of human responsibility prompts McFague to find a concrete 
understanding of sin (1993a: 113). She insists this is necessary to prevent an over spiritualised 
view of sin that does not take the earth into consideration. 
McFague therefore believes that it is important to articulate an ecological view of sin and 
thence defines it not as a rebellion against God, but as, "the refusal to accept our place" in the 
natural order (1993a: 112). In other words in the body of God paradigm anthropocentrism is 
sin. A refusal to acknowledge their position in relation to the natural order means that human 
beings are permitted to dominate and control creation. In this manner the relationship between 
creation and humankind is destroyed. In the body of God model sin is refusing to take 
- 9 9 -
responsibility for the care of the earth (1990: 217). It was noted before that part of being 
responsible means viewing creation with a loving eye. This suggests that arrogance is another 
form of sin. For McFague sin, "is the desire to set oneself apart from all others as not needing 
them or being needed by them" (: 217). 
It may be understood according to one word: "selfishness" (1993a: 115). Selfishness is the 
result of anthropocentrism, because it views human beings at the centre of the universe. In this 
manner sin is understood as the living out of a lie. The consequence of this is the negation of 
relationships. The body of God anthropology understands these relationships to be in three 
forms: human-human, human-animals and human-nature (: 116-129)39. 
In terms of the human-human relationship McFague stresses that injustices among human 
beings need to be resolved before addressing humankind's relationship with the natural order. 
Justice is understood by McFague as, "sharing the limited resources of our common space" 
(: 116). The body of God anthropology therefore encourages research into the link between 
issues such as economics, culture, gender, religion and politics and the destruction of natural 
reality. Sin in this context is refusing to share land and space with those in poverty. 
As regards the human-animal relationship, McFague insists that the common creation story 
shows humankind to be alike and unlike other animals. Sin in this context is the alienation of 
human beings from animals. This occurs when human beings believe animals have no 
commonality with them and are thus inferior (: 122) 
Finally, sin in the context of the human-nature dynamic is when human beings lose a sense of 
belonging to the natural order and then objectify it (: 124). In this manner nature is understood 
as an it, devoid of feeling. Sin is thus adopting an arrogant eye towards creation. 
5.3.1 The Pelagian influence on McFague's anthropology 
These insights seem to be characteristic of a Pelagian understanding of sin, free will and 
responsibility. Pelagius maintained that human beings are completely free and thus responsible 
McFague argues that the universe as God's body model stresses the notion that sin against all parts of the body implies sin 
against God. (1993:114). The body of God model therefore encourages human beings to view nature as sacred. Abuse agamst 
nature therefore means revolt against God. The mental imagery the body of God invokes here is vivid. 
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for their actions (McKim 1988: 71). He believed that this free will is bestowed on humankind 
through God's grace at birth. This freedom together with God's grace assists human beings to 
resist sin. Pelagius thus rejected the notion of original sin arguing instead for the individual's 
responsibility to choose good instead of evil. 
The body of God anthropology seems to have much in common with Pelagian anthropology. It 
does not refer to the notion of original sin, focusing on human responsibility and freedom. 
From an ecological perspective this means humankind is responsible for the well being of 
creation40. 
While McFague does not explicitly refer to God's grace as the cause of freedom, she does 
seem to imply this when she writes, 
we alone can choose to become partners with God in care of the world... the body, that 
God has made available to us as both the divine presence and our home (1990: 217) 
(Emphasis the researcher's). 
This statement implies that the body of God anthropology is Pelagian, as it demonstrates how 
human responsibility and freedom interact with God's presence (i.e. grace) to care for the 
world and thus overcome sin. The value to such an approach is that it opposes fatalism. Human 
beings thus have the knowledge and power to care for creation. The body of God anthropology 
therefore has a positive view of the human being. McFague is therefore focused on ethics 
(1993 a: 111). She uses the metaphors of "guardians and caretakers" to articulate the 
relationship between humankind and creation (: 109). These metaphors appear to be a form of 
stewardship. M. Hilkert challenges the stewardship metaphor and questions whether it moves 
beyond anthropocentrism (1995: 164). Moreover, A. Peterson claims a stewardship ethic does 
not remove the power human beings have over the environment and continues to view the 
natural order in a utilitarian manner (2003: 330). 
Conradie issues words of caution in relation to the stewardship metaphor (2000: 153-174). It 
still presumes that human beings are supreme among the species of the earth and that they 
know what is best for creation; in addition to this the metaphor falsely assumes that humanity 
has the skills to manage "ecological systems" (: 158). Moreover, the stewardship metaphor, 
40 Part of this responsibility is acknowledging that the earth has a limited supply of energy (1993: 58). McFague draws on 
insights from the laws of thermodynamics to substantiate this view. 
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"assumes a relationship between humanity and nature" (: 158). Conradie correctly observes 
that the sciences demonstrate that human beings are apart of the earth. In other words, this 
metaphor does not heighten the notion that humanity needs the earth and is thoroughly 
dependent on it. 
There are also crucial differences between McFague and Pelagius. The former has a more 
concrete view of sin. The danger with a spiritualised view of sin is that it only concerns one 
aspect of the human being (i.e. the spiritual) and fails to consider the importance of sin in the 
physical sense. Moreover, McFague has a more communal understanding of sin, whereas 
Pelagius focuses on the individual human being. In an ecological context a communal 
understanding of sin is more relevant, because ecology is a study of relationships and what 
impacts these. 
5.3.2 The scope of McFague's definition of sin 
Is McFague's definition of sin broad enough? A central concern for the researcher is her 
conjecture that human beings are not sinners if they rebel against God. Her argument is that if 
the universe is thought of as God's body then by sinning against the universe human beings are 
rebelling against God. But what if the universe was not be perceived as God's body? What if a 
metaphor were chosen that stresses the goodness of creation, but does not think of the universe 
as God's body. How would rebellion against God then be conceived? L. Van Dyk also takes 
issue with the body of God model in this regard. She maintains that an incorrect dichotomy is 
established in McFague understanding of sin (1994: 179). McFague implies that rebelling 
against God is different from the refusal to accept one's place. Van Dyk notes that rebelling 
against God includes being unwilling to remain in one's place. This critique is reasonable, 
because the NT commandment means loving God and neighbour41. Failing to love one's 
neighbour, or, according to McFague's understanding, failing to stay in our place, means 
rebelling against God. 
41 By neighbour the researcher means all of creation. This affirms W. Persaud's view that the notion of neighbour needs to be 
extended to the natural order as well (1992: 296f). 
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On the other hand the notion of original sin also needs consideration. Like Pelagius, McFague 
does not stress the impact of original sin or the fall on humanity42 and the created order. 
McFague, although suspicious of how human beings have treated creation, has a positive 
anthropology. She believes human beings are responsible agents . She writes, "Human 
responsibility for the fate of the earth is a recent and terrible knowledge" (1991b: 15). 
However, there are difficulties by not stressing the fallen nature of creation. 
A. Linzey believes there are four consequences to this (1998: 23-6)44. First, the natural world 
has no evil. This means that morality has no reference to nature. In this manner human beings 
view the cruelty demonstrated in nature as normal occurrences. The danger with this is that 
human beings themselves may be tempted to emulate such cruelty or may become morally 
neutral to nature. Second, it is impossible for nature to be redeemed. Instead God uses nature's 
cruelty as an agent instead of saving it through the Holy Spirit. Nature cannot be saved, as 
"there is nothing to be improved upon" (: 24). Third, human beings are not obligated to 
collaborate with God to redeem nature, because the cruelty of nature is a morally neutral issue. 
In this manner morality is merely a human concern. Finally, if nature cannot be redeemed than 
God's moral goodness is questionable. If God has deliberately created a morally flawed 
universe than God is immoral. 
McFague argues for a strong ethical approach in regard to humankind's relationship with the 
natural order. The body of God anthropology encourages human beings to adopt a loving eye 
towards creation. This appears to be a vital and necessary insight and provides a significant 
argument for human responsibility. However, a danger with this approach is that it does not 
require human beings to acknowledge the cruelty of nature. The loving eye does not appear to 
take natural evil seriously. In this manner God's goodness is questioned particularly in regard 
to natural disasters and the victims of evolution. The body of God anthropology is thus in 
tension with points one and four of Linzey's analysis. However, the strength of McFague's 
approach is that it insists that there is an ecological crisis and that nature needs to be saved and 
human beings need to exercise their responsibility in partnership with God to care for the 
42 Augustine focused on original sin and its impact on humanity. He does not appear to address the relationship between 
original sin and creation. M. Fox notes this human-centred view of salvation has lost the beauty and goodness of creation 
(1983:46-51). 
43 McFague seems to be in agreement with K. Rahner here. He maintains that when a subject experiences himself (sic) he 
realises himself to be responsible and free to the depth of his existence (1978: 37f). 
44 For another treatment of the fall and ecological theology see J. Clatworthy's article, "Let the Fall Down: The 
Environmental Implications of the doctrine of the Fall" (1998: 27-34). 
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creation. However, Linzey's warnings need to be taken seriously in any anthropology that does 
not stress the fallen nature of creation and the impact of original sin on it. 
In addition to this a Christian ecological anthropology that does not consider the impact of 
original sin by focusing instead on an evolutionary view of life may not be theocentric. An 
example of this is J. Hick's mythological approach to original sin (1993: 115-7). He does not 
view original sin literally, opting instead for a mythological interpretation of it as, "the fact of 
universal human imperfection" (: 115). Hick contends that according to evolutionary 
anthropology human beings didn't descend from a single created pair, but evolved from lower 
life forms over an incredibly long period of time. The earliest humans had an animistic 
worldview, but were never in complete communion with God. In addition to this humankind 
was never in a harmonious relationship with each other and nature, but were involved in a 
battle for survival. Human beings were fallen in the sense that they were morally and 
spiritually deprived. They were never in an ideal state. For Hick the idea of the fall should be 
abandoned. This is a clear example of how far from theocentrism anthropology may traverse. 
The danger for the body of God model anthropology is that by avoiding the doctrine of original 
sin and the consequence of the fall on all creation, it may become naturalistic and not 
theocentric. 
This tendency towards cosmocentrism or creation-centredness is also a danger for those 
varieties of ecological theologies that emphasise creation spirituality. McFague argues against 
such an approach. She maintains that replacing "redemption spirituality" with "creation 
spirituality" is insufficient (1991b: 15). While the emphasis on redemption to the neglect of 
creation needs to be addressed and the notion that the common creation story invokes an 
appreciation for creation, these approaches do not focus on sin as the cause of the earth's 
predicament. Theology acts as a frame of reference for establishing humanity's compliance in 
creation's degradation. It is for this reason that there needs to be a radicalising of, "the 
Christian understanding of sin and evil" (: 15). McFague believes creation spirituality is 
Utopian, because it does not describe how reality is, but how it ought to be. There is thus an 
element of the prophetic in creation spirituality, however it tends to romanticise reality by not 
taking sin seriously. McFague thus attempts to find a balance between creation and redemption 
spiritualities. On the one hand the body of God anthropology stresses the beauty of creation 
and on the other hand it takes sin seriously. 
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To summarise. There are a limited number of difficulties with this anthropology. McFague's 
understanding of sin seems to need more reflection on original sin and the fall. The neglect of 
this doctrine seems to be due to a Pelagian understanding of human freedom. Moreover, her 
understanding of rebellion against God did not seem clear to the researcher. However, the body 
of God anthropology provides valuable insights into the nature and consequences of sin. It 
takes human responsibility seriously vis-a-vis the degradation of nature. The value to this 
approach is that it opposes anthropocentrism by stressing the dependency of humankind on 
creation. Moreover, a strength of McFague's anthropology is that it does not endorse a 
privatised, individualistic view on sin. Sin is not only an issue between the self and God, it 
includes sin against all creation. The body of God anthropology also intimates the notion that 
sin is a breakdown of relationships. McFague's definition of sin seems to be broad enough for 
a Christian ecological theology and is thus in agreement with point four of the anthropology 
reflection. 
5.4 The body of God model and ecojustice 
The fact that the body of God anthropology stresses a concrete, earthy view of sin means that it 
endorses a form of salvation that takes the well being of all creation seriously. McFague 
critiques the Christian tradition, and in particular the Protestant strand, for encouraging an 
individualistic, "otherworldly salvation" (1993a: 111). McFague's views need to be taken 
seriously in this regard. 
R. Langmead observes the tendency in Evangelical theology to focus on the personal salvation 
of human beings (1998: 164). Such an anthropocentric view does not include the universe and 
earth in any process of salvation. However, Rom. 8 asserts that creation anticipates its full 
redemption. A spiritualised form of salvation is therefore unable to engage in ecojustice, 
because justice is less important that personal salvation and creation is understood as a 
peripheral issue (: 165). Langmead also takes issue with an apocalyptic, otherworldly view of 
salvation. The view here is that the earth is not part of the heaven. Salvation means being in 
communion with God who is in a heavenly kingdom. This means that the earth cannot be part 
of a salvation process. It is believed that events on earth will worsen before they get better. 
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Such an understanding of salvation may prevent Christians from involvement with ecojustice 
45 
issues . 
The researcher is thus in agreement with McFague on the need for a more concrete 
understanding of salvation. Her view on salvation is largely determined by an emphasis on the 
importance of bodies. In this manner salvation is primarily concerned with the well being of 
the world's body and the many bodies located in it (1993a: 23). The body of God anthropology 
is primarily concerned with the liberation of the oppressed. McFague supports the idea of 
human accountability for the care of the oppressed earth (1988a: 673). McFague asserts that 
the oppressed need to be understood as human beings in a state of oppression, as well as, "the 
oppressed earth and all its life-forms" (1993a: 31). The body of God model thus appears to be 
a form of liberation theology. 
A liberation theology identifies a situation of oppression and then analyses why such a 
situation exists. It specifies whom the oppressor and oppressed are. Moreover, liberation 
theology demonstrates how the oppressed may be emancipated. Salvation is identified and 
understood in terms of liberation (Livingston 2000: 294). J. Sobrino interprets oppression in 
the light of injustice: the oppressor and oppressed dynamic is the most definitive form of sin 
and the direct consequence of this sin is death (in Moila 2002: 95). 
Liberation theology attempts to identify those sinful structures that lead to oppression, 
focusing less on personal sin and more on what is termed "structural sin" (: 83). It considers 
the broader sociological reasons for oppression. Issues of justice are thus central to a liberation 
theology. Liberation theologians thus take political, social, economic, religious, cultural and 
gender realities into account in their reflection. In a liberation theology the oppressed may be 
understood in a variety of ways: women, the poor, a racial group and nature. The segregation 
of the oppressed is approached from the perspective of justice, equality and rights. In other 
words a liberation theology struggles to gain justice for the oppressed. It attempts to establish 
the reason for the injustice and how this sin may be overcome. In this manner prophecy and 
advocacy become critical. A liberation theology therefore shows the way social reality is and 
how it should be by being a voice for the oppressed. 
Ruether also critiques an apocalyptic view of salvation as the reason for the alienation between human beings and the 
physical world (1972: 115f). 
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A liberation theology that is ecologically sensitive should address how nonhuman reality is 
affected by: the manner in which society is structured, how society is regulated, how growth 
and development are understood in the society and the spiritual values of a community (Boff 
1995: 19-26). It thus seems tenable to refer to the oppressed in this regard as the created order. 
These insights highlight the need for ecojustice where politics, economics and religion are 
taken seriously. 
While the body of God model may side with liberation theology, McFague believes a difficulty 
with many forms of liberation theology is that they remain anthropocentric (1992a: 44). The 
problem with this is that issues concerning justice and ecology have been held in tension. 
McFague maintains that the two need to be in continuity so that liberation can include the 
earth. Liberation theologies emphasise advocacy and McFague supports this idea, however she 
believes an "advocational theology" must include the ecological context as well (1991a: 21). 
Advocacy appears to be at the forefront of the body of God model (1993a: 72). 
This notion may be seen in McFague's theology in general. She argues that the current 
condition of the planet is such that theology needs to adopt a position of advocacy as a way to 
overcome the destruction of ecosystems (1993a: 68; 1993b: 144). McFague insists that the 
consequence of such an approach for theology would be an agenda that keeps the, "liberation 
of the oppressed, including the earth and all its creatures, in central focus" (1991b: 14). 
McFague's approach affirms the intrinsic and instrumental value of all creation (: 165ff). 
Creation's integrity is maintained when these two types of value are equally affirmed. The 
common creation story rejects a utilitarian understanding of the human-nature relationship, as 
this compromises the integrity of creation. It is only when the intrinsic value of creation is 
avowed that it may be used with, "humility, respect, and thanksgiving" (: 166). 
An advocational theology such as McFague's takes issues of justice seriously, because it seeks 
to confirm the value of all life. She stresses the importance of addressing justice issues in the 
human community before the natural community. The reason for such an approach is that 
social justice has a direct impact on environmental justice (: 117). Humankind can therefore 
only benefit the natural order when its own affairs are in order. 
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H. Hadsell affirms McFague's approach. She notes that justice for a liberation theology occurs 
in social reality and, 
These patterns of social interaction mediate our social relationships and our relationships 
with nature and must be carefully scrutinized (1992: 81). 
Beginning with justice at the human level prevents the naturalisation of justice issues. This 
means that nature is not to be viewed as more significantly than social reality (: 82). When 
nature gains prominence over the social world, human beings become the object and nature a 
subject. In this manner nature determines the value of human life as opposed to human beings 
valuing nature. Such an approach prevents justice, as human responsibility is reduced. The 
body of God approach is thus justifiable. 
McFague defines justice as, "sharing the limited resources of our common space" (1993a: 
116). She believes that it is an ecological sin for those who have land and space to not share 
these with those who don't. McFague thus sees a link between human poverty and 
environmental degradation. In addition to this the body of God model views nature as the "new 
poor", but McFague stresses that this does not mean the "old poor" (i.e. human beings) are 
simply being replaced (: 165). Nature is rather to be viewed as part of the poor community and 
it is humankind that has made it poor. 
The fact that the body of God anthropology takes poverty seriously means it is concerned with 
the economic reasons for the destruction of the natural environment. J. De Gruchy and D. Field 
maintain it is critical to approach economics from an ecological perspective (1994: 207). Such 
a view means that natural resources are not to be understood purely in financial terms. Use of 
resources and development needs to be measured against the impact on ecosystems. Moreover, 
a critique of consumerism is required, because the planet is unable to prolong societies driven 
by a consumer culture. Consumerism allows a select few access to the earth's resources. An 
ecological understanding of economics thus seems tenable. 
McFague's extends her stress on the link between justice and ecology in an economic analysis 
found in the book, Life Abundant. She maintains how economics may be understood and 
applied is determined by two optional worldviews: mechanism and organism (2001: 72). The 
former understands the earth as a corporation composed of single human beings who benefit 
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by optimising the use of resources. Human beings are externally related to each other and the 
environment. The latter understands the earth as a community that thrives through the 
interrelatedness and interdependence of its human and non-human members. McFague has 
thus extended the body of God cosmology to her anthropology. 
Neo-classic economics is derived from a mechanistic view of the world and emphasises 
individualism and growth (: 81). This approach endorses the notion that the wants and desires 
of the individual are fulfilled through continuous rates of growth. Human beings are in external 
relationships with each other and the earth. There is constant competition for natural resources. 
These resources are judged in monetary terms with the result that human beings enter into 
contracts with each other in order to benefit financially. Such an approach propounds that 
growth and the earth's resources are unlimited. Such neo-classical economics results in a 
consumer society. 
An ideal of a consumer society is personal happiness (2001: 84). Happiness is achieved 
through the ownership of material goods. In other words a consumer society is dictated by 
materialism. McFague's analysis seems reasonable. The researcher observes that in the 
contemporary context personhood is defined by what one owns. Such a view means that 
human beings are not valued according to virtues such as tenderness, humility and kindness 
(Col. 3:12), but through ownership of property and material goods. McFague notes that in a 
consumer society only those who own anything are happy, while the poor are not (: 86). This 
means that those who consume the most need to consume far less, and vice-versa. The poor 
therefore need far more food, shelter, medical care and education. In addition to this 
consumerism does not benefit the entire planet and McFague writes 
the big problems are the loss of water, trees, fertile soil, clean air, fisheries, and 
biodiversity and the ways the degradation of each of these renewables contributes to the 
deterioration of the others (: 89) (Emphasis McFague's). 
McFague's polemic of the consumer society is thus also a critique of capitalism. Capitalism 
encourages the accumulation of wealth. In this manner the world is understood in terms of a 
"trade market" metaphor (: 85). The purpose of such a market is to generate consumers for 
various commodities. The commodities are produced and advertised. Governments give 
financial support for this through taxes and transnational corporations distribute these 
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commodities by means of trade agreements. In other words by critiquing the consumer society, 
McFague also seems to take issue with capitalism and globalisation46. 
The body of God model favours the organism model for the universe. The economic metaphor 
for the body of God anthropology is what McFague terms, the "ecological economic model" 
(: 99). She starts her argument for this model by referring to the root of the words ecology and 
economics as oikos (house-Greek) (: 72). This indicates the close relationship between 
economics and ecological issues. The earth is a household with strict ecological and economic 
rules. These rules need to be obeyed so that all the members of the earth household have access 
to its resources. McFague therefore adopts a house economics. 
Ecological economics operates on the premise that the planet's resources are scarce and need 
to be assigned proportionately so that a community continuously functions (: 99). In contrast to 
the neo-classical model this approach is not anthropocentric or utilitarian. It stresses the 
interdependency of the all the members of a community. The focus here is not greed, but on 
need. It is stressed that the members of the whole only benefit when the whole is healthy 
(: 105). In other words human and non-human beings only flourish when the earth is cared for. 
The ecological economic model stresses sustainability . For McFague sustainability is a 
community issue (: 107). It is the community that decides on what its goal should be and how 
to use its capital and resources so that the entire community and not just individuals benefit. 
Capital in this sense is to be understood as both human and natural capital. There are thus 
physical constraints on a community's social vision, as natural resources are limited. 
Sustainability is therefore the maintenance of "the integrity of ecological systems upon which 
all life and production depends" (: 108). It occurs when distributive justice is a reality. In other 
words sustainability relies on the sharing of natural resources. An ecological economic model 
attempts to ensure that all members of a community, both human and non-human beings, have 
the basic means to prosper and survive. Such an approach is located between a "communist 
anthropology" and an "individualistic anthropology" (: 109). It therefore does not seem to 
promote egalitarianism, but stresses equality in terms of access to natural resources. 
Distributive justice from an ecological perspective means that the requirements needed to 
Globalisation is, "the rapid and pervasive diffusion around the world of production, consumption and investment and trade 
in goods, services, capital and technology" (AACC 1997: 3). 
7 McFague argues the neo-classic model does not take sustainability into consideration (2002c: 129). 
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flourish for human beings and the planet must be met. In other words the ecological economics 
that the body of God anthropology makes use of is life-centred. This provides input for an 
ethic centred on life. 
Rasmussen is in agreement with McFague this regard and maintains that economics must 
promote life48 and thence advocates an "oikos economics" (1996: 91). This is therefore 
congruent with McFague's notion of house economics. Rasmussen believes that an oikos 
economics results in the flourishing of life. Contemporary economics is contrary to oikos 
economics. The former views the world as a machine with parts that can be replaced, endorses 
a globalised economy that seeks to increases wealth and understands economics in terms of the 
corporation and not the household. In other words Rasmussen, like McFague, argues for an 
ecological economics based on community that enriches quality of life as opposed to neo-
capitalist economics, which promotes wealth instead of life. 
Santmire believes McFague' argument for the economic ecological model is valid, because, 
"we must be liberated from both our economic and theological assumptions if we are truly to 
love nature and care for the poor" (2001: 33). He maintains the ecological economic model is a 
necessary replacement for the neo-capitalist approach to economics. McFague has thus 
provided a strong argument against the neo-classical economic model by opting for ecological 
economics. 
Several theologians also take issue with the principles of the neo-classic economic model. De 
Gruchy and Field critique the consumer society (1994: 207-8). They endorse an approach that 
uses the insights of liberation theology and ecological ethics. In this manner an analysis of 
economics involves a bias towards the poor and the notion that a society based on 
consumerism will deplete the earth's resources. Nations that are developed seem to be the 
main proponents of consumerism. Moreover, consumerism is unable to be extended so as to 
include all the earth's population. It simply becomes the lifestyle for a select few nations and 
an even fewer group of individuals within these nations. De Gruchy and Field argue, from a 
theological perspective, that an imago Dei anthropology means equality for all. Every human 
being has the right to use the earth's resources and to live a "sustainable lifestyle" (: 207). 
Moreover, the imago Dei implies that all human beings are responsible for the earth. 
Rasmussen argues elsewhere for a "life-centred ethics" (1994: 122ff). 
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Hadsell also takes issue with the growth model and capitalism. It is believed that growth in 
market economies will generate enough for all to have a respectable life and to allow for 
"distributive justice" (1992: 83). Growth has become a product in itself that has been sold 
worldwide. However, Hadsell observes that the growth model has not benefited the natural 
environment. Growth needs the mechanisms of production and consumption. Both these 
processes are damaging to nature. There is thus a tension here. Justice may be in the form of 
economic growth or limiting growth to benefit the natural order. However, Hadsell believes 
that economies that are located on the periphery to major economies invariably are placed in a 
state of dependency. There is therefore a capitalism hierarchy with the major economies at the 
top and minor economies at the bottom (: 84). All these economies are forced to compete at the 
global level. The result of this is that as growth increases so does the inequality of distribution. 
The tendency of major economies is to accumulate wealth by exploiting labour and natural 
resources in minor economies. This signifies that the growth model does not benefit economies 
or the natural environment. 
And, K. Abraham maintains that the ecological crisis has come about due to a focus on the 
growth of industry and technology that support numerous individual's contemporary life-style 
(1994: 66). The West's emphasis on industrial growth is considered a paradigm for 
development. This growth model requires high amounts of capital and natural resources and 
the result of this is exploitation of human beings and the natural order. It is economies driven 
by consumerism that make decisions about which goods are to be produced and the manner of 
technology used. 
J. Rieger believes McFague provides a relevant critique of consumerism, but she does not go 
far in enough in her analysis of the world's economics (2002: 215). In particular she does not 
indicate where economic power is situated. McFague identifies the market as a problem vis-a-
vis the world's economic system, but does not pursue this in depth. Rieger has a valid 
argument here. McFague does allude to the impact of globalisation on the natural environment, 
but does not continue with an analysis of this. 
A. Warmback emphasises the impact of globalisation on the poor (2005: 195). He maintains 
that economic globalisation has increased the margin between the rich and poor, and has this 
resulted in the fragmentation of community. Botman writes, "Globalisation... prescribes a 
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certain autonomy to the market that increases inequality and fragments political life and 
communities" (in Warmback: 195). 
It was indicated before that with its focus on ecojustice, the body of God anthropology seems 
to be a form of liberation theology, because it has a concrete understanding of sin and 
salvation. This is a positive approach, as sin and salvation do not become the concerns of 
another place or time, but are based in current reality. 
5.5 Eschatology 
McFague's eschatology appears to be a "realised eschatology". This idea was pioneered by CH 
Dodd. He maintains that the Kingdom of God is in some sense present (Ladd 1982: 59). This 
means that human beings have a foretaste of what the Kingdom will be like. This approach to 
eschatology allows salvation to be viewed not only as a future event, but as a kairos moment as 
well. 
C. Keller provides an argument for an eschatology that considers ecological concerns to be of 
primary importance (1994: 326-345). She maintains that an eschatology that is responsible 
should be orientated towards ecology. Keller also appears to endorse a realised eschatology. 
She argues that previous notions of eschatology have focused on the apocalyptic idea of a new 
heaven and new earth where an all-powerful God intervenes to bring about a new creation in 
the future. Keller seems to imply that such an "unearthy eschatology" does not promote human 
responsibility for nature, but distracts humankind from it (: 330). An unearthy eschatology 
does not take sustainability seriously, because it is assumed that endless renewable resources 
are unnecessary since the earth will eventually meets its end. This type of eschatology prevents 
human beings from considering the needs and rights of all members of the earth community 
(: 331). In other words salvation becomes an abstract concept with little or no relevance to the 
planet's well being. Keller argues that the bible does not understand the eschaton to mean a 
time when the world will end (: 337). Her argument is valid when considering the holistic 
anthropology promulgated by the biblical writers who had a far more positive view of the 
physical world than did the Greek thinkers. Keller believes the bible views salvation in a 
holistic manner. Shalom is a term that describes how all reality will be restored. Salvation in 
this manner hopes for the time when the earth will be reformed to the point that it may, "be 
lovingly and equitably cohabitated by all creature" (: 338). Even the book of Revelations does 
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not point towards an unearthy reformation and the New Jerusalem is the hope for creation's 
restoration. Keller maintains that salvation needs to become an earthly affair. She states this 
succinctly, 
when salvation means removal from the earth to a heavenly home, then our oikos (home) 
is abandoned to the assaults of those whose ultimate concern is neither heaven nor earth, 
but the power and wealth of their particular households (: 332) (Emphasis Keller's). 
Keller therefore uses an oikos theology in her eschatology. This means that human beings need 
to understand the earth as their home. Keller reminds readers that home does not imply an end. 
Human beings are not simply orientated towards another home, but are located in the earth 
home (: 341). Keller believes that an earthly eschatology should motivate human beings to take 
care of the earth; the biblical metaphor for this being stewardship (: 328). Such an approach 
addresses social issues and thus matters pertaining to economic justice and the natural 
environment. Keller refers to her eschatology as, "ecoeschatology" (: 343). 
McFague's approach to ecojustice has much in common with Keller's ecoeschatology. It 
stresses human responsibility for the earth and thus has notions of sin and salvation that takes 
ecological issues seriously. Moreover, McFague accentuates the need for sustainability. Like 
Keller she advocates the notion of oikos and incorporates the stewardship metaphor into the 
body of God anthropology. Both these thinkers highlight the need for theology to be involved 
injustice issues that impact the natural environment. McFague's approach to ecojustice 
therefore appears to be a form of ecoeschatology. A positive aspect to McFague's 
anthropology is that it includes the natural order within the scope of salvation. 
The body of God anthropology's focus on human responsibility for the earth raises an 
important issue in regard to grace. A central feature of McFague ecological theology is that it 
appears to be orientated towards ecological ethics. This is characteristic of most liberation 
theologies that are orientated towards praxis (Villa-Vicencio 1994: 189). A challenge for these 
kinds of theology is how to express God's unique involvement in emancipating the oppressed. 
It was shown previously that there is a strong Pelagian influence in the body of God 
anthropology. This means that McFague views grace as external to human beings. The body of 
God anthropology demonstrates how human responsibility and freedom interact with God's 
grace to care for the world and thus overcome sin. 
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The problem with the body of God anthropology on this point is that does not consider the 
notion that grace impacts the human being internally as well. A reason for this is that McFague 
appears to adopt an antirealist position in relation to God. The strength of the body of God 
model is that it may be able to affect human beings on the cognitive level. In this manner 
humankind could change its opinion about the natural order. However, a critical realist 
perspective highlights the idea that God is both external and internal to the human being. This 
implies that God's grace may be able to change human beings at the psychological and 
ontological levels. The body of God model does not imply that God operates within the human 
being through the Holy Spirit and gives them plenitude of life (Comblin 1990: 228). 
The Holy Spirit bestows grace and as such is not passive, but active in the lives of human 
beings (Berkhof 1986: 428). It was intimated before that in the imago Dei makes human beings 
open to God and the world. In other words, this openness allows human beings to access grace 
through the Holy Spirit. 
Boff identifies various virtues of grace: faith, hope, love, friendship, peace, joy, critical spirit, 
courage and humour (1984: 163-173) . The first three of these occur at the ontological level 
before the psychological level and are found in the bible (1 Cor. 13:13; IThess. 1:3; Gal. 5:6; 
Rom. 5:1-5). In other words faith, hope and love are as a result of the internal operation of 
grace within human beings. Faith means being open to and then accepting God. Graced human 
beings are able to hope for a better future and then live out this hope in a meaningful manner. 
Love also comes about through openness to grace and involves the acceptance of the other and 
involvement of oneself in the other's reality. Love is thus relevant in terms of accepting the 
differences of both human and non-human beings. 
Particularly significant are the outward manifestation of God's grace. Accepting God's grace 
results in "friendly relations" (: 169). Friendship is a concept that may be extended to the 
natural order as well. Peace is a virtue that opposes fragmentation and thus promotes 
wholeness and completeness (Rom. 5:1; Gal 5:22). The virtue of peace thus prevents a violent 
attitude to human and non-human beings. It also allows human beings to feel connectedness 
with God, each other and the natural order (: 170). Grace generates a critical spirit. Being 
O. Meyer endorses the view that the Spirit is not merely the sustainer of life, but the giver of virtues as well. These virtues 
are also sustained by the Spirit (2002: 45-6). 
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critical is the ability to discern true from false and good from bad so that false ideologies may 
be identified (Prov. 13:7; Rom. 12:2). This is important for any liberation theology that 
attempts to identify sinful social structures and ideologies. Grace allows human beings to be 
courageous when confronting injustices. Courage is therefore due to divine strength and not 
only human ability (Acts 9:27-8; Phil. 1:20). The last virtue that Boff identifies is humour. 
Humour is located within the human being and is energised by grace. It functions as a coping 
mechanism for human beings. 
These insights from Boff are examples of the impact that grace has on human beings. A need 
for the body of God anthropology is to create a balance between internal and external notions 
of grace. This may pose a challenge for McFague's anthropology considering its antirealist 
stance. This may be achieved by articulating the idea that religious metaphors are humankind's 
response to God's grace50. The body of God anthropology therefore needs more emphasis on 
the internal operation of God's grace in human beings. In this manner humankind's 
understanding of the natural order is influenced by religious metaphors (i.e. worldviews), as 
well as God's grace. If the internal nature of grace is not described then the body of God may 
be accused of salvation by good works and not God's grace. 
In light of what has been discussed the body of God anthropology affirms point five of the 
study's anthropology reflection. It prioritises ecojustice and insists on the rights and values of 
all creation. 
5.6 The body of God anthropology and its understanding of the relationship between 
nature and history 
This chapter is concluded with a reflection on the body of God model's approach to the 
relationship between nature and history. McFague's approach to this issue is influenced by her 
embodiment metaphysic. Her high regard for physical reality allows McFague to insist, 
"bodies matter" (1993a: 23). 
R. Otto refers to the experience of God as the numinous where the self experiences God as Mysterium Tremendum (1950: 
12). This is an overpowering and almost overwhelming experience of the divine. One way to understand these interactions 
with God would be through metaphor. Metaphor assists human beings to make sense of these encounters with God. 
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Bodies need space to exist. McFague's anthropology therefore places a priority on the notion 
of space. Bodies need space so that they can have access to air, water and food (: 99). Space is 
a concrete, physical reality, whereas time is a human phenomenon. McFague believes an 
emphasis on space is necessary, because this indicates that human and non-human beings all 
occupy one space: the earth. The common creation story highlights the unity and diversity of 
creation. This influences how space is to be understood. The unity of creation means that 
everything has one space in which to live; however in terms of diversity each entity needs a 
particular space in which to survive. In other words understanding creation's diversity provides 
knowledge of the kind of space needed for each being. This signifies that the primary space, 
the earth, needs to be cared for and maintained. Space therefore requires engagement with 
issues relating to ecojustice. McFague does acknowledge that time has a role vis-a-vis 
ecojustice, because the earth cannot be abused any longer. However, time is a factor, because 
the abuse of space affects time. McFague writes, 
Geography, often considered a trivial subject compared to the more splendid history (the 
feats of the forefathers) might well be the subject of the twenty-first century (: 101) 
(Emphasis McFague's). 
Space is a justice issue, because when space is neglected then the availability of land becomes 
a concern. Those with power will control the availability of good land. The danger with this is 
that human beings and endangered species are threatened, because their access to space is 
threatened. 
Space is humankind's place (: 102). In other words human beings are located in and belong on 
the earth. An emphasis on space highlights the notion that human beings do not merely belong 
to another realm such as heaven. This means that a focus on space is meant to remove the 
alienation between humanity and nature. McFague argues that the ascetic spirituality that 
characterises much of the Christian tradition has not endorsed the, "preciousness, and 
vulnerability of the earth and its many creature" (: 102)51. The body of God model views the 
earth as part of God's body. This obliges humankind to love nature. 
Moltmann is in agreement with McFague. He believes it is necessary to integrate the concept 
of history into the notion of nature and asserts that it is human time needs to be synchronised 
51 This comment by McFague does not take into account the strand of Christian spirituality that marvels at the creation. See 
Santmire. 1985. The Travail of Nature. 
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with creation's time (1985:125, 137-9). He maintains the modern understanding of time in 
terms of progress needs to be negated and brought into harmony with nature's cycles and 
rhythms. Moltmann's views seem relevant, as they signify the concept that human beings are 
not against creation, but with it. 
McFague has given a clear preference for space. The body of God anthropology is thus in 
agreement with point six of the study's anthropological reflection. 
Conclusion. 
It was found that McFague adopts a relational anthropology and is in agreement with point one 
of the anthropology criteria. The common creation story qualifies the body of God 
anthropology. This means that human beings are dependent on the natural order for their well 
being. McFague negates anthropocentrism by appealing to the common creation story. She 
argues for a holistic anthropology that highlights the uniqueness of humankind, but the failure 
of the body of God model to describe the interaction between mind and body, as well at its 
neglect of a complexity hierarchy make it susceptible to reductionism. It is thus in 
disagreement with point two of the study's anthropology requirements. It was also noted that 
the body of God anthropology does not use an imago Dei theology as its departure point and 
thus contravenes point three of the study's anthropology criteria. It was suggested that 
supervenience theory, transpersonal psychology and biblical anthropology are needed as input 
for the body of God anthropology to support its case for a holistic anthropology that 
emphasises human particularity. McFague's view on sin takes natural reality seriously and is in 
agreement with point four of the anthropology criteria. Suggestions were made to broaden the 
scope of McFague understanding of sin. The Pelagian influence on McFague's theology means 
she stresses human responsibility for the environment. She believes part of human 
responsibility for the natural environment is adopting a loving eye towards it. This allows the 
body of God model to address ecojustice issues. It was argued that McFague's analysis of 
economics and the natural environment is in agreement with point five of the study's 
anthropology requirements. This focus on ecojustice makes the body of God model compatible 
with an ecoeschatology. It was pointed out that an internalised understanding of grace should 
be introduced into the body of God anthropology. McFague argues convincingly for a theology 
orientated towards space rather than human history. The body of God anthropology thus 
affirms point six of the anthropological reflection. 
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Chapter 6: An evaluation of Sallie McFague's body of God 
theology 
Introduction 
This chapter begins with a discussion of McFague's views on several models for the G-W 
relationship. She takes issue with those that sanction an external relationship between God and 
the world and thence proposes the body of God model as an alternative. McFague argues that 
the body of God model is a form of panentheism. The researcher will argue it is not 
panentheistic, but tends towards pantheism. In this regard a critique of McFague's notion of 
divine agency and transcendence is provided. The study will focus on the metaphors of mother, 
lover, friend and God as embodied spirit. The chapter then addresses McFague's 
pneumatology to determine its cosmic nature. A critique is made of the body of God model's 
understanding of Christ's identity and function. The chapter closes with a refection of the 
extent of McFague's Trinitarian thought. 
6.1 McFague's critique of various models for the God-world relationship 
McFague identifies five models for the G-W dynamic: deistic, dialogic, monarchical, agential 
and organic (1993a: 137-140). She rightly takes issue with deism. As was noted before deism 
focuses on God's transcendence and forces an ontological divide between God and creation. 
The result of this is creation is not viewed as sacred or holy. McFague believes that an 
advantage with deism is it allows science to scrutinize the natural world without considering 
divine control, but this expels God from the world. Science is believed to be the only manner 
of interpreting the world and Christians have, "an interventionist, God-of-the-gaps view of 
divine reality" (: 138). 
The dialogical model endorses the notion of a God who speaks to human beings who then 
respond to God (2002b: 38). In other words faith in this model is about a personal interaction 
between God and the believer. McFague notes that this model is apparent in the existential 
theologians such as Kierkegaard and Bultmann. Issues such as sin, guilt and forgiveness have a 
central role in the dialogical model. The relationship between God and the individual is an I-
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Thou type. McFague rightly critiques this model, because of its anthropocentrism and 
individualism. The dialogical model does not take natural and social reality into consideration. 
The third model that McFague considers is the monarchical (: 39). This model bears 
resemblance to theism. God is understood as a king who controls loyal and obedient subjects. 
The monarchical model informs several theologies' views on creation and providence. God's 
transcendence is emphasised in order to affirm His power and glory. God is understood in 
personal and political terms and thus opposes the negative tendencies of deism and the 
dialogical model. However, McFague takes issue with this model and identifies three major 
flaws with it: God is remote from the world, is only concerned with human reality and controls 
the world by dominating it (1987: 65). 
First, the monarchical model stresses God's otherness and does not consider His being as a part 
of creation. God is understood as a king located in an otherworldly kingdom. The consequence 
of this is, "God is worldless and the world is Godless" (: 65). God' s involvement with the 
world is sporadic and external. This means that God cannot be internally related to creation. 
A second issue with the monarchical model is its anthropocentrism (: 66f). God as a powerful 
king is only concerned with His human subjects and not the cosmos. God provides orders to 
human subjects who obey, but non-human beings are unable to do this. The monarchical model 
introduces and promotes dualistic hierarchies, because human subjects are inferior to their 
king. It was noted before what the consequences of a dualistic hierarchy may be. 
McFague also takes issue with the monarchical model's approach to God's exercise of power 
(: 68f). God acts on the world, but not in it. According to McFague such an understanding of 
divine agency negates "human growth and responsibility" (: 68). The reason for this is that 
God does not distribute power, but monopolises it. The researcher is in agreement with 
McFague on this point. Such a view of divine sovereignty implies that human beings do not 
possess any capacity for self-transcendence and it does not acknowledge the power that human 
beings do have. 
McFague addresses the agential model as well (2002b: 40). This model presupposes God as a 
person. This means that God may be viewed as a personal, historical agent: His intent and 
purpose is demonstrated in history. This model has been a resource for the doctrines of 
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creation, providence, salvation and eschatology: God creates ex nihilo for His glory and not 
out of necessity, guides and cares for the creation, provides an atoning sacrifice for humankind 
when it sins and then brings creation to fulfillment (: 41). McFague identifies difficulties with 
the agential model (: 41f). In the first instance, the sciences do not always facilitate divine 
agency. Attempts to correlate divine agency with cosmic processes simply endeavours to 
validate God's existence and scientific truth; they don't "pay attention to the world for its own 
flourishing" (: 41). Despite these issues McFague believes the agential model is promising, 
because it uses insights on human personhood. 
McFague believes the agential model needs to be synthesised with the organic model (1993a: 
141). The former maintains divine transcendence and the latter, divine immanence. The 
agential model cannot be used alone, because God gains a monopoly on power and freedom, 
while the organic model on its own negates individuality and freedom. McFague therefore 
attempts to construct a panentheistic model for the G-W relationship. 
Macquarrie also takes issue with the monarchical model, arguing that Christian theology 
should focus attention on the organic model (1975: 151). The organic model affirms the 
mysteriousness and dignity of creation and therefore opposes anthropocentrism. Macquarrie 
insists, however, that the organic model should qualify the monarchical model and uses E. 
Brunner's equations for the G-W relationship to explain this. Brunner argued for the 
sovereignty of God with the following equations: 
God minus the world = God 
The world minus God = Zero (: 148) 
Macquarrie observes that the organic model accepts the second of these equations, because the 
world requires the Spirit for its existence. The organic model cannot affirm the first equation, 
because it implies that God is not affected by the world. Macquarrie argues that while a loving 
God is influenced by the world, God did not create out of necessity, but due to the fact that 
God by God's nature is creative. Macquarrie maintains that the monarchical model needs 
qualification by the organic model and this will, in turn, "promote better attitudes to the 
physical environment" (: 151). Macquarrie, like McFague, is critical of the monarchical model, 
however he does not abandon it choosing instead to synthesise it with the organic model. 
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McFague and Macquarrie thus both make an attempt to balance God's transcendence and 
immanence. 
Barbour critiques the monarchical, deistic, dialogical and agential models. He believes the 
monarchical model with its stress on divine omnipotence does not facilitate human freedom 
sufficiently52 and makes God accountable for suffering and evil (1974: 157). Moreover, God's 
omnipotence is in opposition to natural laws, because God is understood to be able to negate 
these laws. Barbour believes the deistic model separates God and the universe. Providence is 
understood as God giving nature laws that allow it to be self-regulatory. According to this 
body, the universe is not dependent on God (: 157). Barbour believes the dialogical model 
separates humankind and nature to such a degree that cannot be validated by insights from 
ecology and evolutionary biologies. The overly subjective tendency of this model does not 
allow God to be related to nature (: 158). Barbour is more positive about the agential model, 
which indicates the notion that God relates to nature, but not in a coercive manner. According 
to this model God is able to act through natural and historical structures. If God's intentions 
are expressed in the cosmic process then the universe may be seen as part of God's purpose. 
According to this model God's intentions gain priority over divine causation (: 160). 
Barbour believes the dialogical and agential models are complimentary (: 166). Whereas the 
former stresses God's relationship with humankind, the latter addresses God's relationship 
with nature. Barbour's approach seems reasonable. A synthesis of these two models appears to 
overcome anthropocentrism and cosmocentrism. Such a synthesis may be theocentric, because 
God is the common factor for both. However, Barbour prefers a process model, because it 
provides a coherent account of the G-W relationship. He thus views the other models as 
secondary. What Barbour and McFague have in common is their appeal for an organic view of 
life, because process philosophy endorses the idea of the world as an organism. McFague, on 
the other hand stresses the agential model, while Barbour views it as secondary to the process 
model. 
Barbour raises the issue of predestination here. The researcher is in agreement with him on this point, because 
predestination is deterministic and invariably results in fatalism. 
- 122-
6.2 The world as God's body 
6.2.1 Internal relations 
McFague's synthesis of the agential and organic models appears to be informed by her search 
for a relational view of the G-W relationship. She believes that the notion of relationship needs 
to be understood at the "deepest possible level" (1993a: 145). Extending this view to the G-W 
relationship means that God and creation need to be understood as internally related. 
Metaphors derived from the monarchical model are inappropriate, as they underplay the idea 
that God and the world are in a mutual relationship (1987: 61). The body of God model 
stresses the notion of an internal relationship between God and creation. McFague argues this 
type of relationship makes divine agency and knowledge vis-a-vis the universe possible. 
Divine agency is interior, as God expresses God's intentions in the universe and operates 
within creation's natural processes. McFague argues just as human beings have immediate 
knowledge of their bodies, so God knows His or Her body, the universe. In other words God 
has interior knowledge of the universe (: 73). McFague writes, 
this knowledge is empathetic, intimate, sympathetic knowledge, closer to feeling than to 
rationality. It is knowledge 'by acquaintance'; it is not 'information about'. Just as we are 
internally related to our bodies, so God is internally related to all that is (: 73). 
C. Johnston affirms McFague's notion of internal relationship (1992: 155-9) . She argues the 
notion of external relations is epitomised by the Reformers who used voluntarism as a 
mechanism to overcome the medieval synthesis that reinforced the social hierarchy known as 
feudalism. This voluntarism culminated in what Johnston refers to as "atomistic 
individualism", a worldview that emphasises a remote God, human beings in external relations 
and nature composed of "atomistic entities" that are externally related (: 156). The notion of 
external relations does not endorse the interrelatedness of nature, understands human beings as 
independent of nature and allows ecosystems to be abused. Johnston maintains that the idea of 
external relations is contrary to contemporary science, which stresses internal relations. At the 
theological level God is internally related to the world: the notion of the indwelling Holy Spirit 
and the suffering Christ both attest to this. The indwelling Spirit, "is able to empower and 
liberate the whole creation through God's loving influence in every entity" (: 167). The view 
Clayton believes a value of panentheism is its stress on internal divine agency (2004d). 
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that God is inherently relational provides a strong case for the doctrine of the Trinity. 
Johnston's argument appears reasonable. If a relational God is stressed then the doctrine of 
perichoresis, as well as the economic and immanent doctrines of the Trinity are applicable for 
an ecological theology. These insights show the value in McFague's appeal for the notion of 
internal relations vis-a-vis God, humankind and nature. 
6.2.2 McFague's claim that the body of God model is a form of panentheism 
McFague argues that the universe as God's body is profoundly incarnational (2002a: 50). She 
maintains God is permanently incarnated and that incarnation is a part of God's very nature. 
The body of God model therefore synthesises the doctrines of creation and incarnation so that 
God is viewed as the source of everything that exists. In this manner God is, "the One in whom 
we live and move and have our being" (1988a: 672) (emphasis the researcher's). McFague 
understands being in this quotation as both spiritual and bodily being. 
McFague insists that the body of God model is panentheistic (1987: 72). If God is the source 
of all that is then nothing can exist outside of God, however God cannot be reduced to the 
creation. In other words the world cannot exist without God. McFague extends her argument 
for panentheism by reflecting on Ex. 33: 23b where Moses is forbidden to see God's face and 
only His back. She argues that this story prompts humankind to see God's "invisible grandeur" 
in the bodies of planet earth. In other words earthly bodies reflect something about God 
(1993a: 131). 
McFague maintains that the body of God model changes the way divine transcendence and 
immanence are understood. The universe is characterised by embodiment and if God is in 
creation it suggests, "God's transcendence is embodied" (: 133). In other words humankind 
can only perceive or understand divine transcendence in terms of embodiment. McFague 
therefore seems to be arguing that God is incarnated in the universe's diverse bodies. The 
implication of this is that no one body holds a monopoly on the divine presence. All the bodies 
of the universe and earth reflect God. McFague reiterates that viewing bodies as God's 
reflection is seeing God from the back, as was the case with Moses. This means that bodies are 
reflections of God, but not God Him or Herself. McFague therefore attempts to maintain a 
balance between divine immanence and transcendence. As was noted before the body of God 
model also synthesises the agential and organic models to preserve a panentheistic theology. 
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McFague claims that the world as God's body opposes pantheism. She argues that the body of 
God model is closer to pantheism than a monarchical model, which may tend to deism, but the 
body of God model does not completely identify God with the world (1987: 71). In this 
manner God cannot be reduced to the world. McFague asserts that agential metaphors are 
needed to prevent the body of God from becoming pantheistic and proposes God as: mother, 
lover, friend and embodied spirit of the universe. The first three will now be addressed. 
6.2.2.1 Divine agency: God as mother, lover and friend 
McFague uses personal metaphors to describe divine agency: mother, lover and friend. She 
argues that these metaphors reflect central relationships necessary for being human, providing 
important notions of human agency. McFague insists, because human beings are the imago 
Dei, it is tenable to use human agency as an analogue for divine agency (: 81). McFague 
argues that the significance of using these personal agential metaphors is due to their stress on 
divine immanence, because God is understood to be deeply involved in a relational and 
mutualistic manner with the world (: 85). 
Moreover, these personal metaphors appear to provide a Trinitarian framework for McFague's 
panentheism (: 91) In terms of the mother metaphor , God is understood to be the creator of 
the universe, but remains intimately involved with the creation. God as mother means that God 
is most concerned with life in its totality. In other words life is an expression of God, though 
not identical to God in the same manner that children are an expression of their parents, but not 
identical to them. God as lover means that God suffers with His or Her body, the world, and 
desires for it to be healed and all its parts reunited. Just as lovers view each other as precious, 
so God views the world. God as love means that God is the world's saviour. God as. friend 
views God as the world's sustainer. According to this metaphor divine immanence is stressed. 
God is understood as a companion who is in a reciprocal relationship with humankind. This 
partnership is meant to bring about the healing of the body's parts. 
Divine agency vis-a-vis these personal metaphors is understood by McFague as God loving 
and caring for the world. Central to the body of God model is the notion that God loves bodies 
It is worth noting that McFague also denotes this metaphor as parent, but appears to favour mother in order to address issues 
relating to feminist theology. She argues a matriarchical view of God does not intend to generate another form of dualistic 
hierarchy (1989: 139). 
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(: 74). In order to love bodies God is in an internal relationship with them. To assert that God 
loves bodies means that She or He requires for their basic needs to be met. Humankind is to 
function as co-workers with God in order to achieve this. How does love relate to God as 
mother, lover and friend? 
Each expresses love in a unique manner, but have in common the purpose to unite life. God as 
mother expresses love in the form of agape. This is the love for life in its entirety. This means 
God the parent-mother desires to affirm the diverse creatures that have "bodied forth" from 
Him or Her (: 92). Agape love assists the continuation of life in the universe. For McFague 
agape is a form of love that is unique to parenthood and she writes, 
Parental love is the most powerful and intimate experience we have of giving love whose 
return is not calculated (though a return is appreciated): it is the gift of life as such to 
others (1988b: 255) (Emphasis McFague's). 
God as lover expresses eros love incamationally towards God's beloved creation. It is through 
this love that God heals, reunites and accepts all the bodies in the world. God as friend 
expresses philia love in terms of companionship. This love assists human beings as co-workers 
with God to bring all of creation to fulfillment. This means that the sharing of life's basic 
needs is critical to philia. 
God's love for the world means God cares for it internally. This caring attitude highlights the 
notion of a God who acts in the natural processes of the world (: 73). God is the agent in these 
processes and therefore is not reduced to the world. His or Her aims are expressed within the 
universe. God's care for the world is thus a form of divine providence. McFague argues that 
this care is expressed in a manner similar to the way human beings care for their own bodies, 
"with a high degree of sympathetic concern" (: 74) (Emphasis the researcher's). 
6.2.2.2 Divine agency: God as the embodied spirit of the universe 
The fourth metaphor McFague uses to describe divine agency is God as "embodied spirit of 
the universe" (1993a: 150). She argues that if the G-W relationship were understood 
analogously to the relationship between spirit and body then an agential-organic model is 
possible. In other words God is to world as spirit is to body. McFague insists both spirit and 
body are metaphors and relate to the back of God and not His or Her face. She prefers the use 
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of spirit rather than other agential metaphors such as soul, heart, self or mind, because it is 
generic (: 144). It is only human beings that possess a mind or self. In other words by making 
use of spirit, McFague attempts to negate anthropocentrism. She takes issue particularly with 
theories that use the mind-body dynamic to understand the G-W relationship, because they 
operate within a dualistic framework and often explain divine agency as controlling. The 
implication of such theories is that God orders, directs and controls the universe. McFague has 
a valid argument, because the mind-body analogy seems to imply an asymmetrical relationship 
where God assumes the majority of power and this in turn may limit the freedom of the 
universe. Spirit, on the other hand, promotes a relational view of the G-W dynamic. 
The body of God model therefore appears to have a significant pneumatology. It understands 
the world as God's body, a body that the spirit enlivens and empowers. McFague understands 
this process of enlivening as the work of the spirit as the breath of life (: 143). She argues the 
breath of life makes creation dependent on God. In addition to this the spirit as the breath of 
life unites creation, because all creatures require it for their existence. McFague uses Gen. 2 to 
support her view. She insists that this story shows the universe's dust to be empowered by 
God's breath. In this manner God is viewed as the creator and renewer of the universe. 
McFague understands God as the source of the dynamic and diverse universe. She therefore 
argues it is God that allows creation to evolve in the manner that it does. The stress of the body 
of God model is therefore on the continuous creative activity of God. McFague asserts that 
divine activity, when God is understood as the breath of life, is not focused on direction or 
purpose, but on divine presence (: 146). Her logic is that all bodies are inspirited and evolving. 
God is the spirit of these bodies and is therefore in the process of evolution, or as she puts it, 
"continuous with this evolutionary process" (: 146). By doing this McFague attempts to 
explain divine agency in relation to postmodern science. 
By stressing a form of permanent incarnation, she argues against divine intervention. McFague 
stresses the notion of empowerment vis-a-vis divine agency. She writes, 
God's presence and action are evident as the breath of life that gives all bodies, all forms 
of matter, the energy or power to become themselves (: 148). 
McFague insists one of the values with the body of God model is that it overcomes dualism and thus makes salvation 
relevant to both the spiritual and physical aspects of life. Her argument is that if God is embodied then bodies matter to Him or 
Her (1988: 672). 
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McFague stresses the empowering role of the spirit, rather than its function as the guide or 
director of the evolutionary process. God as the spirit of the world acts in a ubiquitous manner 
by providing creation with the ability to diversify. The spirit of life initiates this diversification 
mechanism. The researcher understands McFague to mean that the evolutionary process was 
begun by the spirit of life and is maintained by it. 
In addition to this McFague stresses the redemptive role of God. It was noted before that the 
role of God as friend is to sustain creation. McFague imports the sustaining function of God 
into her pneumatology. She differentiates between the spirit, which is the source of life, and 
the Holy Spirit, which renews life. For the body of God model it is not the spirit that gives 
direction to the creative process, but the Holy Spirit that does this (: 147-8). McFague appears 
to be implying that the Holy Spirit does not direct natural processes, but gives them direction. 
In other words it does not coerce, but lures creation5 . The Holy Spirit not only gives creation 
direction at the biological level, but also at the cultural and historical levels. It therefore 
functions through humankind. In this manner human beings become the, "hands and feet of the 
body of God on our planet" (: 148). By giving creation direction, the Holy Spirit is bringing it 
to fulfillment. In other words there is an eschatological role for the Holy Spirit, which will 
bring, "creation into harmonious union" (: 147). 
These insights from McFague appear to bear resemblance to Tillich's notion of God's 
originating, sustaining and directing creativity (1968: 281-298) . For Tillich God's 
originating creativity is His or Her act of creation. Tillich accepts the doctrine of creation ex 
nihilo, unlike McFague who believes it is unbiblical (1993a: 151). However, what is 
significant about Tillich's views on God's act of creation is his idea of creatureliness. He 
maintains creation out of nothing prevents dualism. In other words Tillich appears to be 
endorsing a monistic view of reality. Thinkers may argue that Tillich, with his extensive 
existential analysis, is orientated primarily towards humankind. However, monism implies that 
everything is in some manner interconnected and interrelated. The consequence of this is God, 
humankind and natures are in a dynamic relationship. Tillich insists creatureliness, "carries in 
itself the power of being" (: 281). In a monistic view of reality, creatureliness may be extended 
from the human level to creation in general. In other words all creation inherently has the 
56 See L. Ford's understanding of the manner in which God lures creation to higher possibilities from a process perspective 
in his, The Lure of God. 
57 This is taken from volume one of Tillich's Systematic Theology. 
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power of being. What is unique about human beings is that they are able to participate in the 
God who is the ground of being in order to overcome nonbeing (i.e. anxiety). These reflections 
on Tillich's view on creatureliness imply the dependence of creation on God, a notion that 
resonates through McFague's thought. 
In terms of sustaining creativity, Tillich accepts the notion that God preserves the world and 
thus rejects deism (: 290). For Tillich, God's relationship with the world is characterised by 
continuous creation. This divine action operates within the natural laws and structures set in 
place by God. Tillich insists that God by God's nature is creative and functions creatively 
within temporal reality. God gives, "the power of being to everything that has being out of the 
creative ground of the divine life" (: 291). 
Finally, Tillich refers to the directing creativity of God (: 293). He understands this as divine 
providence. For Tillich providence must be understood such that the freedom of both God and 
creation is preserved. It is a permanent form of divine agency where God brings everything to 
fulfillment. This direction is available in every finite situation. Tillich does not understand 
God's directing creativity as coercion, but rather as a quality of God that "drives" or "lures" 
(: 296). 
McFague insists that the spirit as the source of life is panentheistic (: 149-150). The world is in 
God and God is in the world, yet the world is dependent on God for its existence. In other 
words God is the breath of the world. God does not require breath from the world. For 
McFague, 
God is embodied but not necessarily or totally. Rather, God is sacramentally embodied: 
God is mediated, expressed, in and through embodiment, but not necessarily or totally 
(: 150) (Emphasis the researcher's). 
McFague argues that this approach does not reduce God to the world; neither does it locate 
God in another reality. In terms of divine immanence God is present as the breath of life and in 
His or Her transcendence is the empowerer of the universe. 
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6.2.2.3 Divine agency: creation 
McFague uses three metaphors to explain creation: production, procreation, and procreation-
emanation (: 151). She takes issue with the production metaphor, which is described in the 
Genesis creation stories. This metaphor emphasises God's transcendence, which then implies 
divine sovereignty. The result of this is God controls the world externally. The deistic and 
monarchical models for the G-W relationship fit into production views of creation. Creation is 
understood as complete, static and ex nihilo (: 152). The problem with this is creation is not 
understood as continuous and dynamic. Moreover, the production model enforces a dualistic 
hierarchy of mind and body (: 156). In this view the mind is superior to the body and controls 
it. 
McFague believes the procreation model is a better alternative to the production metaphor. 
This approach underscores God's immanence and appears to stress that God is internally 
related to creation. This intimacy is due to creation coming from God and not from some stuff 
other than God (: 151). McFague argues creation out of nothing generates an external 
relationship between God and the world, while creation out of something other than God 
negates the creation's dependence on God. Creation from God' being, on the other hand, 
presents an internal relationship between God and creation, however McFague stresses that 
this does not mean that God is reduced to creation. The procreation model supports the notion 
of a continuous creation. This endorses God's continual divine agency in the creative processes 
of nature, as was described previously. For McFague creation emerges from God and then 
continues to grow and change (: 152). 
McFague again makes an attempt to balance divine transcendence with divine immanence. She 
does this by synthesising the procreation model with the metaphor of emanation (: 153). 
Emanation is the doctrine that creation's life comes about from the energy of its divine source. 
The procreation model implies that God gives the universe its multitude of bodies, while 
emanation signifies the idea that God empowers and enlivens these bodies. This makes 
creation dependent on God who is the source of life. McFague's synthesis of the procreation 
and emanation metaphors supports her notion of "immanental transcendence" (: 154). She 
prefers to understand transcendence not as existing apart from physical reality, but rather as 
describing something extraordinary. This means God's transcendence is concrete. It can be 
seen in those facets of creation that are extraordinary. McFague argues that is the diversity of 
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creation that reflects the glory of God. The procreative-emanationist model stresses God as the 
originator of and empowerer of creation. It is this breath of life that facilitates creation's 
diversity. 
6.2.2.4. Suffering 
In terms of theodicy McFague signifies the notion of God being at risk vis-a-vis the world 
(1987: 72). She assumes a monistic view in this regard and therefore does accept a dualism 
where two realities are in opposition to each other. This implies that God has the capacity to 
suffer and be vulnerable. With its stress on divine immanence the body of God model stresses 
that suffering and evil impact God, humanity and the natural order. God is in a sense involved 
with evil, but is not the source of it. By this McFague appears to mean that God is personally 
affected by the suffering that is a consequence of evil. God therefore experiences the pain58 
caused by evil. If the universe is God's body then God experiences the pain felt by creation. 
The advantage with this approach to suffering is that God has suffered not just on the cross, but 
before and after it as well. McFague insists that God overcomes suffering through the power of 
love. This makes human beings co-workers with God in addressing situations that cause 
suffering. Human beings are to overcome evil and suffering, not through domination and 
control, but through love and care. The researcher supports McFague vis-a-vis the issue of 
theodicy, because the body of God theology signifies a God who suffers, as well as human 
responsibility. 
6.3 Is the body of God model panentheistic? 
It was indicated previously that the body of God model makes a sustained attempt to balance 
divine transcendence and immanence. McFague's argument for panentheism is determined by 
her understanding of divine agency. A convincing argument for divine immanence is presented 
throughout the body of God model. McFague's concepts of internal relations; her use of 
personal metaphors and the notion of an embodied spirit for divine agency; and the use of a 
procreative-emanationist understanding of creation all signify God's immanence in creation. In 
M. Sarot argues that divine passibility implies that God can feel pain and must therefore be corporeal in: 1992, God, 
Possibility and Corporeality. 
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addition to this McFague uses the panentheistic en metaphor in various places of her 
theological reflection. 
She asserts for example that creation has its existence in God and the body of God model 
emphasises the "creator in the creation" (1993a: 132, 133). McFague writes, 
a panentheistic view of the relation of God and the world is compatible with our model of 
God as the spirit that is the source... Everything that is in God and God is in all things and 
yet God is not identical with the universe (1993a: 149). 
There are therefore indications that the body of God model is panentheistic. However, 
McFague's argument for panentheism hinges on the issue of divine agency. If her 
understanding of divine agency can support divine transcendence then the body of God model 
is a form of panentheism. A critique will thus be provided of McFague's use of personal 
metaphors, God as embodied spirit and the notion of procreative-emanationist creation. 
6.3.1 Mother, lover and friend 
It was indicated before that one of the requirements for theological language is there should be 
a dialectical relationship between primary-religious and secondary-theological language. 
Theological language interprets religious language in an ordered, coherent manner. Not all of 
religious language can be taken literally. To do so would result in over-familiarity with God 
and thus idolatry. In other words, there needs to be a balance between primary-religious and 
secondary-theological language. Specifically, theological language should be both existential 
and conceptual. 
McFague's use of the metaphors mother, lover and friend is motivated by an emphasis on the 
notion of internal relations. These three metaphors emphasise the intimate, close relationship 
that God has with the world, however they do not seem to move from the primary-religious 
level to the theological-conceptual stage. Religious language relates to the subjective 
experience of God, while theological language addresses the ontological aspect of God and 
thus considers God's objective reality. In other words theological language attempts to 
conceptualise God's otherness. The metaphors of mother, lover and friend do not appear to 
address God's transcendence adequately. Moreover, they lack conceptual purchase. 
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Another problem the researcher has with the body of God model's use of personal metaphors 
is whether these articulate a genuine relationship between God and the world. The study noted 
before that in order for two parties to be in a relationship, both need their identity (i.e. their 
otherness) to be affirmed. The metaphors of mother, lover and friend do not appear to make a 
clear distinction between the world and God's otherness. McFague's counter to this would be 
that a metaphor relates to the is and is not of its reference point. God has a body in a manner 
that is and is not like a human body. But a concern here is that the body of God model argues 
extensively for the is of God, but does not focus much on the is not of God. The consequence 
of this is that God's otherness does not get sufficient conceptualisation. In this manner a 
relationship between two others is not maintained. 
Kaufman affirms what the researcher has been arguing. He maintains that the metaphors of 
mother, lover and friend are applicable if they are able to depict a relationship where the 
distinctiveness of both persons is presented in such a manner that the two remain in a positive 
relationship with each other (1988: 16). Kaufman observes that the world as the body of God 
implies that God appears to be mother of His or Her own body. Moreover, it appears that God 
directs love and friendship towards His or Her own body rather than to personal counterparts. 
Kaufman is implying that God appears to be in a relationship with Him or Herself and not with 
unique subjects. The impression here is that if the body of God model were to be orientated 
more towards divine transcendence then it may be able to argue convincingly for a genuine 
relationship between God and the world. 
Kaufman also argues that personalistic metaphors, such as those employed by McFague, do 
not address complex realities such as God or the natural order. Complex realities also need to 
be understood conceptually. He insists that if reflection on the G-W relationship is to be 
relevant, it needs to centralise concepts such as "life", "creativity" or "universe" and not 
personalistic images (: 17). Kaufman believes that McFague has not conceptualised her 
personalistic metaphors sufficiently and the result of this is theology has religious images as its 
foundation. He insists that a theology that is concerned with ecological issues needs to reflect 
on God by using metaphors that are conceptual by nature, as these are able to take up into 
themselves, "the great complexity of reality as we know it today" (: 18). Kaufman believes a 
concept such the Trinity would prove to be more adequate for such theological reflection. 
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These insights signify a problem with using highly personalistic metaphors such as mother, 
lover and friend. McFague's use of these terms has an implicit Trinitarian theology, but this is 
not conceptualised satisfactorily. The metaphors of mother, lover and friend do seem to stress 
divine immanence and are therefore prone to reducing God to the world. McFague's metaphor 
of the world as God's body therefore appears to be more pantheistic than panentheistic. Divine 
agency is only possible if the notion of a transcendent God is clearly articulated. In order to act 
in the world, God needs to be transcendent. Her metaphor of God as the embodied spirit of the 
world is now considered. 
6.3.2 God: the embodied spirit of the world 
McFague argues for the notion of divine embodied spirit from the perspective that human 
beings are inspirited bodies. The advantage to such an approach is that it understands spirit as a 
general term and therefore negates anthropocentrism. By adopting such an approach McFague 
is able to signify the unity of God, humankind and nature. She argues against the use of the 
mind-body analogy to articulate the G-W relationship, because it is dualistic and views God as 
controlling. The body of God model is what McFague terms a "spirit theology" (1993a: 145). 
It is therefore an attempt to explain how God as spirit is able to influence physical reality, 
however McFague is not clear about this issue. In light of what has been discussed, the 
researcher takes issue with the body of God model on two fronts: it appears to be ambiguous 
about how exactly the spirit may influence physical reality and does not seem to explain God's 
transcendence sufficiently. 
6.3.2.1 Divine agency 
McFague believes the spirit theology she is advocating is commensurate with postmodern 
science. The spirit empowers creation and thence allows diversifying in the manner that it 
does. This empowerment mechanism is for McFague evidence of God's involvement with the 
evolutionary process. God is both source and empowerer of the natural order. The value to 
such an approach is that it makes creation dependent on God. A problem with McFague's 
approach is it does not seem to be clear about how exactly a spiritual entity, such as God, is 
able to influence physical realities such as cosmic and biological processes. In addition to this, 
the body of God model does not stipulate how God's spirit relates to space and time. The body 
of God model does not specify how is it possible for the infinite to incorporate the finite into 
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its mode of being. Pannenberg's notion of the infinite that includes the finite is important in 
this regard (Tupper 1973: 204). Process philosophy's notion of time in the mode of God's 
being appears to be an adequate reflection as well. 
Moltmann's concept of the indwelling Spirit takes God's occupation of space and time 
seriously. In this manner Moltmann is able to express divine immanence without 
compromising God's spiritual nature. In addition to this, Moltmann addresses scientific 
concerns about how the non-physical may influence the physical. The Spirit gives nature its 
capacity for change. It "penetrates" the world and thus provides it with the potential to change 
and evolve (1985: 12). 
Moltmann links God's omnipresence with His or Her spatial presence and therefore attempts 
to make space an attribute of God59. He uses the term "absolute space" to denote the space in 
which created beings exist (: 154). Absolute space is the spatial aspect of the divine reality and 
thus the direct presence of God. Moltmann makes a distinction between space and matter. 
Finite objects are located in absolute space, which is infinite. This distinction allows Moltmann 
to articulate the difference between God and creation. In this manner objects are located in 
God, but are not God. Moltmann writes, 
if God perceives everything immediately and directly through his omnipresence, this 
presupposes that God's eternal, uncreated omnipresence is the same as the omnipresence 
of space (: 155). 
Moltmann also addresses the issue of God and time (1985: 114). He believes at the moment of 
creation, God drew His (sic) eternity into himself in order to make time for the creation. In this 
manner God gave creation its own particular form of time. God's relationship with creation's 
time is a halfway point between God's eternity and creation's time. It is at this point where 
God expresses God's "resolve to create" (: 114). Moltmann thus presents a convincing 
argument for the indwelling of God in space and time. 
These insights highlight the possibility of relating God's Spirit to space and time. A problem 
with the body of God model is that it does not indicate how the empowering spirit is located in 
the universe's space and time. This compromises McFague's conjecture that the spirit is a 
Pannenberg maintains the Spirit operates in space and time, "to time by the power of the future that gives creatures their own 
present., to space by the simultaneity of creatures in their duration" (1994: 102). 
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divine agent. The consequence of this is her argument for panentheism is weakened, with a 
resulting tendency towards pantheism. The issue of God's transcendence in the body of God 
model then becomes problematic. 
6.3.2.2 Transcendence 
McFague claims that the body of God model is a form of panentheism. She provides a 
sustained argument for the presence of God's spirit within creation and thus makes a strong 
case for divine immanence. The body of God model disavows the mind-body analogy as an 
argument for panentheism. 
Despite the fact that that McFague takes issue with the mind-body analogy, she initially uses it 
as an argument against pantheism. She insists that just as human beings do not identify 
themselves completely with their bodies, so God cannot be completely identified with the 
world (1990: 213). Human bodies are expressions of humanhood, but human beings have the 
unique ability to reflect about their bodies and therefore to objectify them. Human beings 
verbalize about the human body. This indicates that the human self is able to consciously 
disconnect from his or her body. McFague argues that this is analogous with the world as 
God's body. God has the capacity to reflect on His or Her body, the world. In other words 
McFague has used the mind-body dynamic to prevent the body of God model from being a 
form of pantheism, but in later theological reflection has abandoned the use of this analogy 
altogether so as to prevent anthropocentrism. The consequence of this is a central argument for 
divine transcendence in the body of God model is neglected in McFague's later theological 
reflection. 
Moreover, by focusing on spirit and body at the expense of mind, the body of God model 
utilises a narrow anthropology for theological reflection on the G-W relationship. Jesus is 
recorded as saying that human beings are to love God, "with all your heart, with all your soul, 
with all your mind" (Mk. 12:30). Human beings are therefore not just spirit and body, but mind 
as well. It was highlighted previously that mentality is not unique to human beings. The 
process concept of panpsychism was used to illustrate this. If the human being is an 
appropriate representation of what God is like then it is important to have a broad 
anthropology. It was for this reason that the researcher suggested a modification of McFague's 
anthropology to include the notion of mind or in the least, mentality. The idea that the mind is 
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irreducible to the body has implications at the theological level, for it implies that if God has a 
mind it cannot be reduced to the world. In addition to this it was argued before that embodied 
beings have the capacity for self-transcendence. Human beings in particular are more than their 
bodies. If the G-W relationship were understood in this manner than a stronger case for 
panentheism vis-a-vis divine embodiment may be possible. In this manner the world may be 
understood as God's body, moreover, with God transcending it. In the body of God model's 
case, little consideration is given to the mind-body interaction. It is for this reason that 
McFague's doctrine of God may have reductionistic tendencies. 
A problem with the body of God model is that it, as is the case with some forms of 
panentheism, views transcendence as the opposite of immanence. G. Jantzen believes that 
transcendence needs to be understood as the opposite of reductionism and not immanence 
(1984: 127). She maintains such an approach stresses the irreducibility of God to the universe 
and that the universe is God's body. McFague insists the body of God model does not reduce 
God to the world; neither does it locate God in another reality. God is present as the breath of 
life and in His or Her transcendence is the empowerer of the universe, but McFague makes this 
claim without viewing transcendence as the opposite of reductionism. She focuses instead on 
God's presence in the world as the embodied spirit. 
The researcher believes the mind-body metaphor is better able to demonstrate the nature of 
God's transcendence and His or Her immanent agency within creation. In addition to this it 
appears to present a stronger argument for divine embodiment than the body of God model, 
because it is able to reflect on how it is possible for the non-physical to influence the physical. 
This has implications for how divine agency and transcendence is to be understood. Jantzen 
and Clayton both make use of the mind-body analogy to argue for panentheism. 
Jantzen argues that if God is to be considered a person then it seems appropriate to affirm 
divine embodiment. She insists there are three abilities needed for something to be considered 
a person: perception, action and presence (1984: 74-100). The body of God model seems to 
meet Jantzen's second and third requirements for personhood, but what of perception (i.e. the 
concept of mind)? Perception requires sensory organs and this necessitates embodiment (: 74-
8). It has been argued by theologians that God does not require perception to know what 
human beings know: God can know what human beings know without sensory organs. In 
response to this Jantzen differentiates between two types of perception (: 79). The first is 
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perception of objects and events external to the person through sensory organs. The second is 
perception of objects and events internally, that is, within the body and these include 
experiences such as hunger, pain or contentment. Jantzen denotes the latter as "direct 
awareness", because it is unmediated (: 79). She argues theologians typically understand God's 
knowledge of the world as direct. God does not need light waves to see or sound waves to hear 
human being's thoughts and intentions. If we are to understand God's knowledge of the world 
as unmediated then it is tenable to refer to the world as God's body. Jantzen does identify 
disanologies: God is omniscient and thus has complete knowledge of the processes of His or 
Her body, whereas human beings have partial knowledge of their bodies. What is significant at 
this point is Jantzen has provided an argument for the notion of a divine mind functioning 
within the world. Perception requires a mind. God therefore appears to have a mind that 
interacts with the world. 
The body of God does not reflect adequately on the concept of mind. The result of this is it 
does not seem to provide an argument for omniscience and divine embodiment, because both 
of these require a divine mind. McFague does not seem to affirm how exactly God's 
omniscience is to be understood. In this manner God's transcendence is compromised. 
Clayton makes extensive use of the mind-body analogy to articulate God's irreducibility (i.e. 
God's transcendence) and divine agency. He believes human agency is an adequate analogy of 
divine action in the world . An advantage to this approach is it its ability to explain the 
relationship between divine agency and natural laws (1997: 242). Clayton then describes 
supervenience theory in order to articulate the thesis that non-physical properties are able to 
influence physical states. He uses this as an analogy for divine agency and terms it the 
"Panentheistic Analogy" (2004a: 210). Clayton argues there is a bi-directional information 
flow between mental properties and the brain. This becomes an analogy for the G-W 
relationship where God is viewed as the mind of the world. God has contact with all events in 
the universe, albeit on a non-physical level and monitors this input of data. God then responds 
to this input by acting on the universe. While the universe influences God, He or She is not 
reduced to it. The concept of spirit is at a higher level than the mind, with the former being 
irreducible to the latter. The spirit is mediated through the mind and thence acts on the 
Clayton believes however that divine agency cannot be limited to one body as is the case with human beings. It includes the 
entire universe (2004c). 
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universe (: 211). The researcher is in agreement with Clayton. The benefits with the 
panentheistic analogy are: God is not reduced to the world and divine transcendence is 
maintained61, God is understood to be influenced by the world (i.e. theodicy) and God affects 
the world through downward causation. 
These insights from Jantzen and Clayton stress the need for a mind-body analogy to argue for 
divine transcendence and embodiment. The researcher suggests the body of God model needs 
to incorporate the concept of mind into its argument for God's transcendence and agency. If 
this is not done then the body of God model may tend towards pantheism. Moreover, McFague 
is not clear about divine agency. Her insistence on a spiritual theology that disavows any 
reflection on the mind-body dynamic presents a genuine problem with any attempt to integrate 
the notion of mind into the body of God model. 
6.3.2.3 Creation 
McFague insists the doctrine of creation ex nihilo is unbiblical and was a theological 
development in the early church (1993a: 151). Jantzen affirms this view and believes the 
doctrine of creation ex nihilo, "is nowhere directly stated in the bible" (1984: 133). McFague 
and Jantzen's views appear sensible. If it is assumed God did not create out of nothing or 
something or anything at all then it seems reasonable to assert that all there was at the moment 
of creation was God. In other words God had to create out of what was available to God: His 
or Her being. 
However, Macquarrie offers valuable insights on the concepts being and nothing vis-a-vis 
God. He maintains panentheism presents God as being and nothing (1984: 172). The term 
being refers to the manner in which something is able to exist. For example human existence 
is different from the way a stone exists. While both exist, their modes of existence differ. This 
is affirmative of God. God does not exist in the same manner as objects in time and space. In 
this sense God does not exist, because God's mode of existence is at a higher, 
incomprehensible level. This means that God is nothing. The researcher interprets 
Macquarrie's proposal here as implying that God's transcendence is God's nothingness. To 
61 The implication of this is that God is not dependent on the world in order to exist. This makes belief in an eternal life 
possible, because God does not need a body to exist. 
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assert that God created out of nothing appears to indicate that God created out of God's 
transcendence. This highlights the notion that God gave creation being62. Macquarrie writes, 
"God exists in the sense of the source of all existence" (: 173) (emphasis the researcher's). 
Macquarrie argues from a panentheistic perspective and this means God remains in the world 
after creating it. The notion that God gives being or lets be highlights God's desire for life. 
This means God is more focused on giving life than coercing creation to His or Her divine 
will. These reflections are significant,because they affirm: God's transcendence, creation ex 
nihilo, the dependence of creation on God and God's immanent life giving attributes. 
These insights highlight the notion that creation ex nihilo may be possible. Moreover, God is 
transcendent and also immanent as the life giving Spirit. God therefore remains in creation by 
augmenting its being. The importance of Macquarrie's insights is that it balances the notion of 
divine transcendence with an emanationist creation approach63. 
McFague's approach expresses the closeness of God with the creation. The procreative and 
emanation models both stress God's immanence. However, McFague's argument for divine 
transcendence vis-a-vis to creation does not appear convincing 4. She prefers to understand 
divine transcendence as something extraordinary. It can be seen in those facets of creation that 
are extraordinary. McFague argues it is the diversity of creation that reflects the glory of God. 
The procreative-emanationist model stresses God as the originator and empowerer of a diverse 
creation. While these arguments are convincing from an aesthetic, emotive perspective, they 
have less purchase from a rational, intellectual point of view. McFague declares, "The doctrine 
of creation in this view is a practical, not an intellectual affair" (2002b: 43). The consequence 
of this view is God's transcendence is not giving enough conceptual clarity. McFague's 
approach to creation appears to be a form of pantheism. 
The above reflection shows the body of God model has a tendency towards pantheism and is 
thus in disagreement with point one of the study's requirements for an ecological theology. 
McFague's argument for divine transcendence and agency were shown to be weak. Her 
disavowal of the mind-body analogy as an argument for divine corporeality was indicated to be 
62 This would equate with Tillich's concept of God as the ground of being. 
63 He uses two metaphors to denote classical theism's account of creation and an emanationist view of creation. The former is 
referred to as "making" and the latter as "emanation" (1984: 37). Making emphasises God's external relationship with 
creation and emanation stresses God's closeness. 
64 K. Tanner notes that the old models of creation that McFague critiques were also used to signify the creation's dependence 
on God. According to these models God is the universe's goal, power and source (1994: 418). 
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unwarranted. The doctrine of creation ex nihilo was shown to be able to preserve God's 
transcendence and intimate relationship with creation. This view of creation is thus in 
opposition to McFague's procreation-emanation perspective. 
6.4 The body of God pneumatology 
It was noted previously that McFague does not adequately explain how a non-physical reality 
such as God's embodied spirit may influence physical reality. She has little reflection on how 
God's spirit may be in space and time. It was suggested that the body of God model should 
make use of the mind-body analogy in order to correct this problem. The value with 
McFague's spirit theology is that it does attempt to address divine agency vis-a-vis the 
evolutionary process. The notion that the embodied spirit is the source of life and the 
empowerer of natural processes highlights creation's dependence on God. McFague's views on 
the work of the spirit is reflected in the following words by Moltmann, 
The possibility of perceiving God in all things, and all things in God, is grounded 
theologically on an understanding of the Spirit of God as the power of creation and the 
wellspring of life (1992: 35) (Emphasis the researcher's). 
While McFague's pneumatology is not as developed as Moltmann's, its intention is the same: 
an orientation towards the cosmos. In other words McFague's spirit theology is a cosmic 
pneumatology. The spirit as the source and empowerer of nature's dynamic processes is 
continuous with the evolutionary process. 
McFague's intention vis-a-vis to her pneumatology is to signify the concept of God dwelling 
in and permeating creation with the spirit. This is important, because creation is viewed as 
holy. M. Brinkman maintains the Christian understanding of a transcendent God only views 
divine immanence in terms of Christ's Spirit. The operation of the Spirit of Christ is believed 
to be efficient only in the preaching of the gospel and in the sacraments (1998: 209). 
According to such a view the Holy Spirit is merely concerned with the sanctification of human 
beings. Brinkman's insights are relevant. Such a view of the Holy Spirit is problematic, 
because it is anthropocentric and localises God's presence in the sacraments. 
The body of God model overcomes these two problems with the Spirit, because it stresses the 
spirit in creation and its processes. Moreover, McFague broadens the scope of the sacraments 
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to include all creation. She insists that God's presence is one of sacramental embodiness. This 
means the world is a sacrament of the divine. This affirms Ruether's view that an ecological 
theology may be of the sacramental or covenantal variety (2000: 603-14)65. The former uses 
the bible and mysticism to generate an experience where human beings feel an intimate 
connection with God and the earth. The focus is thus on togetherness and communion. The 
covenantal approach uses the bible and the entire covenant tradition as paradigms for what 
should constitute correct relationships with God and the earth. The body of God model 
appears to be a sacramental ecological theology. A challenge for such a sacramental is how to 
reflect on God's transcendence. Brinkman writes, 
Besides the more 'intimate' imagery of the creator-creature relation, which the 
pneumatologically orientated theologians are presently highlighting, there is also the more 
'distanced' imagery, easily recognised in Scripture (1998: 210). 
Brinkman provides a necessary reminder that God's transcendence needs as much articulation 
in an ecological theology as divine immanence. It was highlighted before that McFague's 
argument for divine transcendence is problematic with the result that her approach seems 
pantheistic. 
Moreover, McFague creates a dichotomy between the spirit and the Holy Spirit. The former is 
the source of life and the latter its renewer. McFague believes the Holy Spirit gives natural and 
cultural/historical processes direction and will thus bring all creation to fulfillment. Christian 
theology affirms the notion that it is the one Spirit that is involved in creation, as well as its 
renewal. K. Niirnberger asserts, 
the Spirit is indeed an expression of the creative, redemptive and transformative presence 
of God in Christ, valid and accessible in all times and all places (2002: 78). 
Moltmann argues that humankind's experience of the Holy Spirit reveals the creative Spirit in 
nature (1985: 101). He supports his argument by referring to Pauline theology in Romans. 
Moltmann understands the term "yearning" to be the self s experience of the Holy Spirit, 
because believers long to be God's children (Rom. 8: 23). This "yearning" is also an 
experience of creation, which longs for God's sons to be revealed. Moreover, the Holy Spirit 
65 J. Haught identifies three approaches to a theology of the environment: apologetic, sacramental and eschatological (1993: 
90-110). He favours the eschatological approach, arguing that, "in the Bible sacramentality is taken up into eschatology" 
(: 105). 
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expresses this restlessness with "inexpressible sighing" (Rom. 8: 26). In other words what 
believers experience as the Holy Spirit is also an experience of the Spirit in creation. This 
signifies the continuity between the Holy Spirit and the Spirit of creation. They are the same 
Spirit. This means the one Spirit is the source, empowerer and transformer of creation. 
McFague's dichotomy therefore appears to be a false one. The consequence of this is the 
Trinitarian aspect of McFague's cosmic pneumatology is weakened. This will be discussed 
under the Trinitarian analysis of the body of God model. 
Is McFague's pneumatology acceptable for an ecological theology? The body of God 
pneumatology is cosmic by nature. While McFague does not provide a strong argument for 
how precisely the spirit may penetrate matter, she does argue for an extension of the notion of 
sacrament to include the entire universe. The importance of this approach is that it makes 
creation dependent on God. However, McFague separates the spirit from the Holy Spirit. In 
this manner the possibility for Trinitarian reflection is reduced. The researcher is therefore 
undecided about the compatibility of McFague's pneumatology with point two of the 
requirements for an ecological theology. 
6.5 Body of God Christology 
McFague does not accept traditional understandings of the identity and work of Jesus Christ, 
arguing that these interpretations lead to "Jesusolatry", anthropocentrism, individualism and a 
spiritualised soteriology (2001: 159). 
In terms of Jesusolatry, Jesus is understood to be the unique incarnation of God. This means 
God entered the world as Jesus at one particular time and place, to die a unique death for 
human sin in the form of a sacrifice and then to be resurrected so that when human beings are 
united with Jesus they are freed from sin. McFague believes this Jesus-centredness limits God, 
because God is confined to, "Jesus and to Jesus' work of forgiving human sin" (: 159). In other 
words not only is God's work bound, but human responsibility as well. In this manner injustice 
at the human and natural level is ignored. 
Christology has also focused on an anthropocentric, individualistic and spiritualised 
soteriology. McFague believes these interpretations of salvation are psychological, as they ease 
the sinner's conscience (: 160). The consequence of this is salvation does not relate to the 
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earth's well being. A spiritualised understanding of salvation permits human beings to 
overlook injustices in this world and thus support the status quo. 
McFague therefore attempts to construct a Christology that addresses ecological concerns66. 
She maintains there are six possible Christologies in this regard: prophetic, Wisdom67, 
sacramental, eschatological , process and liberation . McFague favours prophetic and 
sacramental Christologies. 
McFague's approach to an ecological Christology is qualified by the theological injunction, 
"God with us" and centres on Jesus' ministry as a paradigm for praxis (2000: 34). A prophetic 
Christology is concerned with Jesus' ministry towards the oppressed. McFague believes Jesus' 
words and works were an attempt to overcome oppressive hierarchies that held the oppressed 
in bondage. She maintains his ministry needs to be extended to nature. In this manner justice 
and rights are understood for human beings and nature. Moreover, the term neighbour in the 
Great Commandments should be extended to non-human beings. Loving creation and 
accepting the intrinsic worth of non-human beings are central for McFague. Struggling for the 
rights of all creation requires a theology of the cross, where human beings put themselves at 
risk for the well being of human and non-human beings (: 36). In these circumstances, God is 
with us. 
McFague believes a sacramental Christology overcomes Jesusolatry, because it focuses not 
merely on a prophet, but on God (: 37). The incarnation is understood as God's continuous 
presence in the world. Jesus incarnation is therefore not unique, because it is merely a 
paradigm of God's continuous operation in the world. This means the entire universe is a 
sacrament of God. For McFague history occurs within nature. A God of history is therefore a 
God of nature. A sacramental Christology accentuates embodiment and therefore prioritises 
matter. The resurrection is understood as a source of hope, because it is a symbol of life 
triumphing over death. This highlights the concept of a God of life. As human beings oppose 
This chapter may also be found in Hessel, D and Ruether, RR. (Eds). 2000. Christianity and Ecology: Seeking the Well-
being of Earth and Humans, pp 29-45. 
67 Jesus is viewed as, "the embodiment of Sophia, God's creative and ordering energy" (McFague 2003: 335). 
68 With these Christologies God's Spirit operates in Christ to transform the world towards peace and reconciliation (: 335). 
69 These Christologies stress nature's organic unity and the intrinsic worth of all creatures (: 336). 
70 Liberation Christologies focus on Jesus ministry to the oppressed. They have recently recognised the relationship between 
human and nature's oppression (: 336). 
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injustices and struggle for life, God is with them. McFague maintains cosmic Christology is a 
form of sacramental Christology. 
Both prophetic and sacramental Christology provide an edifice for McFague's body of God 
Christology. McFague structures her Christology in two sections: the shape of the body and the 
scope of the body (1993 a: 162-191). 
McFague denotes the shape of the body as, "the Christie Paradigm" (: 162). According to this 
view, Jesus functions as a paradigm for the incarnation. This means that Jesus' incarnation is 
not unique, because it merely signifies what God is already doing in the universe. In other 
words the incarnation of Jesus did not localise or particularise God's presence and agency. 
McFague believes there are three aspects of Jesus' ministry, which characterise the shape of 
God's embodiment (: 168). There is the deconstructive phase where Jesus' parables 
challenged oppressive hierarchies that caused poverty. The parables highlight Jesus' inclusive 
love for the poor and McFague suggests that nature should be seen as the "new poor" (: 165). 
The reconstructive phase concerns Jesus' healing ministry, which shows the importance of 
bodily needs . The prospective phase concerns Jesus' fellowship with sinners and those 
considered outcasts. This phase signifies Jesus' concern for people's physical needs. McFague 
argues for solidarity with the oppressed, including nature (: 171). These reflections indicate 
that the Christie paradigm is a prophetic Christology. McFague also addresses the issue of 
natural selection and those who are victims of natural processes. She asserts, 
Solidarity with the oppressed, then, becomes the Christian form of both consonance with 
and defiance of the evolutionary principle (: 172). 
In other words Christians are to remain in solidarity with those human and non-human victims 
of natural selection. In this manner human beings should oppose the oppression of those who 
are affected by the negative aspect of evolution. 
In regard to the scope of the body, McFague makes use of the cosmic Christ motif. 
Interestingly, McFague relates the cosmic Christ to the resurrection and writes 
The resurrected Christ is the cosmic Christ, the Christ freed from the body of Jesus of 
Nazareth, to be present in and to all bodies (1996b: 286). 
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McFague's intention here is to highlight the notion of God's presence at all places. In other 
words the resurrection did not remove God from the world, because He or She is present 
incarnationally. McFague therefore seems to be implying that the resurrection is a sign of 
God's continued presence in the world. The resurrection provides hope for the future. The 
risen Christ is Christianity's mode of expressing faith and hope, with Christ identified as the 
new creation's firstborn who is then pursued by the creation (: 295). 
In addition to this the cosmic Christ reflects divine immanence and is identified with the 
entirety of evolutionary history. In this manner salvation occurs in time and space and is not an 
otherworldly issue. In other words salvation is relevant in creation, specifically in God's body, 
to such a degree that Christ's healing ministry, "takes place in and for creation" (: 288) 
(emphasis McFague's). McFague argues that the scope of the body requires for the Christie 
paradigm to be extended to the natural order. The three phases of Jesus' ministry are thus 
applicable to the totality of creation. 
McFague uses traditional sacramental imagery as a framework for her Christology. She values 
traditional sacramentalism, because of its focus on the physical as a channel for God's 
presence and activity (: 290). On the other hand, McFague believes traditional sacramentalism 
has a utilitarian understanding of objects, because these are understood in terms of their 
usefulness for divine presence. She believes traditional sacramentalism needs to be viewed in a 
non-utilitarian manner so as to affirm creation's intrinsic value. In addition to this, McFague 
believes traditional sacramentalism needs to be complimented with "negative sacramentalism", 
which is an awareness of evil and devastation in the natural order (: 291). McFague insists 
human beings are to struggle against ecological disaster. The presence of God understood as 
the cosmic Christ highlights that God is with humankind in this regard. McFague writes vis-a-
vis the cosmic Christ, 
God suffers with us in our suffering, that divine love is not only with us in our active work 
against the destruction of our planet but also in our passive suffering when we and the 
health of our planet are defeated (: 294). 
The following is an appraisal of the body of God Christology. McFague's cosmic Christology 
has positive features. It is a lucid attempt to integrate the doctrines of creation, Christology and 
71 McFague terms this "sustainability", or the capacity to function according to the needs of the body (1993: 168). 
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redemption. McFague thus reduces the traditional dichotomy between salvation and creation. 
All the thinkers that the study consulted, who endorse a cosmic Christology, are in agreement 
with this. For McFague the Christie paradigm is applicable to God's entire body. This 
generates a link between redemption and creation. As was the case with Moltmann's cosmic 
Christology, McFague addresses the issue of natural selection and the victims of evolution. 
These victims are included in the salvific process. 
McFague's approach to Christology bears resemblance to that of liberation theology, because 
of its prophetic stance. The value to such an approach is the historical Jesus is used as a 
paradigm for ethical behaviour. This allows McFague to avoid speculating about Christ's 
divinity and focus instead on Jesus' praxis vis-a-vis the oppressed. This gives McFague scope 
for a concrete view of sin and salvation. Her approach is therefore a Christology from below72. 
Moreover, McFague provides a strong case for theodicy. Her conjecture that Jesus' incarnation 
was not unique and is a paradigm for God's activity in general implies that God suffered 
before the cross and continues to do so. This is significant if the cross is understood according 
to McFague's view of incarnation. In this manner the cross is not unique, it merely describes 
what God's activity has always been: to be with creation and thus suffer with it. This approach 
challenges views that God is impassible or apathetic. In the same manner the resurrection 
describes God's passion for life and the knowledge that suffering will end. 
McFague's insistence that the incarnation was not unique appears to locate her theology under 
the rubric of religious pluralism73. The view that all religions are equal may be a valuable entry 
point into discussions pertaining to ecological issues. Religious tolerance is a sociological 
factor that influences peaceful relations between human beings. A peaceful society has the 
potential to care for the natural environment. An advantage to an ecological theology that takes 
religious pluralism seriously is that the natural order is as important as issues relating to God 
or human beings . This reflection indicates that McFague supports a degree Christology. 
72 Such a Christology takes Jesus' humanity as its premise. Jesus is viewed as different from other human beings but only in 
degree. This approach may thus be termed a "degree Christology" (Van Niekerk 1982: 6). Scholars who study the historical 
Jesus, particularly theological liberals, tend towards a degree Christology. 
73 Religious pluralism stresses the equality of all religions and the quality of salvation in them. As a result, all religions have 
salvific efficacy and ultimately lead to God or Ultimate Reality. Jesus Christ is therefore not the only channel or means of 
salvation. The orientation is thus towards God as the source of revelation and salvation, not to a unique saviour figure 
(Karkkainen 2003: 166-171). 
4 For such an earth centred approach vis-a-vis religious pluralism see: Knitter, P. 1995. One Earth, Many Religions: 
Multifaith Dialogue and Global Responsibility. 
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There are however difficulties with the body of God Christology. While McFague does show a 
close connection between Christ and creation, she does not link salvation with grace. God's 
grace operates through Jesus Christ (Peters 1992: 246). In other words Christ is the source of 
grace and the Holy Spirit its dispenser (Berkhof 1986: 426f). McFague does not make much 
reference to grace at all. The implication of this is that human beings focus on the historical 
Jesus as a moral example and not on Jesus as the source of grace. The researcher believes the 
latter is as significant as the former, because grace assists human beings to become like Christ 
who is the image Dei (Heb. 1:3). 
McFague's degree Christology is important in terms of religious pluralism, but it also 
compromises Jesus' uniqueness. She writes vis-a-vis God's presence 
Jesus is one such place for Christians, but there are other paradigmatic persons and events-
and the natural world (1993a: 162). 
A problem with theological positions that endorse a degree Christology in order to facilitate 
religious pluralism is that they have a tendency towards epistemological reductionism. These 
positions promote a single truth proposition: all religions make equally valid truth claims. 
While it is important to preserve the equality of all religions, not all religions make the same 
truth claims and these are often in conflict with each other. The researcher believes a better and 
more peaceful alternative would be to acknowledge the uniqueness of religions without 
reducing their central truth claims. Respect and tolerance for differences appears to be a more 
viable option. Christians are therefore entitled to acknowledge the uniqueness of Jesus Christ 
who is the self-disclosure of a God who loves the entire creation. 
A consequence of McFague's degree Christology is its failure to reflect sufficiently on Christ's 
divinity. A reason for this is McFague's suspicion of logos Christology. W. McWilliams 
insists a logos Christology is one important means of articulating the cosmic Christ (1998: 
345). McFague writes, 
But any intimacy between God and matter came to an abrupt end when, in the Nicene 
faith, the Logos became identified exclusively with the second person of the trinity, with 
the transcendent God (1993a: 32). 
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Van Dyk understands this as a, "serious distortion of logos-christology" (1994: 178). The 
researcher is in agreement with Van Dyk. The logos concept was used by the conciliar church 
to articulate Christ's divinity75. Justin Martyr understood Logos to mean divine reason. The 
Logos was the principle through which the world was formed and governed. By drawing on Jn. 
1:1-14, Martyr argued Jesus was the Logos and thus the perfect expression of God's nature and 
function. Athanasius in defending Christ's divinity argued that Jesus as the Logos became 
flesh and did not merely enter into a human being (McKim 1988: 27, 32). In other words the 
Logos was understood to be a cosmic principle that brought creation into existence and then 
ordered it. It was shown previously that Moltmann uses the Word in his cosmic Christology to 
describe how diversity is generated. 
Pannenberg appropriates this idea and terms the Logos, "the productive principle of diversity" 
(1994: 62). This means the Logos, who is the Father's eternal Son, is the origin and orderer of 
diversity. The Logos is different and thus transcendent to the diversity of creatures, but is also 
operative in them by maintaining their identity. 
These insights highlight the potential a logos Christology has for constructing a cosmic 
Christology. It is able to describe how Christ interacts with the cosmos and also affirms the 
divinity of Jesus. Unfortunately the body of God Christology does not make use of logos 
Christology and thus does not provide a fuller description of the role of the cosmic Christ in 
the universe. 
Is the body of God Christology adequate in terms of the study's ecological requirements? It 
does not express Christ's divinity sufficiently and therefore is not clear how exactly Christ may 
be cosmic in scope. Despite this McFague has made an important attempt to bridge the 
doctrine of salvation with the doctrine of creation. Her approach is more centred on a 
christopraxis76 than reflection on ontological speculation about Christ's two natures. In other 
words McFague is more concerned with an ecological ethic based on Jesus' relationship with 
the oppressed. The body of God Christology should be understood in this light. It is for this 
reason that McFague's Christology affirms point three of an adequate ecological theology. 
According to S. Need, McFague understands the incarnational language of Chalcedon to be static, however he argues 
it articulates, "a complex, fluid relationship between the human and the divine" (1995: 253) 
75 This term is borrowed from Moltmann (1994: 2). 
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Another consequence of McFague's Christology is it does not have the resources for a 
sufficient Trinitarian reflection. She suggests that face, body and spirit should replace the 
traditional terms for the trinity, but does not elaborate much on this (1993a: 191). This is the 
issue that the study now addresses. 
6.6 The degree of Trinitarian reflection in the body of God model 
McFague's use of the personal metaphors mother, lover and friend allude to a Trinitarian 
theology. Mother relates to God's creative nature and signifies that God is a God of life. God 
expresses life, but is not identical to it. The mother metaphor expresses an intimate relationship 
between God and creation just as Jesus used abba to highlight an intimate relationship between 
God and His children (Mk. 14: 36). As lover God suffers with creation and thence is its 
saviour. God desires for the world to be healed. As friend God sustains the world. God is 
understood as companion with humankind and this partnership is designed to facilitate the 
earth's healing. 
It was argued previously that these personal metaphors lack conceptual purchase. Moreover, 
they appear to be a form of modalism. This is the view that the Father, Son and Holy Spirit 
have distinct expressions in the world- as creator, redeemer and sanctifier (Peters 1992: 98). 
The eternal God does not possess any distinctions, however when God expresses Godself in 
temporal reality then the Father, Son and Spirit become distinct. A problem with modalism is it 
compromises the Trinity's unity. If God is to be omnipresent, then God is fully God in all 
places. This means God's actions of creation, redemption and sanctification are the work of the 
one Triune God. 
Gaybba believes actions that extend beyond the parameters of the Godhead are performed by 
all three persons of the Trinity, arguing from the standpoint of the mutual relationship (i.e. 
perichoresis) located in the Godhead (2004: 96). He argues that even though all three Persons 
of the Trinity are involved in creation, redemption and sanctification, their roles in each of 
these is different. Gaybba uses creation as an example. The Father is the source of everything 
and the Son reveals God's image. The Spirit is the bond of love between Father and Son and in 
this manner allowed love to be shared at the creation of the universe. Love is the "motivating 
power" behind the Trinity's actions (: 114). McFague's Trinitarian theology vis-a-vis the 
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personal metaphors she uses therefore needs development, because in their unrevised version 
they are modalistic. 
In addition to the modalistic nature of McFague's personal metaphors, her notion of God as the 
embodied spirit of the world is also problematic from a Trinitarian perspective. The body of 
God model introduces a dichotomy between the spirit and the Holy Spirit. A consequence of 
this is that the spirit may be understood as something foreign to the Trinity. Moreover, 
McFague believes the spirit is the source and empowerer of the universe. Even if the spirit and 
the Holy Spirit were the same, creation and providence becomes the sole function of the Spirit. 
In addition to this McFague does not describe the work of the Spirit and the work of Christ 
sufficiently. The body of God model fails to link its pneumatology with Christology. The 
result of this is that McFague is unable to describe how the Spirit and Christ operate in 
creation's processes. Gaybba states, "The Father made everything through the Son in the unity 
of the Holy Spirit" (2004: 114). 
It was noted under the study's ecological theology reflection that Moltmann is a theologian 
who has maintained a strong Trinitarian approach to his ecological theology. He believes the 
Spirit produces new types of interaction during the evolutionary process. In addition to this the 
Spirit harmonises these interactions and thus makes creation coherent. The Spirit therefore 
unifies reality, as everything has the one Spirit, but also allows creation to maintain its 
uniqueness. It is the Word that is the source of this diversity. The Spirit therefore gives 
creation accesses to the source of diversity. These insights indicate that a Trinitarian approach 
is needed to articulate God's action in the evolutionary process. 
Perichoresis is a doctrine that supports a relational view of God. McFague does not make use 
of this insight. The reason for this is she may be suspicious of Trinitarian speculation on the 
immanent Trinity. However, a relational view of God may be supported not only by reflection 
on the immanent Trinity, but also on the economic Trinity. Rahner asserts that the economic 
and immanent Trinity are the same (1970: 21-2). In other words God reveals Godself as a 
network of relationships in the salvific history of humankind and in the incarnation of Jesus 
Christ. McFague does not argue for a relational view of God from a Trinitarian perspective, 
but from the vantage point of the common creation story. Her thesis is that if reality is 
relational then God must be as well. In other words, the body of God model has not provided 
an adequate theological argument for the concept of a relational God. 
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McFague discards the traditional terms for the Trinity and suggests the "invisible face, the 
visible body, and the mediating spirit" (1993a: 193). Her reason for doing this is that the 
traditional view of the Trinity is unable to preserve God's transcendence and immanence. 
McFague is suggesting that there is no such thing as Trinitarian panentheism. She prefers a 
"monotheistic, panentheism theology" where God is in some degree physical and not just 
spiritual (1990: 213). The researcher is in disagreement with McFague on this point. 
Moltmann's panentheism is clearly Trinitarian. Moreover, Edwards argues that a Trinitarian 
panentheism is crucial to understand how creation is relational (2004: 200). Field believes an 
ecological ethic needs to be based not on a monotheistic theology, but on a Trinitarian 
theology that underscores divine transcendence and immanence (1994: 204). 
After consideration of these insights, the researcher believes the body of God model provides 
an inadequate Trinitarian reflection. McWilliams affirms the researcher's findings and writes, 
"Although she draws insights from Jesus' teaching and ministry, McFague does not make 
christological or trinitarian concerns central to her program" (1998: 351). The body of God 
model is thus in disagreement with pointfour of the study's requirements for an ecological 
theology. 
Conclusion 
The body of God model was found to be pantheistic. McFague's argument for divine 
transcendence and agency were shown to be problematic. Contrary to McFague's sentiment, 
the mind-body analogy is a valid argument for divine corporeality. Her argument that creation 
ex nihilo causes a dualism between God and world is unwarranted. The doctrine of creation as 
a synthesis of procreation and emanation is therefore unable to signify divine transcendence. 
The body of God model is thus contrary to point one of the study's theological criteria. The 
researcher is undecided about the applicability of the body of God model's pneumatology vis-
a-vis point two of the theological criteria. McFague's separation of the spirit from the Holy 
Spirit compromises Trinitarian reflection. The body of God Christology was accepted, because 
of its focus on christopraxis. This degree Christology is not clear about the two natures of 
Christ, but does stress the cosmic scope of Christ and is therefore compatible with point three 
of the study's theological reflection. The body of God model does not have adequate 
Trinitarian reflection and is in opposition to point four of the theological criteria. 
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Chapter 7: Conclusion and Contextualisation 
Two criteria were formulated to address the validity of McFague's metaphorical theology. It 
was argued that theological language should balance primary-religious and secondary-
theological language. McFague's metaphorical theology meets these two criteria, however it 
was argued that it might be a form of antirealism. It was suggested that the notion of divine 
revelation needs to be stressed in McFague's theological method to counter the charge of 
antirealism. 
McFague's use of the term postmodern science is ambiguous and the researcher suggested that 
contemporary science seems more appropriate. The body of God model does not locate science 
as it its foundation, but understands it as a dialogue partner. The researcher found the body of 
God model to be in agreement with points two and three of the study's cosmological criteria. 
McFague provides a lucid argument for a relational view of the cosmos. This means the body 
of God model is congruent with the term ecology, which is a study of relationships. The body 
of God model is therefore a form of holism that opposes dualism. Moreover, McFague argues 
convincingly for a theocentric cosmology. Her intention in this regard is to signify creation's 
dependence on God, a characteristic of the body of God model that is observed in the notion of 
God as the embodied spirit of the world. The researcher argued the body of God model tends 
towards reductionism, because it does not incorporate a complexity hierarchy. Integrating 
Wilber's holoarchy concept, as well as process philosophy's panpsychism may decrease this 
tendency. In this manner the body of God model may be modified in order to meet the 
requirements of point one of the cosmological criteria. There are therefore theoretical 
resources to modify the body of God model's cosmological weaknesses. A consideration of 
these reflections seems convincing enough evidence for the researcher to accept the body of 
God model as a resource for a Christian cosmology. As a metaphor it provokes a change in the 
manner in which human beings are able to view the world. In this regard McFague appears to 
be promoting a cosmology that is functional. This approach is directed towards ethics and thus 
how human beings are meant to behave towards the natural order in a manner that benefits all 
creation. 
The researcher found the body of God anthropology to be relational and thus compatible with 
point one of the anthropological criteria. McFague's use of the common creation story 
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provides a strong argument against anthropocentrism. She understands human beings as part of 
the natural order. A weakness with McFague's anthropology is it does not provide a strong 
argument for human particularity. It was argued the body of God anthropology tends towards 
reductionism and is not theocentric, thus placing it in disagreement with points two and three 
of the study's anthropological criteria. The researcher suggested the integration of 
supervenience theory, transpersonal psychology and biblical anthropology with the body of 
God anthropology to overcome reductionism. The researcher believes the greatest strength 
with McFague's anthropology is its affirmation of points four, five and six of the study's 
anthropological requirements. It has a notion of sin that includes the natural order. The body of 
God model provokes human beings to develop a loving eye or attention epistemology vis-a-vis 
nature. This means appreciating the natural order for its intrinsic value and not as a resource 
for human benefit. The body of God model functions as a powerful transformative metaphor in 
this regard. McFague's orientation towards an ecological ethic stresses human responsibility 
for the natural environment. The significance of this is human beings are discouraged from 
blaming God for environmental degradation. McFague takes ecojustice issues seriously. She 
has a concrete understanding of sin and salvation and thus appropriates insights from liberation 
theology. Moreover, the body of God anthropology is orientated towards space rather than 
time. It is therefore a form of ecoeschatology. The researcher believes these insights justify the 
body of God anthropology as an adequate resource for a Christian ecological theology. 
The researcher argued the body of God model appears to be a form of pantheism. It does not 
seem to provide a strong argument for divine transcendence and agency due to its disavowal of 
the mind-body analogy and an overemphasis on divine immanence vis-a-vis creation as 
procreation-emanation. McFague's conjecture that creation ex nihilo causes a dualism between 
God and world was shown to be unwarranted. McFague's over identification of God with the 
world makes it contrary to point one of the study's theological criteria. The researcher is 
undecided about the applicability of the body of God model's pneumatology vis-a-vis pom? 
two of the theological criteria. McFague's separation of the spirit from the Holy Spirit 
compromises a Trinitarian reflection. The body of God Christology was accepted, because of 
its focus on christopraxis. This degree Christology is not clear about Christ's two natures, but 
does stress the cosmic scope of Christ and is thus compatible With point three of the 
theological criteria. McFague's focus on christopraxis links up with her anthropology, because 
Jesus Christ is understood as the paradigm for human action towards the natural environment. 
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This provides a strong Christian basis for the body of God model. It was discovered the body 
of God model has minimal Trinitarian reflection and is in opposition to point four of the 
theological criteria. The researcher believes the body of God model needs more theological 
development vis-a-vis the doctrines of God, creation, pneumatology and Trinity. 
After consideration of these three areas ofMcFague's thought, the researcher believes the body 
of God model is a necessary resource for a Christian ecological theology. Its strength is a clear 
orientation towards ethics that takes Jesus' praxis as its departure point. In this manner the 
historical Jesus is taken seriously. The body of God model functions as a transformative 
metaphor that takes into account the social reality that affects the health of planet earth. It is 
inclined towards reductionism, but there are sufficient resources from other theorists that can 
be integrated into the body of God model in order to overcome this charge. 
The researcher believes the body of God model is relevant for the South African context. South 
Africa is a country with its own unique history. A significant part of that history was the policy 
of apartheid. This system of forced race separation had dire socio-economic consequences for 
the majority of South Africans. It caused injustices in relation to ownership of land and led to 
racial prejudice. The body of God model addresses these three issues. 
In regard to the socio-economic issue, the body of God model with its emphasis on ecojustice 
is important for the South African context. South Africa is part of the global economy and has 
thus become a consumer society. Its macro-economic policy has been designed for 
globalisation and is a form of centralised economics where government invests in a small 
number of corporations (Boult, Cunningham and Popenoe 1998: 381). This economic policy is 
known as GEAR (Growth, Employment and Redistribution) and highlights the need to create 
jobs and distribute income to the poor (: 382). GEAR is an attempt to overcome the economic 
poverty caused by apartheid, however it encourages a consumer society (and thus the 
economic growth model) and endorses the mechanism of globalisation. 
The body of God model is directly critical of consumerism and implicitly critical of 
globalisation. It is opposed to consumerism, which results in a utilitarian view of the natural 
order and believes natural resources are unlimited. Moreover, a consumer society places 
resources in the hands of a select few. In other words, consumerism culminates in injustice for 
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both humankind and the natural environment. Globalisation on the other hand does not appear 
to eradicate economic poverty or benefit the natural environment. Transnational corporations 
(TNC's) control the world economy by situating their operations in countries where there are 
low wages and minimal controls on the natural environment and employment (Page 2006). 
This forces governments to lower wages and employment standards in order to maintain 
contact with these TNC's. This does not benefit the poor. Globalisation may result in the 
deterioration of the natural environment. An increase in trade requires more transport and 
therefore higher levels of pollution, which increases greenhouse gas emissions. Moreover, raw 
materials are sold at a lower cost then their true worth to corporations. The body of God model 
argues for an economic strategy that focuses on the well-being of human and non-human 
beings. In other words it insists on the notion of economics orientated towards ecology rather 
than consumerism or globalisation. 
The body of God model challenges GEAR to affirm number 24 of the Bill of Rights in the 
South African constitution (Act 108 of 1996) which states, 
Everyone has the right-
(a) to an environment that is not harmful to their health or well-being; and 
(b) to have the environment protected, for the benefit of present and future 
generations, through reasonable legislative and other measure (1996: 11). 
The body of God model has relevance for the South African context in terms of the land issue. 
From June 1913 and through the apartheid era, thousands of people were forcibly removed 
from the land that they owned. The post-apartheid government has put into place land reform 
programs to restore these people to their land. These programs include the restitution program, 
redistribution implementation system and the tenure reform program . The body of God 
model would support such programs, because of its focus on space. Space is ajustice issue, 
because when space is neglected then the availability of land becomes a concern. The danger 
with this is that human beings are threatened, because their access to space is limited. 
Government programs such as those mentioned attempt to give all human beings access to 
space. However, the body of God model stresses that non-beings also need access to land on 
which they can flourish. The South African government has implemented the National 
Biodiversity Strategy and Action Plan (NBSAP), which attempts to conserve biodiversity, use 
South Africa's biodiversity in a sustainable manner and encourage the sharing of resources 
77 This information was retrieved from http://land.pwv.gov.za/land_reform on 11 November 2006. 
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derived from this biodiversity . This plan assesses South Africa's species and the status of the 
ecosystem by identifying threats to the dwelling places of various species. The body of God 
model affirms such an approach. 
The body of God model also addresses the issue of racism. According to A. Nolan there is a 
link between racism and treatment of the natural environment (in Warmback 2005: 188). He 
believes those who understand themselves as superior to other human beings have a tendency 
to misuse all of God's creation. Nolan maintains it is when human beings develop a respectful 
attitude towards nature that they are able to respect one another. The body of God model 
encourages human beings to develop a loving eye towards creation. This sentiment translates 
into a society where respect for diversity is paramount. A loving eye is relevant for South 
Africa, because it opposes racism and promotes love for the natural order. Moreover, the body 
of God model is postmodern by nature and therefore takes cultural and religious diversity 
seriously. This is important for South Africa, which has several religious and cultural systems. 
Sallie McFague's entire theological oeuvre may be summarised in the following quotation 
from her book, Models of God, 
I have suggested that a new sensibility is required, one characterised by the felt awareness 
of our intrinsic interdependence with all that lives, a holistic, evolutionary, ecological 
vision that overcomes ancient and oppressive dualisms and hierarchies, that encourages 
change and novelty, and that promotes an ethic of justice and care, one characterized as 
well by a profound acceptance of human responsibility for the fate of the earth... and 
therefore by the willingness to think differently, to think in metaphors and models that 
support a unified, interdependent understanding of God-world and human-world 
relationships (1987: 27). 
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